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Emerging Pattern of Rabies Deaths and 
Increased Viral Infectivity
Sharon L. Messenger,* Jean S. Smith,* Lillian A. Orciari,* Pamela A. Yager,* and Charles E. Rupprecht*
Most human rabies deaths in the United States can be
attributed to unrecognized exposures to rabies viruses associ-
ated with bats, particularly those associated with two infre-
quently encountered bat species (Lasionycteris  noctivagans
and Pipistrellus subflavus). These human rabies cases tend to
cluster in the southeastern and northwestern United States. In
these regions, most rabies deaths associated with bats in non-
human terrestrial mammals are also associated with virus vari-
ants specific to these two bat species rather than more
common bat species; outside of these regions, more common
bat rabies viruses contribute to most transmissions. The pre-
ponderance of rabies deaths connected with the two uncom-
mon L. noctivagans and P. subflavus bat rabies viruses is best
explained by their evolution of increased viral infectivity.
ites by rabid dogs are the source of 35,000–50,000 human
rabies deaths each year globally (1), yet most human
rabies deaths in the United States are attributed to unrecog-
nized exposures to rabid bats. Particular attention has focused
upon two relatively rare bat species (Lasionycteris noctiva-
gans and Pipistrellus subflavus) because rabies variants asso-
ciated with these species account for approximately 70% of
human cases and 75% of cryptic rabies deaths (2–6). 
Molecular typing (i.e., phylogenetic analysis of DNA data)
has shown that rabies viruses associated with insectivorous
bats (L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants in particular) are
the culprits in what otherwise would have been unsolved cryp-
tic human rabies deaths. However, phylogenetic analyses of
human rabies cases have not provided insights into why an
unexpectedly large proportion of human rabies deaths involve
the uncommon L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants. Pas-
sive surveillance systems used by state public health depart-
ments confirm that human encounters with Eastern Pipistrelle
bats (P. subflavus) and Silver-haired Bats (L. noctivagans) are
rare. Neither species exceeded 5% of all bats submitted for
rabies testing in the southeastern United States, and Silver-
haired Bats account for <12% of all bats submitted in the
Northwest (7). Moreover, the prevalence of rabid individual
bats within each species is also low and similar to the esti-
mated prevalence in other, more common, bat species (8,9).
While these surveillance studies are known to produce biased
estimates of the true prevalence of rabies in natural bat popula-
tions, they should accurately reflect the prevalence of rabies in
bat species encountered by the public. In addition, we have
determined that although other bat species occasionally are
infected with L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants, the fre-
quency of such spillover is low (6,10). A survey of rabid
“house bats” (i.e., Eptesicus fuscus and Myotis lucifugus) in
the United States revealed that only 2 of 117 E. fuscus and 4 of
15 M. lucifugus were infected with L. noctivagans and P. sub-
flavus variants (6). The sample size of M. lucifugus is notably
small because this species is rarely found rabid, despite sub-
missions of thousands of individual bats each year (11). Thus,
all available data suggest that L. noctivagans and P. subflavus
variants are rare.
Given that L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants appear
to be infrequently encountered, two explanations have been
proposed to explain their prevalence among cryptic human
rabies deaths associated with bats. The small vector hypothesis
suggests a failure to recognize that a bite has occurred when a
small bat is involved (7,12). Absence of a bite history may
result from inaccurate documentation when a patient could not
be questioned directly or was not lucid. In 18 of 34 cases with
no bite history, however, documented contact with a poten-
tially rabid animal could have contributed to an unrecognized
bite (i.e., physical contact with bats in 11 cases, bats in resi-
dence in 4 cases, and contact with a known sick domestic ani-
mal in 3 cases). Among these contacts, 11 involved L.
noctivagans and P. subflavus variants. In addition, bites by
smaller bat species, such as Eastern Pipistrelles, may be more
likely to go unnoticed than bites by larger bats, which may
explain why more cases are associated with this species.
Wounds from the teeth of small bat species are not easily seen
without careful examination (13,14), possibly leading to the
impression that a bite has not occurred. 
A second hypothesis was suggested by results from experi-
mental data comparing rabies virus isolates from Silver-haired
Bats with those from domestic dogs and a coyote (15,16).
These data showed that, although both viruses replicated
equally well in neuroblastoma cells, rabies viruses from Sil-
ver-haired Bats replicated to higher titers in fibroblast and epi-
thelial cells, particularly at low temperatures of 34°C. Such
growth characteristics might facilitate successful infection
after a superficial bite. Thus, superficial contact may occur fre-
quently between bats and terrestrial mammals (including
humans), but may be unlikely to result in a productive infec-
tion unless L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants are
involved (the increased infectivity hypothesis). Although these
experimental data suggest that L. noctivagans and P. subflavus
variants have evolved increased infectivity, comparison
between viruses associated with Silver-haired Bats and dogs *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA 
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(including one coyote) is not sufficient to pinpoint whether
increased infectivity evolved in the common ancestor of L.
noctivagans and P. subflavus variants and, thereby, is relevant
to the noted prevalence of these variants among human rabies
deaths. 
We proposed a novel test of the increased infectivity
hypothesis using a comparative phylogenetic approach in
which we characterized transmission patterns from bats to
nonhuman terrestrial mammals. Transmission of bat rabies to
terrestrial mammals can be viewed as a natural experiment that
removes the confounding effects of vector size and, therefore,
can be used as a control in understanding transmission patterns
between bats and humans. That is, such comparisons take
advantage of a fundamental difference between rabies expo-
sures in humans and rabies exposures in other terrestrial mam-
mals (nonhuman terrestrial mammals cannot initiate
postexposure prophylaxis even if they are aware of a bite).
Given that size of the vector species is not a factor in terrestrial
mammal deaths, we can control for the effect of bat vector size
in our comparison. Therefore, a disproportionate number of L.
noctivagans and P. subflavus cases among terrestrial mammals
would be consistent with increased infectivity of the L. nocti-
vagans and P. subflavus variants. If these variants are not over-
represented in terrestrial mammal rabies cases, we can reject
the increased infectivity hypothesis, leaving the small vector
hypothesis as the most plausible alternative.
Methods
Sequence Data
Sequences were obtained from reverse transcriptase poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR)–amplified portions of the
nucleoprotein (positions 1,157–1,477), based on the reference
strain M13215 (17). The taxa include 32 rabies virus samples
obtained between 1958 and 2000 from frozen (n=27) and for-
malin-fixed (n=5) U.S. human brain tissue specimens, 17 of 41
U.S. bat species (n=54), and 98 nonhuman terrestrial mam-
mals (24 cats, 3 dogs, 5 cattle, 9 horses, 1 sheep, 1 llama, 42
foxes [grey, red, and kit], 1 raccoon, 1 ringtail cat, and 11
striped skunks), determined to have been infected by a bat
rabies virus by using monoclonal antibody screening. Reser-
voir species from the eight U.S. terrestrial rabies-endemic
regions (n=24) were included as outgroups. Nucleotide
sequences included in this study will be deposited in GenBank
but are also available as an aligned matrix (batrabies.nex). 
Phylogenetic Analyses
Phylogenetic analyses used PAUP* 4.0b2 (18), employing
the neighbor-joining search algorithm (minimum evolution)
using maximum likelihood to estimate Ti:Tv ratio and nucle-
otide base frequencies (settings correspond to Hasegawa-Kish-
ino-Yano [HKY] 1985 model of nucleotide sequence
evolution). We assessed tree support using the nonparametric
bootstrap method (1,000 replicates). Phylogenetic analyses
presented here included only frozen human brain samples
(n=27). Additional analyses (not shown) that included incom-
plete taxa (formalin-fixed human case samples) did not alter
tree topology but decreased nonparametric bootstrap propor-
tions for nodes including formalin-fixed taxa.
Results and Discussion
Phylogenetic analysis (Figure 1) links 20 of 27 bat-associ-
ated human cases (24/32 cases, including formalin-fixed sam-
ples not shown in Figure 1) with L. noctivagans and P.
subflavus variants. In contrast to the patterns seen in humans
(Figures 1 and 2A), a wide variety of bat rabies variants are
implicated in the terrestrial mammal cases across a broad geo-
graphic area and largely correspond to the most common bat
rabies virus variants in that geographic region (Figures 1 and
2B). Two notable exceptions to this general geographic pattern
occur in the northwestern and the southeastern United States
(Figure 2B). In these two regions, L. noctivagans and P. sub-
flavus variants account for a substantially larger percentage of
transmission events to terrestrial mammals than expected,
given the rarity of the host bat species and L. noctivagans and
P. subflavus variants in those geographic areas (Figure 2C)
(because spillover of these variants to other bat species is rare,
we    used the prevalence of rabid Silver-haired Bats and East-
ern Pipistrelles as a surrogate for the prevalence of L. noctiva-
gans and P. subflavus variants). These two geographic regions
also match very closely the geographic distribution of human
rabies deaths in the United States associated with these vari-
ants (Figure 2A). In the northwest region, delimited by the
human cases associated with Silver-haired Bats (clade 1), the
L. noctivagans rabies virus variant accounted for 57% of bat-
associated cases in terrestrial mammals and 80% of bat-associ-
ated cases in humans, despite the fact that rabies-positive Sil-
ver-haired Bats account for only 5% of all bats submitted for
testing. Similarly, in the southeast region, delimited by human
cases associated with Eastern Pipistrelles (clade 2), where nei-
ther Eastern Pipistrelles nor Silver-haired Bats exceed an aver-
age of 2% of all rabies-positive bats submitted, the P.
subflavus variant accounted for 63% of bat-associated cases in
terrestrial mammals and 89% of bat-associated cases in
humans. The high prevalence of L. noctivagans and P. subfla-
vus variants among terrestrial mammals in the same regions
where human cases have occurred suggests that a similar
mechanism, such as increased infectivity of these rabies virus
variants, is responsible for both epidemiologic patterns.
Our study included 13 terrestrial mammal species, both
domesticated and wild, suggesting that exposure to bat species
likely occurred in a variety of habitats, including more remote
forest habitats. Our data set was comprised mostly of foxes
and cats (two species likely to capture and feed upon bats), but
we had no reason to suspect that their behavior would create a
disproportionate opportunity for infection by L. noctivagans
and P. subflavus variants compared with other bat variants. 
While our data do not invalidate the small vector hypothe-
sis, the terrestrial mammal data show that even when vector
size does not play a role in determining whether bat bites areEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 153
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recognized, L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants are still the
most prevalent rabies virus variants among bat-associated ter-
restrial mammal deaths in the northwestern and southeastern
United States. For human rabies cases, small vector size may
still play a role in the probability of detecting a bat bite, while
the increased infectivity of L. noctivagans and P. subflavus
variants enhances the likelihood of a successful infection fol-
lowing a superficial bite. Additional experimental data (e.g.,
site-directed mutagenesis) will be necessary to show defini-
tively whether L. noctivagans and P. subflavus variants have
evolved genetic changes associated with increased infectivity.
Nonetheless, comparisons of phylogenetic patterns between
independent datasets in which one data set can be used to con-
trol for one or more potentially relevant parameters offers a
valid method of hypothesis testing. Additionally, through phy-
logenetic analyses such as these, we can target those taxa and
genomic regions that warrant further investigation.
Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree of bat-associated rabies
cases. Taxa represent 203 rabies virus variants from 27
human rabies cases (formalin-fixed taxa removed) and 98
terrestrial mammals infected with a bat rabies virus, 54
bat samples representing 17 species, and 24 terrestrial
mammal outgroup taxa. Each circle represents a case
(terrestrial mammal = closed circles, human = open cir-
cles) associated with the monophyletic clade in the phy-
logeny to the left. Numbers at tree nodes indicate
nonparametric bootstrap proportions.RESEARCH
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Figure 2. Geographic distribution of (A) human (including 5 formalin-
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identified by rabies virus variant isolated. Minimum length polygons
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and Eastern Pipistrelles (clade 2) shown in (A) and superimposed in
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lence of variants in bats was estimated from unpublished state public
health department reports that determined the percentage of rabies-
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of bats submitted (7, unpub. data). Prevalence of L. noctivagans and P.
subflavus variants in terrestrial mammals and humans is estimated as
the percentage of all spillover cases in each clade region infected with
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Araçatuba Virus: A Vaccinialike 
Virus Associated with Infection in 
Humans and Cattle 
Giliane de Souza Trindade,* Flávio Guimarães da Fonseca,† João Trindade Marques,*
Maurício Lacerda Nogueira,† Luiz Claudio Nogueira Mendes,‡ Alexandre Secorun Borges,‡§ 
Juliana Regina Peiró,‡ Edviges Maristela Pituco,¶ Cláudio Antônio Bonjardim,* 
Paulo César Peregrino Ferreira,* and Erna Geessien Kroon*
We describe a vaccinialike virus, Araçatuba virus, associ-
ated with a cowpoxlike outbreak in a dairy herd and a related
case of human infection. Diagnosis was based on virus growth
characteristics, electron microscopy, and molecular biology
techniques. Molecular characterization of the virus was done
by using polymerase chain reaction amplification, cloning, and
DNA sequencing of conserved orthopoxvirus genes such as
the vaccinia growth factor (VGF), thymidine kinase (TK), and
hemagglutinin. We used VGF-homologous and TK gene nucle-
otide sequences to construct a phylogenetic tree for compari-
son with other poxviruses. Gene sequences showed 99%
homology with vaccinia virus genes and were clustered
together with the isolated virus in the phylogenetic tree.
Araçatuba virus is very similar to Cantagalo virus, showing the
same signature deletion in the gene. Araçatuba virus could be
a novel vaccinialike virus or could represent the spread of Can-
tagalo virus.
he poxviruses comprise a family of large DNA viruses
capable of infecting vertebrate and invertebrate hosts (1).
Viruses from this family have caused naturally occurring or
introduced infections in all populated continents (2). In Brazil,
as in other parts of South America, little is known about the
occurrence and circulation of poxvirus in the wild (3–6). After
the worldwide elimination of smallpox in the 1970s, a few
reports of poxvirus isolation in South America have been pub-
lished, including scattered reports of parapoxvirus outbreaks in
sheep and goat herds and virus isolation from wild or captive
animals (7,8). The existence of mousepox outbreaks in animal
facilities is also known, but most cases remain unpublished. 
In recent years, however, many cases of unidentified dis-
eases in dairy cattle with similar pathology have been reported
in rural areas of Brazil, and some human infections have been
associated with these illnesses in herds. Such diseases, charac-
terized by the appearance of nodular and pustular lesions on
bovine teats, are frequently related to viral infections such as
bovine herpes mammillitis, pseudocowpox, and cowpox infec-
tions (9–12).
After clinical and initial laboratory analysis, cowpox virus
(CPXV) was considered to be the obvious etiologic agent
causing this human and cattle infection. CPXV (genus Ortho-
poxvirus) is the causative agent of localized and painful vesic-
ular lesions. The virus is believed to persist in wild host
reservoirs (including mammals, birds, and rodents), cattle, zoo
animals, and domestic animals, including cats in parts of
Europe and Asia. Contact of these reservoirs with susceptible
animals and people can trigger the onset of disease (13,14).
When humans are affected, the lesions occur on the hands and
sometimes on the arms, usually followed by axillary adenopa-
thy (15). However, CPXV isolation has not been reported from
cattle or humans in Brazil, which led investigators to consider
the possibility that infections were caused by vaccinia virus
(VACV), since VACV was used as a live smallpox vaccine
throughout the country until the late 1970s.
The occurrence of VACV-infected animals (domestic or
wild species) is believed to be a result of contact with people
recently vaccinated against smallpox. In fact, during mass
smallpox vaccination campaigns, VACV infections were occa-
sionally transmitted from the vesicular lesion on the vaccinee
to domestic animals, usually cattle. In turn, infected animals
transmitted VACV to susceptible people (14,16,17). Such
infections were shown to be reproducible in experimental con-
ditions (18). 
Vaccinialike viruses have been isolated from the wild in
Brazil; at least one of these viruses, the Cantagalo virus, was
specifically obtained from infected cattle and humans after an
outbreak of a cowpoxlike disease (6,14,19). These facts indi-
cate the long-term establishment and active circulation of dif-
ferent vaccinialike viruses in the wild in South America,
similar to the well-documented establishment of buffalopox
virus in India (19,20).
We describe the isolation and characterization of a vaccini-
alike strain linked to a cowpoxlike outbreak affecting a dairy
herd and associated with human infection; a similar outbreak
attributed to Cantagalo virus infection was recently described
(14). The virus reported here, named Araçatuba virus, was
readily identified as a poxvirus by conventional methods,
including characterization of pock morphology on the chorio-
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allantoic membrane of chick embryos and electronic micros-
copy, which allows a quick differentiation between CPXV,
pseudocowpox virus, and herpesvirus. However, such tech-
niques do not differentiate between closely related viruses
such as CPXV and VACV. To obtain accurate phylogenetic
information, we detected poxvirus-conserved genes, such as
thymidine kinase (TK), vaccinia growth factor (VGF), and
hemagglutinin (HA), in the genome of Araçatuba virus using
polymerase chain reaction (PCR). These genes were
sequenced and the data used to generate phylogenetic trees.
We also analyzed the A-type gene (ATI) based on restriction
length polymorphism, which is a phylogenetic tool used to dif-
ferentiate and classify orthopoxviruses (13). Based on these
techniques, Araçatuba virus was shown to be similar to
VACV–Western Reserve (WR) strain, the prototype member
of the poxvirus family and the Orthopoxvirus genus. In addi-
tion, in relation to the HA gene, Araçatuba virus was very sim-
ilar to Cantagalo virus, showing the same signature deletion in
the gene. Such findings specifically point to the ubiquity of
VACV circulating in the wild in Brazil as well as to the public
health problems that may arise from the presence of this virus.
Methods
Case Report
Five adult Girolanda cows from a herd of 40 animals were
sent to the Veterinary Teaching Hospital at Unesp-Araçatuba,
São Paulo State, Brazil; they had painful lesions on their teats,
which interfered with milking. Lesions initially appeared on 2
cows and spread quickly to 35 animals, as well as the milker’s
hands (Figure 1). Starting as a red focal area, the lesions devel-
oped quickly into a wound that healed with difficulty. No such
episode had previously occurred on that farm. The cows had
these symptoms for approximately 8 days before being taken
to the veterinary surgeon. During the clinical examination,
lesions in different stages were recognized; in most of the
cows, nodular ulcerative wounds of 2–6 mm in diameter were
predominant. Lesions were localized only on teats and udder,
and many of them had dark, raw crusts. The teats had
increased local temperature and were sensitive to touch.
Because of the pain, cows avoided their suckling calves. At the
farm, the only manual milker was also affected. The milker
had approximately 10 lesions on both hands and arms, but he
did not initially accept any medical help and did not consent to
examination. Because asepsic measures were not carried out,
contact between the cows’ teats and the milker’s hands during
milking probably enhanced the rapid spread of virus within the
herd. Oral vesicles were not observed on calves’ muzzles or on
buccal mucosae. Sterile samples of the vesicles and crusts
were collected and sent to the Laboratório de Viroses de
Bovídeos, Instituto Biológico, São Paulo for analysis. The ani-
mals were isolated from the herd, and teat lesions were treated
with glycerine and a topical antibiotic, while the milker
received medication at a nearby hospital. Three months after
onset of infection, the remaining lesions on the cows were in
an advanced healing process; however, all affected cows pro-
duced substantially less milk.
Virus Isolation and Electron Microscopy
The material collected was prepared in 20% suspension of
Eagle minimal essential medium (MEM) with 1% antibiotic to
isolate the virus by inoculations in bovine fetal kidney cell
monolayers at the Instituto Biológico, São Paulo. Samples that
showed cytopathic effects were analyzed by transmission elec-
tronic microscopy. Material isolated from bovine fetal kidney
cell monolayers was spread on the chorioallantoic membrane
of embryonated chicken eggs and incubated at 37°C for 72 h
(21).
Cells and Viruses
VACV, WR strain, was obtained from the National Insti-
tute for Medical Research (Mill Hill, London, U.K.) and
CPXV, Brighton strain, was provided by Dr. C. Jungwirth,
Würzburg, Germany. Viruses were propagated in Vero cells
and purified in a sucrose gradient as described (22). Vero cells
were propagated at 37°C in MEM, supplemented with 5%
fetal calf serum. Vero cells were also used for viral titration
(23).
Figure 1. Lesions from suspected Araçatuba virus on hand of dairy farm
worker (milker) (A) and teats of cow (B).Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 157
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Amplification and Cloning of 
Homologous VGF Gene and TK
The primers based on the TK and VGF nucleotide
sequence of VACV–WR were produced as described by Fon-
seca et al. (6). The purified Araçatuba virus genome was used
as a template, and temperatures of 45°C were used for anneal-
ing. Amplified fragments were cloned into the pGEMT vector
(pGEM-T Easy Vector Systems, Promega Corp., Madison,
WI). The portion of the HA coding sequence was amplified by
using primers EACP1 and EACP2 as described by Roop et al.
(24), and the approximately 900-bp fragment was produced
and cloned into the pGEMT vector.
Amplification and Restriction Fragment 
Length Polymorphism (RFLP) of ATI Gene
A PCR-based method for rapid screening and taxonomic
differentiation is currently used to explicate Orthopoxvirus
taxonomy (25,26). The assay uses primers designed from the
ATI gene sequence from CPXV. We performed PCR with the
primer pair ATI-up-1 5´AATACAAGGAGGATCT3´ and ATI-
low-1 5´CTTAACTTTTTCTTTCTC3´. After the amplifica-
tion reactions were carried out, the amplicons were digested
with XbaI at 37°C for 3 h, as described (26).
Nucleotide Sequencing
The PCR-amplified TK, VGF, and HA fragments of
Araçatuba virus, cloned into the pGEMT plasmids, were
sequenced in both orientations by the dideoxy-chain termina-
tion method (27) by using M13 universal primers (fmol DNA
Sequencing System; Promega Corp.) and [a32 P]dCTP for oli-
gonucleotide labeling. Sequences were analyzed by using the
BLASTN and BLASTX programs (28). The DNA sequences
of the Araçatuba virus, TK, and VGF genes were deposited in
GenBank (accession nos. AF 503169 and AF503170). A phy-
logenetic tree was constructed by using the Treecon program
with the Araçatuba virus–TK and Araçatuba virus–VGF
nucleotide sequences (29).
Results
Virus Morphology
After Araçatuba virus was isolated in bovine fetal kidney
cell monolayers, the samples were viewed by transmission
electronic microscopy. Typical brick-shaped poxvirus forms
were observed, measuring about 260 x 360 nm, with a superfi-
cial structure formed by tubules on long irregularly arranged
filaments (data not shown). Samples were also added to
embryonated chicken eggs so pock formations could be visual-
ized on chorioallantoic membranes. White, nonhemorrhagic
pocks were found (data not shown).
PCR of Conserved Genes in Orthopoxvirus 
Genus and Nucleotide Sequence Analysis
PCR amplification of TK, VGF, and HA genes generated
528-, 381-, and 960-bp fragments, respectively. Amplicons
were cloned into pGEMT vector and sequenced in both orien-
tations. When compared to nucleotide sequences available in
the GenBank databases using the BLASTN program, the TK
and VGF genes from Araçatuba virus were highly similar to
homologous genes of VACV–WR. Optimal alignment showed
similarity rates of up to 99.5% between Araçatuba virus and
VACV–WR genes and minimal differences from nucleic acid
substitutions. The coding region of HA gene was analyzed by
alignment with similar sequences of VACV–WR and Canta-
galo virus deposited in GenBank (accession nos. AF229247
and AF482758.1). The Araçatuba virus HA nucleotide
sequence contained a signature deletion identical to a deletion
detected in the sequence of Cantagalo virus (Figure 2A). This
feature, absent in the sequence of most VACV strains, was
used to correlate Araçatuba virus with VACV strain Istituto
Ozwaldo Cruz (IOC), which was used as vaccine in some
regions of Brazil during the smallpox eradication campaign
(14). Using the nucleotide sequences from Araçatuba virus and
other poxviruses, we constructed evolutionary trees with the
Treecon program and placed Araçatuba virus isolate in the
same cluster as other VACV strains (Figure 2B and 2C). 
Analysis of the ATI Gene Amplicom
Although the formation of typical A-type inclusions is
restricted to cells infected with cowpox virus, ectromelia virus,
and raccoonpox virus (2), the sequence coding the N-terminus
of the protein is highly conserved in many viruses, including
CPXV, VACV, variola virus, camelpox virus, and ectromelia
virus. These conserved sequences flank variable regions con-
taining different size deletions, which may generate different
size fragments after PCR amplification. The specificity of this
assay is enhanced by the use of restriction enzymes, XbaI or
BglII, allowing the detection of mutations at the restriction
sites for these enzymes. We amplified the ATI gene from
Araçatuba virus, VACV–WR, and CPXV for comparison. As
described, the VACV–WR ATI amplicon generated 3 frag-
ments after digestion with XbaI (26) (Figure 3). The larger
fragment has approximately 900 bp, and the shorter fragments
migrate closely, between the 300-bp and 400-bp markers. The
profile obtained after digestion of Araçatuba virus ATI ampli-
con was similar to that of VACV–WR (Figure 3). The main
difference, however, is that the larger fragment generated after
XbaI digestion of the Araçatuba virus ATI amplicon is smaller
than the VACV–WR fragments. These differences in size are
also detected when nondigested ATI amplicons from
Araçatuba virus and VACV are compared. Nevertheless, the
pattern obtained for Araçatuba virus is completely different
from the CPXV ATI pattern (Figure 3).
Discussion
In Brazil, few studies have been conducted on the exist-
ence and circulation of poxviruses in the wild. In recent years,
however, a growing number of poxvirus isolates have been
obtained from samples from wild and domestic animals as
well as humans; some of these viruses have caused cowpox-RESEARCH
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like diseases in both animals and humans (6,14,19). All of
these reports have shown that such viruses were related to
VACV, which raises the question of whether populations of
VACV are actively and widely circulating in the country
among wild or domestic animal hosts. If so, such an event is
similar to the history of the buffalopox virus in India and
Southeast Asia. Until recently, that virus was considered an
exclusive case of VACV being able to adapt to long-term sur-
vival in nature (20).
In this context, we isolated a novel virus, Araçatuba virus,
from one of these cases of cowpoxlike diseases. The infection
affected a herd of milking cows as well as their milker, in a
rural area of the state of São Paulo, Brazil. Overall, our results
suggest that the isolated virus is a VACV variant. Sequencing
of conserved and nonconserved genes from poxviruses, such
as TK, VGF, and HA, respectively, has been used for the clas-
sification of unknown poxvirus isolates (6,14,19). In the case
of Araçatuba virus, phylogenetic trees designed from the
nucleotide sequences of these genes indicate clearly that the
virus belongs to the VACV subgroup like other orthopoxvi-
ruses isolated in Brazil during the 1960s and 1970s, the BeAn
58058 and Cotia viruses (6,19,30). This proposition is
strengthened by RFLP analysis of the Araçatuba virus ATI
homologous gene. This strategy has also been widely used for
poxvirus taxonomy studies (25,26). Although the Araçatuba
virus ATI pattern is not identical to the VACV–WR pattern, the
virus fits on the VACV subgroup, and the pattern differs decid-
edly from the CPXV ATI pattern. Such differentiation is
important because CPXV was the most obvious candidate to
be the agent of such diseases. The Cantagalo virus ATI gene
was characterized only at protein level and showed the same
pattern of bands as the VACV strains (14).
For now, the discussion about the probable origin of
Araçatuba virus, as well as other VACV isolated from animals
and people in the country, is purely speculative. Araçatuba
virus could be another vaccinialike strain or could represent
the spread of Cantagalo virus. A logical assumption is to asso-
ciate these viruses with variola vaccine stocks that may have
escaped to the wild when the vaccination program was taking
place in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, identifying the
origin of those isolated VACV is difficult since many different
samples, such as VACV-Lister, VACV-WR (Brazilian Health
Ministry, pers. comm.), VACV-IOC (14), and even mixtures of
different samples were used during the smallpox elimination
campaign in Brazil. Researchers have proposed that at least
one of the isolates, the Cantagalo virus, may have been derived
from VACV-IOC (14). However, this finding is based on the
Figure 2. (A) Nucleotide sequence of the Araçatuba virus hemaggluti-
nin (HA) and comparison with same sequences from Cantagalo virus
and vaccinia virus–Western Reserve (WR). Box indicates deletion
region conserved in the sequences of both Araçatuba and Cantagalo
viruses, but not in vaccinia virus, Western Reserve (WR). Star (*) indi-
cates regions conserved in all three viruses. (B) Phylogenetic tree con-
structed based on the nucleotide sequence of poxvirus thymidine
kinase genes. Nucleotide sequences were obtained from GenBank
(accession nos. X01978, M35027, M57768, AF163843, AF163844,
EVY18384, U94848, K02025, S51129, L22579, S55844, X52655, and
M14493). (C) Phylogenetic tree constructed based on the nucleotide
sequence of poxvirus vaccinia growth factor genes. Nucleotide
sequences were obtained from GenBank (accession nos. U18340,
L22579, U18337, U18338, X69198, M35027, J02421, S61049,
CVU76380, AF170722, and M15921). The Treecon program (29) was
used to construct trees. Bootstrap confidence intervals are shown on
branches (100 sample iterations).
Figure 3. Detection and restriction fragment length polymorphism taxo-
nomic analysis of the Araçatuba virus ATI gene. Primers based on the
ATI gene nucleotide sequence from the cowpox virus were used to
amplify the gene. (A) The amplified fragments were resolved on 0.6%
agarose gel with ethidium bromide. Line 1 shows Araçatuba virus; line 2
shows vaccinia virus; and line 3 shows cowpox virus, Brighton strain.
(B) Products obtained after amplification were digested with XbaI
restriction enzyme. Fragments were resolved on 1.5% agarose gel
stained with ethidium bromide. Arrowheads indicate molecular sizes
(line 1, Araçatuba virus; line 2, vaccinia virus; line 3, cowpox virus
(Brighton strain).Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 159
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nucleotide sequence of a single gene, and this issue is still a
subject of some debate. Nevertheless, the Araçatuba virus HA
nucleotide sequence revealed an interesting similarity with
that of the same gene from Cantagalo virus, particularly at a
signature sequence used to trace back the possible origin of
this virus. Also of note, the Cantagalo virus was isolated in the
city of Cantagalo (Rio de Janeiro state), about 850 km east of
Araçatuba city. Moreover, a similar genetic feature of the HA
gene was also detected in yet another cowpoxlike virus iso-
lated from persons in the city of Muriaé (state of Minas
Gerais), 800 km north of Araçatuba (data not published).
From the northern border at the Amazon region to the
countryside of southeastern Brazil, an alarming number of
genetically related vaccinialike viruses have been isolated
from infected animals and humans. This fact clearly points to
the existence and wide circulation of established, active VACV
isolates in the vast wild and rural areas of Brazil. Whether the
number of VACV infections has recently increased or whether
only now they are being reported is difficult to determine.
Nevertheless, the isolation of Araçatuba virus, together with
other recently isolated viruses, was sufficient to trigger an alert
by the Public Health Bureau in at least one of São Paulo’s
neighboring states (Minas Gerais). How these viruses man-
aged to persist in nature so long after the end of smallpox vac-
cination is a matter of speculation, but we think that they
established circulation in some unknown wild hosts and were
eventually transmitted to cattle and humans when they came in
contact with populations of wild animals because of agricul-
tural expansion.
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Equine Amplification and Virulence of 
Subtype IE Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalitis Viruses Isolated during 
the 1993 and 1996 Mexican Epizootics
Dante Gonzalez-Salazar,* José G. Estrada-Franco,† Anne-Sophie Carrara,† 
Judith F. Aronson,† and Scott C. Weaver†
To assess the role of horses as amplification hosts during
the 1993 and 1996 Mexican Venezuelan equine encephalitis
(VEE) epizootics, we subcutaneously infected 10 horses by
using four different equine isolates. Most horses showed little
or no disease and low or nonexistent viremia. Neurologic dis-
ease developed in only 1 horse, and brain histopathologic
examination showed meningeal lymphocytic infiltration,
perivascular cuffing, and focal encephalitis. Three animals
showed mild meningoencephalitis without clinical disease. Viral
RNA was detected in the brain of several animals 12-14 days
after infection. These data suggest that the duration and scope
of the recent Mexican epizootics were limited by lack of equine
amplification characteristic of previous, more extensive VEE
outbreaks. The Mexican epizootics may have resulted from the
circulation of a more equine-neurotropic, subtype IE virus strain
or from increased transmission to horses due to amplification
by other vertebrate hosts or transmission by more competent
mosquito vectors.
enezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV; Togaviridae:
Alphavirus) is an emerging pathogen of humans and
equines in many parts of the New World (1–3). Sporadic out-
breaks date to the 1930s or earlier in South America and have
affected hundreds of thousands of people, horses, donkeys,
and mules, causing high mortality rates in equines and severe
illness in humans. Most outbreaks have been confined to
northern South America, but one that began in Guatemala and
El Salvador in 1969 spread northward through Mexico and
reached Texas in 1971 (2,4,5). The etiologic agents during all
of the major VEE outbreaks were subtype IAB or IC VEEV.
Other subtypes of VEEV, including subtype IE strains that cir-
culate in sylvatic and swamp habitats of Central America and
Mexico, are traditionally considered enzootic, equine-aviru-
lent, and incapable of exploiting horses as amplification hosts
to cause widespread disease (6–9). 
Before 1993, the only VEE outbreak confirmed by virus
isolation in Mexico was the 1969–1971 epizootic/epidemic
(5). The etiologic agent was a subtype IAB VEEV strain that
likely originated from an inadequately inactivated equine vac-
cine preparation (10,11). Another VEE outbreak in Tamauli-
pas, Mexico, was detected serologically in 1965–1966, but no
virus strains were isolated (12,13). 
During 1993 and 1996, small outbreaks of equine encepha-
litis occurred near the Pacific Coast in the Mexican States of
Chiapas and Oaxaca, respectively. These outbreaks involved
125 and 32 equine cases, respectively, with case-fatality rates
of 50% and 38%; human VEE was not confirmed, although
human seroprevalence in the region is high (J.G.E.-F., S.C.W.,
unpub. data). Antigenic, sequencing and phylogenetic studies
indicated that the VEEV strains isolated from horses belong to
subtype IE and are closely related to enzootic strains isolated
nearby in sylvatic habitats on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala
from 1968–1980 (14–16). These Mexican outbreaks repre-
sented the first confirmed equine cases attributed to VEEV
subtype IE infection. Although the 1966 Tamaulipas epizootic
may have been caused by subtype IE viruses that circulate
nearby on the Gulf Coast of Mexico (12), the IE subtype was
not known to be equine virulent (8) and had never been shown
to be capable of equine amplification or of producing equine
epizootics. The 1993 and 1996 Mexican epizootics placed
these assumptions into doubt.
Partial sequence analysis of the PE2 envelope glycoprotein
precursor gene of four isolates made during the 1993 and 1996
Mexican outbreaks showed that they are strongly linked to
enzootic subtype IE VEEV isolates made in 1968 and 1980
along the Guatemalan Pacific Coast (14,15). Complete struc-
tural gene nucleotide sequence comparison of a Guatemalan
1968 isolate with a 1993 Mexican isolate showed that they dif-
fer by only 3% at the nucleotide level (14), and more recent
genomic sequencing of four strains has shown an overall
nucleotide sequence divergence of <2%. Only eight amino
acid changes are predicted to have accompanied the emer-
gence of the epizootic strains (16). This genetic similarity sug-
gests that small numbers of mutations in enzootic progenitors
may have resulted in acquisition of the equine-virulent pheno-
type, as indicated by previous studies of subtype IC VEEV
emergence in Venezuela (17).
To determine the virulence and viremia characteristics of
VEEV strains isolated during these Mexican outbreaks, and to
assess retrospectively the role of equines as amplification
hosts during epizootic transmission, we conducted experimen-
tal infections of horses with four different Mexican strains iso-
*Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agricolas y Pecuar-
ias, Mexico City, Mexico; and †University of Texas Medical Branch,
Galveston, Texas, USA
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lated from horses in 1993 and 1996. Although severe clinical
neurologic disease occurred in one animal, low levels of  vire-
mia or none was detected after subcutaneous inoculation  of
any of the horses, which suggests that equines were not the
principal amplification hosts in Mexico during the 1993 and
1996 epizootics.
Methods
Virus Preparation
The VEEV strains used for experimental infections are
described in Table 1. These viruses (without further passage)
were diluted in Eagle minimal essential medium (MEM) con-
taining antibiotics and 10% antibody-negative normal horse
serum before being used. 
Horse Infections
Ten antibody-negative horses were identified, ranging in
estimated age from 24 to 36 months. Only horses with no evi-
dence of preexisting alphavirus immunity were used in this
study of  experimental infections. One week before the VEEV
inoculations, all horses were treated with insecticide to elimi-
nate external parasites, and their temperature and blood counts
were recorded 3 days before the viral inoculations. The horses
were selected at random for inclusion in two experimental
groups of six and four animals, respectively.
Horses were inoculated with four different Mexican sub-
type IE VEE epizootic isolates (Table 1). Two strains were
obtained from the 1993 Chiapas outbreak and two others from
the 1996 Oaxaca outbreak. The first set of six horses was inoc-
ulated (three each) with strain CPA201, isolated from the brain
of an encephalitic horse during the 1993 Chiapas outbreak,
and strain OAX 131, isolated from the brain of a diseased
horse from the 1996 Oaxaca outbreak. The last group of four
horses (two each) was inoculated with OAX 142, isolated
from the brain of a moribund horse from Oaxaca in 1996, and
the I-290-93 strain, from the serum of a diseased horse from
the 1993 Chiapas outbreak.
All horses were infected by subcutaneous inoculation in
the shoulder region of 0.6–1.0 mL of MEM containing 10%
antibody-negative normal horse serum and 2,000 Vero cell
PFU of VEEV, a dose comparable to that inoculated by
alphavirus-infected mosquitoes (18). Although infection by
the bite of an infected mosquito may potentiate viremia lev-
els generated by some bunyaviruses (19,20), we used needle
inoculation for two reasons: 1) almost all past experimental
equine infections with other epizootic VEEV have been con-
ducted with needle infections, and we wanted to generate
data that could be compared directly to the literature;  and 2)
lack of a high containment insectary near the large animal
biocontainment facility precluded the use of infected mos-
quitoes.
Each pair or trio of horses inoculated with a given virus
strain was housed together in an isolation room within a large
animal biocontainment building. Each horse was placed in a
single stall and fed daily with fresh hay and water, and the
horse’s clinical signs were monitored at least twice daily. Rec-
tal temperature was recorded twice daily until day 14 postinoc-
ulation, beginning on the day before inoculation. Blood was
collected twice daily by venipuncture until day 9 and serum
samples were stored at -70°C for virus titration. Additional
blood was also collected into EDTA-containing tubes every
morning for up to 9 days, beginning the day before inocula-
tion, and analyzed for hematocrit, hemoglobin determination,
and platelet and leukocyte counts (also counts of basophils,
eosinophils, and monocytes).
The maintenance and care of animals complied with the
guidelines of the Centro Nacional de Investigaciones en
Microbiologia, Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones
Forestales, Agricolas y Pecuarias.
Histopathologic Studies
All of the horses, except one (no. 4) that died on day 12,
were killed 15 days after inoculation. Necropsies were carried
out to extract tissues of interest. For histopathologic studies,
samples were taken of white and gray matter from the anterior,
median, and posterior brain. The medula oblongata and a por-
tion of the spinal chord were taken at random. Tissue samples
<5 mm in thickness were fixed in 10% neutral buffered forma-
lin and processed by routine methods for paraffin embedding.
Sections were stained with hematoxylin and eosin.
Virus and Viral RNA Assays
Serum viremia levels were assayed by the inoculation of
serial dilutions onto monolayers of Vero cells to assess plaque
formation. Serial dilutions were also injected intracerebrally
into 1- to 2-day-old mice, and titers were calculated as 50%
lethal dose (LD50) values. Attempts to isolate VEEV from
brain samples included the inoculation of Vero cell monolay-
ers and inoculation of 1- to 2-day-old mice. 
Table 1. Mexican equine isolates of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus used for experimental infections
Strain Date of isolation Place of isolation Tissue Passage historya
OAX131 25 June 1996 Chahuites, Oaxaca State Cerebrum sm1, RK1
CPA201 29 June 1993 Rancho El Recuerdo, Mapastepec, 
Chiapas State; 15°, 25′  N 93° 01′  W 
Brain sm1, RK1
OAX142 5 July 1996 Tapanatepec, Oaxaca State Cerebrum sm1, RK1
I-290-93 12 July 1993 Rancho La Guadalupe, Mapastepec, 
Chiapas State 15°, 25′  N 93° 00′  W
Serum sm1, RK1
aRK, rabbit kidney, sm;suckling mouse.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 163
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Reverse transcription–polymerase chain reactions (RT-
PCR) were also carried out on RNA extracted from paraffin-
embedded brain tissue from horses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 (insuffi-
cient brain tissue was left after histologic analyses on the
remaining horses) to detect VEEV RNA. RNA was extracted
from tissues by using the QIAGEN (Valencia, CA) RNeasy kit
according to the manufacturer’s protocol. Approximately 20
mg of each sample was placed in a microfuge tube with 1,200
µL of 100% xylene and vortexed to dissolve the paraffin. The
tissue was washed twice with an equal volume of 100% etha-
nol, then dried and resuspended in 350 µL of the QIAGEN
RTL buffer before being ground with a pestle and 0.5 mm zir-
conia/silica beads (BioSpec Products, Bartlesville, OK). The
RNA was eluted in 30 µL of Rnase-free water and 3 µL of
RNasin (Promega, Madison, WI) and used for RT-PCR.
RT-PCR was performed with the OneStep RT-PCR kit
(QIAGEN). The primers were designed to amplify genome
positions 8505–8882, yielding an expected 377-bp product:
sense primer: 5′ -CATAGACAATCCTGGTTACGACGAG-3′ ,
reverse primer: 5′ -CACCTGGCAAGCAGAAAGTATCC-3′ .
The 50-µL reaction mix was comprised of QIAGEN OneStep
RT-PCR buffer, 400 µM of each dNTP, 600 nM of each primer,
and 10 µL of RNA sample. The samples, along with negative
control (water alone) and positive control (viral RNA) samples,
were placed in a thermocycler for: 30 min at 50°C, 15 min at
95°C, followed by 40 cycles at 94°C for 1 min, 56°C for 1 min,
72°C for 1 min, and a final extension of 10 min at 72°C. A sem-
inested reaction followed with the same sense primer and a
nested reverse primer 5′ -GCACACCTGATGCACCTG-3′  to
amplify genome positions 8505–8642, for an expected 137-bp
product. For the seminested PCR, all initial PCR samples,
including the controls, were diluted 1/50. The seminested PCR
was performed by using Taq polymerase (Promega) for  30
cycles at 95°C for 30 sec, 56°C for 30 sec, 72°C for 2 min, and a
final 72°C extension for 10 min. 
PCR samples were analyzed on a 1% agarose gel, and visi-
ble DNA products were purified by using a QIAquick PCR
purification kit (QIAGEN) and sequenced by using the sense
primer and the ABI PRISM Big Dye Terminator v3.0 kit
(Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA). Results were com-
pared to the genomic viral sequences for the Mexican viruses
used (GenBank Accession nos. AF448536, AF448537, and
AF448538).
Serologic Tests
Before the virus inoculation, serum samples from all
horses were tested for preexisting antibodies to VEE, eastern
(EEE), and western equine encephalitis (WEE) viruses by
using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) with
cell lysates prepared from BHK-21 cells infected with VEEV
strain Trinidad donkey (21,22), EEE virus strain 82V2137
(23), and WEE virus strain Fleming (24). After the horses
were injected, seroconversion was detected by using Vero cell
plaque reduction (>80%) neutralization tests (PRNT) with the
CPA201 strain.
Results
Clinical Signs and Symptoms
All animals became infected by VEEV as indicated by
seroconversion detected by PRNT (titers >1:40) on day 12 or
15 after inoculation. Symptoms of VEEV infection were
absent in the infected horses, and only clinical signs were
observed. In 9 of the 10 horses, the only clinical sign consis-
tent with VEE was intermittent fever. Horses nos.1–5 and 10
showed a moderate temperature elevation of approximately
1°–2°C, whereas horses 6–8 and 9 showed only a small eleva-
tion of approximately 0.5°–1.0°C.  Horse 6 did not display any
febrile response, only normal variation in its temperature
(Table 2). All animals had normal temperatures when they
were killed on day 12 or 15. When it occurred, fever peaked 2–
7 days after inoculation (Figure 1). Most horses displayed a
slight anorexia, but none completely ceased eating during the
study, except for horse no. 4 (described below). Diminished
Table 2. Outcome for horses experimentally infected with Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus strains
Horse no. Gender Virus strain
Maximum 
temperature (°C)
Maximum 
viremia levela Clinical outcome Histopathologic findings
1 Male OAX131 40.3 2.8 No disease Perivascular cuffing, minimal encephalitis
2 Male OAX131 40.2 1.4 No disease Perivascular cuffing, minimal encephalitis
3 Male OAX131 39.1 1.4 No disease Perivascular cuffing, minimal encephalitis
4 Male CPA201 40.8 2.4 Fatal encephalitis Perivascular cuffing, lymphocytic 
meningitis, focal encephalitis
5 Male CPA201 38.4 1.4 No disease Normal
6 Female CPA201 37.7 <0.6 No disease Normal
7 Male OAX142 38.2 <0.6 No disease Normal
8 Female OAX142 38.9 <0.6 No disease Normal
9 Male I-290–93 38.6 <0.6 No disease Normal
10 Male I-290–93 39.8 <0.6 No disease Normal
aTiters expressed as log10 suckling mouse intracerebral lethal dose50/mL serum.RESEARCH
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eating tended to coincide with fever, and appetence coincided
with a return to normal temperature.
Platelet counts increased slightly after day 5 in horses
infected with strain CPA201 (Figure 2). A modest leukopenia
occurred from day 2 to day 6 in two of three animals infected
with strain CPA201. Horse no. 4, infected with strain CPA201,
developed severe neurologic disease and showed the greatest
reduction in leukocyte counts (Figure 3). A slight leukocytosis
was seen in animals infected with OAX131 from day 3 to day
5. Otherwise, most animals showed little evidence of changes
in leukocyte counts. Hematocrit values did not drop (data not
shown) as in most previous studies of equines infected with
epizootic VEEV (6,9). Strains I-290–93 and OAX142 produced
no apparent reduction in platelet counts (data not shown).
Horse no. 4 was the only animal that exhibited clinical
signs of encephalitis. On day 6 postinoculation, this male
appeared weak, and on day 8 it exhibited nervousness, anor-
exia, pendular head movements, marked incoordination of the
extremities, penile relaxation, teeth grinding, muscular trem-
ors, restlessness, dyspnea, head shaking, excessive sweating,
movement of the ears in all directions, circular walking, and
blindness. On day 9 this animal was more tranquil, with less
sweating. It assumed an abnormal posture with its head resting
on the wall, and blindness was evident because the horse
began walking into various objects. On day 10, horse no. 4
showed incoordination, nervous ticks of the head, and com-
plete blindness. By day 11 a weight loss was evident; on day
12 the horse was prostrate and was therefore killed.
Viremia Levels
Of 10 horses infected with VEEV strains from the two
Mexican epizootics, none showed detectable viremia levels
when serum specimens were assayed for plaques on Vero
cells. When inoculation of newborn mice with serial dilutions
was used, two of three horses infected with strain CPA201 and
three horses infected with strain OAX131 demonstrated vire-
mia with low titers on days 1–3 and 2–4, respectively (Figure
4). The other two VEEV strains (I-290–93 and OAX142) did
not produce detectable viremia levels.
Virus Isolation and Viral RNA Detection
Virus could not be isolated from brain tissues of any of the
horses by inoculation of either Vero cells or baby mice. This
was not unexpected because the animals were killed 12–15
days after infection, when the virus was presumably cleared by
the immune response (neutralizing antibodies detected in all
animals). Of the brain samples from horses 1–4 and 10 which
were available for viral RNA detection by RT-PCR, all were
positive (Figure 5). Sequences of the PCR amplicons were all
identical to the parent strains, except for horse no. 4 infected
with strain CPA201, which had a thymine to cytosine synony-
mous transition at nucleotide position 8562. Strain I-290–93
used to infect horse 10 had not been sequenced previously, but
the sequence of the amplicon derived from horse 10 was iden-
tical to that of strain OAX131.
Necropsy and Histopathologic Findings
Gross pathologic lesions attributable to VEEV infection
were not observed upon necropsy in any of the horses. Sec-
Figure 1. Mean rectal temperatures of equines infected with four differ-
ent Mexican strains of subtype IE Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus.
Bars indicate standard deviations; shaded box indicates approximate
normal values.
Figure 2. Mean platelet counts in horses infected with virus strains
CPA201 and OAX131. Bars indicate standard deviations; shaded box
indicates approximate normal values. Normal temperature ranges from
The Merck Veterinary Manual, SE Ariello and A. Mays (eds.), 1998,
Merck & Company, Inc., Whitehouse Station, New Jersey.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 165
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tions of brain from all 10 horses were examined. The fatally
infected horse,  no. 4, showed multifocal perivascular cuffing,
lymphocytic meningitis, and focal encephalitis, characterized
by focal neuronal necrosis and neuronophagia with associated
microglial nodules (Figure 6B). Lesions were seen in gray and
white matter of the cerebrum and cerebellum, but were not
present in available sections of hippocampus or spinal cord.
Samples of skeletal muscle and kidney from horse no. 10
showed no pathologic changes. Lymphoid tissue was not
examined for any of the animals. All three horses infected with
isolate OAX131 also showed evidence of meningitis with
perivascular cuffing, and minimal encephalitis (Figure 6A).
Animal no. 2 displayed more intense lesions, with numerous
admixed eosinophils within leptomeningeal and perivascular
infiltrates (Figures 6C and 6D).
Discussion
Equine Amplification and VEE Emergence
Previously described experimental infections of equines
with epizootic subtype IAB and IC VEEV generally resulted
in high rates of overt disease with high-titered viremia levels,
often reaching 105-8 suckling mouse intracerebral lethal dose
50% units (SMICLD50/mL serum) (4,6,7,9,25–28). This high-
titered viremia, combined with the attractiveness of equines to
many potential mosquito vectors and poor anti-mosquito
defensive behavior, results in their high efficiency as amplifi-
cation hosts for epizootic virus transmission. Equine case-
fatality rates in these previous studies were generally approxi-
mately 50%, similar to those measured during natural epizoot-
ics. In contrast, enzootic VEEV belonging to subtypes ID
(6,9), IE (8,9), II (Everglades virus) (25), III (Mucambo virus),
and IV (Pixuna virus) (29) generally produces little or no clin-
ical illness and viremia less than 105 SMICLD50/mL serum
after experimental equine infection. These enzootic viruses,
including a subtype IE virus strain isolated near Veracruz near
the Gulf Coast of Mexico, also have not generally been associ-
ated with equine disease in nature (3,8). 
During 1969–1971, a VEE epizootic involving a subtype
IAB strain spread northward from Guatemala along the Pacific
Coast of Chiapas and Oaxaca States and then crossed into Ver-
acruz State on the Gulf Coast before moving north to Texas
(5). The reasons why the 1993 and 1996 Mexican outbreaks
did not spread northward along the same route are unknown,
but our studies suggest that the recent Mexican outbreaks were
fundamentally different than those caused by subtype IAB and
IC VEEV. The maximum viremia levels we measured in
experimentally infected horses were approximately 1,000-fold
lower than titers measured in previous studies using subtype
IAB and IC VEEV strains from more extensive outbreaks
(4,6,7,9,25–28,30). The titers we measured with the Mexican
equine strains were also much lower than the infection thresh-
olds for mosquitoes, as predicted by most experimental infec-
tions with VEEV (31–34). This finding indicates that equines
probably did not serve as amplification hosts to support epi-
zootic transmission cycles in Mexico during 1993 and 1996.
This lack of equine amplification, which is believed to be a
critical factor in VEE spread, probably limited the duration
and scope of the 1993 and 1996 Mexican epizootics. The low-
titered viremia level, even in the horse in which fatal encepha-
litis developed, also indicates that the Mexican subtype IE epi-
zootic viruses may be more neurotropic than other VEEV
strains that apparently reach the central nervous system only
after exceeding higher viremia titer thresholds (4,6,9). 
Other possible explanations for sudden appearance of
equine disease during the 1993 and 1996 outbreaks include
increased transmission to horses by efficient amplification in
other vertebrate hosts, or enhanced transmission by adaptation
of local VEEV strains to equiphilic mosquito vectors.
Although robust vector surveillance was not conducted during
the 1993 and 1996 Mexican epizootics, rainfall patterns and
Figure 3. Mean leukocyte counts in horses infected with virus strains
CPA201 and OAX131. Bars indicate standard deviations. Data for
horse no. 4, in whom severe neurologic disease developed after infec-
tion with strain CPA201, are shown individually. Bars indicate standard
deviations; shaded box indicates approximate normal values. Normal
temperature ranges from The Merck Veterinary Manual, SE Ariello and
A. Mays (eds.), 1998, Merck & Company, Inc., Whitehouse Station,
New Jersey.
Figure 4. Mean viremia titers in horses infected with four different Mexi-
can strains of subtype IE Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus. A log10
titer of 0.6 suckling mouse intracerebral lethal dose50 represents the
maximum sensitivity of the assay. Bars indicate standard deviations.RESEARCH
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anecdotal reports do not indicate unusually large mosquito
populations. Vector incrimination and susceptibility testing are
needed to assess the hypothesis that the Mexican epizootic
strains are more infectious for mosquitoes and more readily
transmitted than putative enzootic IE progenitors identified in
phylogenetic studies (15,16).
Equine Virulence of the Mexican VEEV Strains
In some respects, our results agreed with those of previous
experimental studies of VEEV in equines. Infection with the
Mexican VEEV strains resulted in mild leukopenia as has been
reported (9). However, the mild hematologic abnormalities
were more like those caused by enzootic VEEV strains than
epizootic, subtype IAB and IC variants (9). In contrast to many
VEE outbreaks attributed to subtype IAB and IC strains (3),
the four Mexican epizootic virus strains we tested in horses
produced an overall mortality rate of 10% but a case-fatality
rate of 100%. These results also contrast with the reported
case-fatality rates during the 1993 and 1996 Mexican out-
breaks of 50% and 37%, respectively, and with the 1993 attack
rate of 30% (14). The case-fatality rate differences probably
reflect sampling error because our experimental infections
produced disease in only one horse. Possible explanations for
the discrepancy in apparent:inapparent ratios in our study ver-
sus data collected during the outbreaks include an underreport-
ing of true inapparent infections during the 1993 epizootic, or
phenotypic differences between the virus populations we inoc-
ulated into horses versus those circulating naturally during the
epizootics. The latter possibility is discussed below.
Detection of VEEV RNA in the brain of five horses killed
12–14 days after infection, despite the absence of detectable
infectious virus, was somewhat surprising. This result indi-
cates that VEEV replicated in the brain of all horses, consis-
tent with some pathologic lesions in the asymptomatic animals
infected with strain OAX131 (Table 1). Persistence of viral
RNA in the brain after the disappearance of infectious virus
has also been reported for other alphaviruses (35).
Previous sequencing, rodent infection, and in vitro studies
with these Mexican VEEV strains suggested that mixed popu-
lations of viruses may circulate in nature, represented by dif-
ferences in amino acid composition and charge on the surface
of the E2 envelope spike glycoprotein (16). Genomic sequenc-
ing studies of the four Mexican VEEV strains we studied
revealed one amino acid difference: strain OAX142 has a Glu
residue at position 117 of the E2 envelope glycoprotein,
whereas the other three strains have Lys (16). The possibility
that the Lys residue does not represent the wild-type sequence
was considered previously because alphaviruses including
VEEV are known to accumulate artifactual, positive charge
amino acid changes in the E2 protein as the result of selection
for binding to heparan sulfate on the surface of cells in culture
(36). Because these changes reduce the virulence of alphavi-
ruses in laboratory rodents, they can place into question the
wild-type phenotype of VEEV strains.
However, our results further support the previous conclu-
sion that the E2-117 Lys residue was present in natural VEEV
isolates during the Mexican outbreaks as the consensus amino
acid, but possibly in a mixed quasispecies population (16). The
only strain that produced neurologic disease in our study was
CPA201, which has a consensus Lys at E2-117. Strain
OAX142, which has Glu-117, produced no detectable disease,
viremia, or hematologic alterations. These results are not con-
sistent with the hypothesis that the Lys at E2-117 resulted from
heparan sulfate adaptation during RK cell passage, which
would be expected to result in artificial attenuation (36).
Figure 5. Results on 1.5% agarose gel of reverse tranferase–poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) products stained with ethidium bro-
mide and imaged under UV light. M: 100-bp marker; H1–4, H10:
horses 1–4 and 10; (+): positive control viral RNA, 1.8 x 102 PFU
amplified; (N-): negative control for nested PCR (-); negative control
from single round RT-PCR. All horse samples and the positive control
show a band at the expected size (134 bp), and negative controls
show only the primers (below 100 bp).
Figure 6. Representative histopathologic changes of brains of infected
equines. A. Cerebrum, horse no. 3 (strain OAX131), showing perivas-
cular cuff of lymphocytes (original magnification x200, hematoxylin and
eosin [H&E] stain). B. Cerebrum, horse no. 4 (strain CPA201), showing
perivascular cuff of lymphocytes (original magnification x200, H&E
stain). C. Cerebral gray matter, horse no. 2 (strain OAX131), showing
infiltration of mononuclear cells into brain parenchyma (original magnifi-
cation x200, H&E stain), D. cerebral gray matter, horse no. 2, showing
numerous eosinophils within perivascular infiltrate (arrow) (original
magnification x200, H&E stain).Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 167
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Because the Lys-117 mutation produces the small plaque phe-
notype characteristic of most epizootic, equine-virulent VEEV
strains, it remains a potential virulence determinant worthy of
further characterization by using cDNA clones and reverse
genetics.
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Elimination of Epidemic Methicillin-
Resistant Staphylococcus aureus from 
a University Hospital and District 
Institutions, Finland
Pirkko Kotilainen,*† Marianne Routamaa,* Reijo Peltonen,* Jarmo Oksi,* Esa Rintala,‡ Olli Meurman,* 
Olli-Pekka Lehtonen,* Erkki Eerola,§ Saara Salmenlinna,¶ Jaana Vuopio-Varkila,¶ and Tuire Rossi*
From August 1991 to October 1992, two successive out-
breaks of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
occurred at a hospital in Finland. During and after these out-
breaks, MRSA was diagnosed in 202 persons in our medical
district; >100 cases involved epidemic MRSA. When control
policies failed to stop the epidemic, more aggressive measures
were taken, including continuous staff education, contact isola-
tion for MRSA-positive patients, systematic screening for per-
sons exposed to MRSA, cohort nursing of MRSA-positive and
MRSA-exposed patients in epidemic situations, and perception
of the 30 medical institutions in that district as one epidemio-
logic entity brought under surveillance and control of the infec-
tion control team of Turku University Hospital. Two major
epidemic strains, as well as eight additional strains, were elimi-
nated; we were also able to prevent nosocomial spread of other
MRSA strains. Our data show that controlling MRSA is possible
if strict measures are taken before the organism becomes
endemic. Similar control policies may be successful for dealing
with new strains of multiresistant bacteria, such as vancomy-
cin-resistant strains of S. aureus.  
ethicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has
emerged worldwide as an important nosocomial patho-
gen. In some U.S. hospitals, MRSA already accounts for 30%
to 50% of all nosocomial S. aureus isolates. The situation is
comparable in many European centers: according to a recent
survey (1), the proportion of MRSA compared to all nosoco-
mial S. aureus isolates studied was >50% in Portugal and Italy
and >30% in Turkey and Greece. The methicillin-resistance
rate was low (2.0%) in the Netherlands, calling attention to the
distinguished Dutch MRSA strategy (2). Switzerland, which
had the lowest MRSA prevalence (1.8%) in the European sur-
vey (1), is noted for innovative interventions to improve hand
hygiene in hospitals and, thereby, to reduce MRSA transmis-
sion (3).
In the Scandinavian countries, methicillin-resistant strains
still account for <1% of all nosocomial S. aureus isolates (4).
MRSA has remained uncommon also in Finland (5,6), and
until the 1990s, mostly sporadic cases of MRSA were identi-
fied in hospitalized patients. In recent years, however, several
nosocomial outbreaks caused by different epidemic strains
have occurred (6). Two successive MRSA outbreaks at the
Turku University Hospital, Finland, and in nearby institutions
were the first and, so far, the second largest. We describe the
Turku outbreaks and the subsequent yearly numbers of new
MRSA cases identified in our district. We also discuss the con-
trol measures taken, which have been followed since then, to
confine the spread of epidemic MRSA at the university hospi-
tal and in the whole Southwest Finland Medical District. 
Methods
Background
The Turku University Hospital is a teaching facility that
serves as a tertiary referral center for southwestern Finland.
Approximately 500,000 inhabitants live in the Southwest Fin-
land Medical District; the density of the population varies
from 20–100 inhabitants per square kilometer. The institutions
include 1 university hospital, 1 central hospital, 7 regional hos-
pitals, and 22 health-care centers. 
From August 1991 to October 1992, two successive out-
breaks caused by different MRSA strains occurred in the
departments of surgery and medicine at University Hospital.
During and after these outbreaks, these two MRSA strains
were isolated from patients and staff members in five addi-
tional institutions in our district. 
Screening Policy
Our policy of screening contact patients of the MRSA-pos-
itive patients and the hospital staff for MRSA varied during
the different phases of the outbreaks. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, the term contact patient refers to a patient hospitalized
on the same ward at the same time with an MRSA-positive
patient. 
Surgical Unit Outbreak
During the outbreak in the surgical unit, in most cases
MRSA was isolated from a clinical specimen. Initially, a pol-
icy decision was made not to screen either the contact patients
*Turku University Central Hospital, Turku, Finland; †National Public
Health Institute, Turku, Finland; ‡Satakunta Central Hospital, Pori, Fin-
land; §Turku University, Turku, Finland; and ¶National Public Health
Institute, Helsinki, Finland 
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of MRSA-positive patients or the staff on outbreak wards for
MRSA. When the number of MRSA cases increased, we per-
formed one cross-sectional study to screen all patients cared
for in the department of surgery during that particular day for
nasal and wound colonization by MRSA. 
Medical Unit Outbreak
After the first two cases were diagnosed in the medical
unit, we began screening other patients treated in the medical
intensive-care unit (ICU). During weeks 6–8, all contact
patients connected with MRSA-positive patients (treated in the
ICU after admission of the index case) were screened once by
using nasal swabs if they were still hospitalized. If a new case
was identified on a ward, the roommates of the patient were
screened. If transmission of MRSA was observed on a ward,
all patients were screened. Initially, screening involved only
nasal swabbing, but from the first week of June 1992 on, cul-
tures were taken also from the perineum, groin, and axillae, as
well as from all open wounds, skin lesions, and, later, the
throat. After 10 identified cases of MRSA, we began to label
case records of the colonized patients and contact patients with
tags showing MRSA information. The contact patients were
screened on the next visit; previous roommates of MRSA-pos-
itive patients were isolated while waiting for culture results.
After providing two sets of negative MRSA cultures, contact
patients were no longer screened on subsequent admissions.
However, patients once found to be MRSA positive were
screened on subsequent admissions and placed in single rooms
to be cared for in contact isolation. All patients previously
treated at hospitals abroad or with a known MRSA problem
were screened at the time of admission and nursed in contact
isolation until results from colonization cultures were nega-
tive. We screened the staffs of the medical ICU and the hema-
tology and infectious diseases units by nasal swab at varying
intervals during the medical outbreak. Screening cultures were
done, as described (7,8).
Identification of MRSA
The isolates grown on culture plates were identified as
MRSA following the National Committee for Clinical Labora-
tory Standards guidelines (9). Genetic resistance to methicillin
was verified by the presence of the mecA gene (10). All
MRSA isolates were submitted to the Staphylococcal Refer-
ence Laboratory at the National Public Health Institute, where
they were typed with the international phage set and ribotyp-
ing and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), as described
(6). Two isolates were defined as different strains if they had
different phage types and/or PFGE and ribotypes. We consid-
ered phage types different if two or more strong phage reaction
differences occurred. Ribotypes were considered different if
any band difference occurred. Before 1995, PFGE types were
considered different if any band difference occurred. After
1995, PFGE types were considered different if four or more
band differences occurred. 
Elimination Treatment
Elimination treatment with topical or combined topical and
systemic antimicrobial therapy was given to selected patients
(e.g., long-term care patients of health-center wards and nurs-
ing homes) and those with severe underlying diseases who
were frequently admitted to any hospital in the district
(7,8,11). Long-term carriers among the staff were also given
elimination treatment. Detailed data on drug regimens will be
reported separately.
Results
MRSA Strains
From 1991 through 2000, a total of 202 persons in the
Southwest Finland Medical District were infected or colonized
by MRSA (Table). On the basis of phage typing and molecular
typing, we identified 15 different MRSA strains isolated from
two or more persons. These strains included 10 isolated from
hospitalized patients (outbreak strains) and 5 causing intrafa-
milial clusters in the community (familial strains). The strain
causing the surgical outbreak (referred to as the surgical strain)
belonged to phage type 75,77,84,85III and had a characteristic
ribotype and PFGE pattern. The strain causing the medical
outbreak (referred to as the medical strain) was nontypable
with phages (NT), but the strain relatedness between different
isolates could be ascertained by ribotyping and PFGE. A third
MRSA strain typed 54,84,85III/96V/95 caused the Mynamaki
Health Center outbreak described previously (7). A detailed
typing analysis, including a picture of the PFGE profiles of
these major epidemic strains, has been published (6) and
describes the corresponding strain identification code as E6 for
the surgical strain, E7 for the medical strain, and O9 for the
Mynamaki strain. The cases involved in these three outbreaks,
as well as the clusters caused by 12 additional MRSA strains,
are summarized in the Table. The remaining 63 strains were
isolated from one person each. 
Three (30%) of 10 outbreak strains and 22 (35%) of 63
unique strains were designated as of foreign origin. None of
the five familial strains were of foreign origin.
MRSA Outbreaks at the University Hospital
Surgical Unit Outbreak
The hospitalization periods of the patients during the surgi-
cal outbreak and the times when MRSA was first isolated in
each case are shown in Figure 1. In August 1991, the surgical
strain was isolated from a bone sample of patient 1 who was
cared for on an orthopedic ward for posttraumatic osteomyeli-
tis. The patient was referred to the infectious diseases unit to
be cared for in contact isolation, but she was readmitted to the
orthopedic ward three times during the following 4 months for
treatment of osteomyelitis. Each time, the isolation precau-
tions followed by hospital personnel did not comply with the
standard adopted later.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 171
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MRSA was next isolated from head wound of a colonized
male patient on the same ward. He was placed in a single room
to be cared for in contact isolation, but when the wound
healed, the patient was transferred to a three-bed room. Subse-
quently, three of his roommates (patients 3, 4, and 5) acquired
MRSA. By the 3rd week of December 1991, the combined
number of patients colonized by epidemic MRSA had
increased to eight cases on two wards and in the surgical ICU.
A shortage of single rooms and the threat of an expanding out-
break led to implementation of the following control mea-
sures: 1) intensive education of the staff on hospital hygiene,
2) nursing of all MRSA-positive patients in single rooms in
contact isolation, preferably in the infectious diseases unit, 3)
strict adherence to contact isolation precautions and minimal
duration of hospitalization whenever an MRSA-positive
patient was treated at the department of surgery (e.g., operative
treatment required), and 4) cross-sectional screening of all
patients nursed on surgical wards and in the surgical ICU on
December 19, 1991, for nasal and wound colonization. The
screening uncovered three new cases of MRSA on epidemic
wards. By year end, all patients identified as MRSA positive
had been either discharged or transferred to the infectious dis-
eases unit. Thereafter, no new transmission of MRSA was
observed on surgical wards, although by the end of August
1993, the surgical strain was isolated from clinical specimens
of eight additional patients who had been cared for on the epi-
demic wards during 1991–1992. These patients had evidently
acquired the surgical strain while hospitalized during the out-
break, but the MRSA colonization was not recognized then
because screening was not done routinely.
In November 1995, the surgical strain was unexpectedly
isolated from an endotracheal aspirate of a patient in the surgi-
cal ICU. This patient had also been cared for on the orthopedic
ward during the 1991 outbreak. Subsequent screening of con-
tact patients in the ICU showed MRSA colonization in three
other patients who had ventilatory support at the same time.
No new transmission of MRSA was observed after these
patients were transferred to the infectious diseases unit. The
total number of University Hospital patients infected or colo-
nized by the surgical strain was 24.
Table. Yearly number of new cases caused by different methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) strains, Southwest Finland Medical 
District, 1991–2000
Year
Strains
Total
Surgical 
outbreaka
Medical 
outbreakb
Mynamaki
outbreakc
MRSA 
outbreak IVd
MRSA 
outbreak Ve
Other 
outbreaks
Familial 
MRSAf
Solitary 
MRSA
1991 11 21 3
1992 19 56 2g 17 8
1993 1 1 13 4 2h 24 2 7
1994 32 5
1995 4 37
1996 2 79
1997 26 8
1998 2g 17 19
1999 2g 21 0 1 4
2000 52 g 41 1 2 2
Total 37 57 13 4 5 10 13 63 202
aStrain was recovered from 24 patients at the university hospital,10 patients at a regional hospital, and 3 staff members in these hospitals.
bStrain was recovered from 30 patients and 18 staff members at the university hospital and from 9 patients in other district institutions. 
cStrain was recovered from 12 patients and 1 staff member in a health-center ward and associated nursing home (7).
dStrain caused a cluster of four cases in an intensive-care unit of a central hospital.
eStrain caused a cluster of four infected patients and one infected staff member in a health-center ward at the beginning of 2000, but was subsequently eliminated.
fIntrafamilial clusters of two to four MRSA cases in the community.       
gMRSA strain was transmitted from one patient to another at the university hospital.
hMRSA strain was transmitted from one patient to another at a regional hospital.
Figure 1. Spread of surgical outbreak strain. Methicillin-resistant Sta-
phylococcus aureus (MRSA) isolated August 1991–October 1992 in 17
patients cared for on two surgical wards and the surgical intensive-care
unit. Hospitalization periods of these patients are shown as horizontal
lines. Symbol • indicates the time point when the first culture positive for
MRSA was taken.RESEARCH
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Medical Unit Outbreak
The index patient was treated for cerebral hemorrhage in
an ICU in Rome, Italy. After his referral to the department of
neurology of University Hospital in December 1991, the med-
ical strain was isolated from his endotracheal aspirate. For the
next 3 months, the patient was cared for in contact isolation in
a single room on a neurologic ward; we found no evidence of
MRSA transmission to other patients on that ward.
Medical ICU
In March 1992, the index patient became ill with septic
shock caused by MRSA and was admitted to the medical ICU
for respiratory support. For the first 24 hours, he was not iso-
lated because of a misunderstanding but treated in the same
room with three other patients who had ventilatory support.
His contact patients were neither screened nor isolated.
Two weeks later (Figure 2), the medical strain was cultured
from an endotracheal aspirate of a patient who had died in the
ICU a few days earlier. The devised screening program was
delayed, and subsequent screening on weeks 6–8 found six
new patient carriers and two staff carriers of MRSA. The med-
ical ICU was closed to new admissions, and an auxiliary ICU
was established for those patients who had not been exposed to
MRSA. 
In the auxiliary ICU, a new staff carrier of MRSA was
identified on week 12 and a new patient carrier and a staff car-
rier on week 13. The MRSA-positive patient was immediately
referred to the infectious diseases unit. The six other patients
who had shared the ICU room with him were simultaneously
transferred to that same unit. Screening cultures later revealed
MRSA colonization in five of them, indicating that early
cohorting of these contact patients may have been critical in
preventing further spread.
Hematology Unit
In May 1992, we identified MRSA colonization in four
patients cared for on the hematology ward. Two of them
became colonized while being treated in the medical ICU in
April and transmitted MRSA to their two roommates on the
ward before carriage became manifest. Using nasal swabs, we
screened a number of patients treated at that time on the same
ward. Many other contact patients already discharged were not
screened when they were readmitted, rendering further spread
of MRSA possible. At the beginning of July 1992, MRSA was
isolated from an endotracheal aspirate of a bone marrow trans-
plant patient cared for on the hematology ward (Figure 2).
Subsequent screening showed colonization in 11 additional
hematologic patients and 12 staff members.
We prevented nosocomial transmission by immediately
closing the hematology ward. For the next 3 months, hemato-
logic patients were cared for in three separate cohorts: 1) those
not exposed to MRSA were admitted to the hematology unit
when it was reopened, 2) those potentially exposed to MRSA
during the previous 4 months were cared for in a separate
cohort in the infectious diseases unit until three sets of coloni-
zation cultures had proved negative, and 3) those colonized by
MRSA were cared for in the infectious diseases unit. The total
number of University Hospital patients colonized by the medi-
cal strain was 30, and the last case was identified in February
1993. This patient had evidently become colonized in April
1992 while being treated in the ICU at the same time as the
index case. His MRSA colonization had remained unknown,
since contact patients were not screened at that time.
Staff Carriage
A total of 20 staff members were colonized with MRSA
during these two outbreaks. All five long-term carriers
received elimination treatment with a successful outcome. The
staff members who were colonized were sent home but could
return to work after they had provided three successive nega-
tive MRSA cultures.
MRSA in Other District Institutions
In August 1992, the first case of the surgical strain was
identified at Turku City Hospital. Subsequent screening found
colonization in seven additional patients on three different
wards. After two more cases were identified in 1996, the total
number of city hospital patients colonized by the surgical
strain was 10. During August and September 1992, we found
nine patients in two local hospitals and two health-center
wards colonized by the medical strain. In each institution,
MRSA was first isolated from a clinical sample, and screening
of contact patients on the ward found a few additional cases.
The infection control team of University Hospital visited each
facility to delineate appropriate control measures for MRSA.
Colonized patients were referred to the infectious diseases unit
for elimination treatment. Other patients were screened, and
those found to be colonized were cared for in contact isolation
until they could be admitted to the infectious diseases unit for
decolonization. By following this strict control policy, we
were able to eliminate MRSA from these five institutions.
In 1993, the Mynamaki Health Center outbreak was con-
trolled as previously described after 13 cases (7), and a central
Figure 2. Number of new cases weekly of methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus among patients and staff during the medical outbreak,
third week of March to the second week of September 1992. Time is
shown in weeks from the admission of the index case (black column) to
the medical intensive-care unit. White columns indicate patient cases;
striped columns indicate staff cases.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 173
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hospital ICU outbreak was controlled after four cases (out-
break strain IV). In 2000, MRSA outbreak strain V was elimi-
nated from a long-term care facility after five cases occurred.
Of the five additional epidemic MRSA strains, one was elimi-
nated after two cases in a regional hospital, and the other four
strains were eliminated after causing two cases each at Univer-
sity Hospital (Table).
Long-Term Follow-Up of Patients
Of the 37 patients who acquired the surgical strain, 6 died
within 1 month after MRSA was identified, 20 died during the
following years, and 3 were not part of follow-up. Eight
patients remain residents in our district, two of them still car-
rying the surgical strain. The majority of the 39 patients who
acquired the medical strain had severe underlying diseases. Of
all 39 patients, 21 died within 3 months of colonization, 12
died during the following years, and 1 was not part of follow-
up. Five patients who still live in Turku, three of whom were
treated to eliminate carriage, no longer carry MRSA. Thus, the
medical strain has been eliminated from our district.
Discussion
During past few years, news on MRSA has usually been
discouraging. Clinicians and infection control practitioners
appear to have lost confidence in their capability to control the
nosocomial spread of this pathogen. The number of papers
focusing on the overwhelming spread of MRSA is increasing
(1,12–17), whereas those addressing successful efforts of con-
trol or stating that nosocomial spread of MRSA can and should
be controlled are few (18–22). A number of researchers debat-
ing the control of MRSA have questioned whether controlling
this microorganism is reasonable, feasible, or justified (23–25)
and whether the tracing of colonized people is justified (26).
We describe the elimination of MRSA from a university hospi-
tal and a medical-district–wide control policy for MRSA after
the outbreak. Our results show that controlling or even elimi-
nating MRSA is possible, if strict measures are systematically
taken before the organism becomes endemic. Our experience
should encourage other countries with a low incidence of
MRSA to continue efforts to prevent the spread of this micro-
organism in hospitals and long-term care facilities.
According to 46 published reports on outbreaks, 10% of
the hospitals with >40 cases have achieved definite or proba-
ble elimination of MRSA (27). Although >100 patients and
staff members in our district initially became colonized by epi-
demic MRSA, this microbe is being controlled almost 10 years
after these first outbreaks. We eliminated the medical strain
from the whole district, and only a few outpatients presently
carry MRSA in the community. Moreover, we were able to
prevent nosocomial spread of the almost 100 additional
MRSA strains encountered in our area. Even the 22 MRSA
strains introduced by patients transferred from hospitals
abroad have remained solitary cases, despite their epidemic
potential. In fact, after the small university hospital ICU out-
break in 1995, nosocomial transmission of MRSA has been
detected in our district hospitals only three times; on each
occasion, MRSA colonization of the index case was not
known or suspected on admission. 
Containment of the Turku outbreaks in 1991–1992 was
greatly impeded by the fact that we had no national guidelines
on how to control MRSA in Finland at that time and very little
previous experience with these microorganisms. Detailed
guidelines published by authorities from abroad advised an
active control policy (28), but stringent measures were per-
ceived by our colleagues as too disruptive for the patient care
in our institution. One major argument against adopting an
aggressive line of control was the lack of severe MRSA infec-
tions because many of our patients were colonized without
clinical infection. During the early phase of the medical out-
break, the infection control team adjusted to a lenient control
policy because of our previous experience with the surgical
strain, which was easily contained. The behavior of the medi-
cal strain, however, was quite different from the surgical
strain, and the inadequacy of the control measures at the
beginning of the medical outbreak is now evident. We may
have been able to restrict this outbreak to only a few cases if
all ICU patients had been screened for MRSA and MRSA-pos-
itive patients had been isolated as soon as we discerned that
appropriate control measures had not been taken when caring
for the index patient or if the medical ICU had been closed to
new admissions after the second or third MRSA case. Simi-
larly, screening of only some of the MRSA contact patients in
the hematology unit in May 1992 was clearly insufficient. Had
our efforts initially been more aggressive and the outbreaks
quickly controlled, we may have saved many persons from
becoming colonized with MRSA and considerably reduced the
costs of infection control measures required. 
The most important lesson from these first epidemics was
that an ambivalent and permissive control policy for MRSA
easily fails. We have subsequently made every effort to avoid
making the same mistake. Whenever MRSA has been intro-
duced into our hospitals, rapid steps have been taken to adopt
appropriate control measures. The mainstays of our present
policy involve continuous staff education, caring for MRSA-
positive patients in single rooms in contact isolation, system-
atic screening of patients exposed to MRSA, including all
patients transferred from hospitals abroad or with a known
MRSA problem, and cohort nursing of MRSA-positive and
exposed patients, at least in epidemic situations. 
National guidelines have proved most beneficial in pre-
venting the spread of MRSA in a few low-incidence countries
(2,6). Medical-district–wide guidelines may be equally impor-
tant when an individual hospital is struggling with MRSA and
needs practical or moral support. The Turku MRSA policy
involves perceiving our medical district with its approximately
30 institutions as one epidemiologic entity; the infection con-
trol team of University Hospital is responsible for the control
of MRSA (and also of other multiresistant bacteria) in the
whole entity. This overall responsibility ensures that the same
control policy for MRSA is followed in all district institutions.RESEARCH
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If MRSA is encountered in any local hospital or health-center
ward, consultation is given; if nosocomial transmission of the
microbe is observed, the infection control team visits the insti-
tute. We continuously strive to prevent the development of
MRSA reservoirs in our extended-care facilities. In so doing,
treatment to eliminate MRSA carriage in long-term patients
has been favored, while in contrast, efforts to eliminate MRSA
in outpatients have not had the same focus.
Many of our experiences were taken into account when the
National Guidelines for the Control of MRSA in Finland were
prepared in 1995 (6). To a great extent, the MRSA control pol-
icy finally adopted is in line with that currently followed in the
Netherlands (2) and initially recommended by the British
authorities in 1990 (28). Because of the increasing prevalence
of MRSA, those guidelines were replaced in the U.K. by more
lenient instructions in 1998 because the situation in many parts
of the country was such that a more flexible approach was con-
sidered appropriate (29,30). With the dramatic increase of
MRSA, other countries (including the United States) where
these microbes are already endemic in hospitals have adopted
more flexible control policies (31,32). However, now that van-
comycin-resistant S. aureus (VRSA) exists (33), controlling
MRSA is even more imperative. A lenient or ambivalent pol-
icy is especially inappropriate in those countries where MRSA
remains uncommon, since they may still have a fair chance of
eliminating this pathogen. In southwestern Finland, the factors
possibly contributing to our success include active education
and excellent compliance of health-care personnel, a uniform
health-care system, and low population density.
Anticipating the emergence of new and even more serious
strains of multiresistant staphylococci poses a demanding
challenge to clinicians and infection-control practitioners
worldwide to seek novel methods, which could effectively pre-
vent the spread of these microorganisms. Despite an inability
to control MRSA in many countries, we believe that confining
these newly emerging multiresistant strains may be possible,
provided that vigorous efforts are taken early while the
microbe still remains rare. If rapidly begun, aggressive mea-
sures may not be needed for long and thereby be cost-effec-
tive. To meet future challenges successfully, a stringent and
consistent international control policy should be issued and
universally obeyed. 
We have shown that controlling or even eliminating
MRSA is possible, if strict measures are taken before the
organism becomes endemic. A similar policy may be success-
ful when combating new and even more serious strains of mul-
tiresistant bacteria (e.g., VRSA). The recent emergence of
VRSA emphasizes the need for unremitting and vigorous con-
trol of MRSA. National guidelines for MRSA control policy
have proven beneficial in a few low-incidence countries. Our
results suggest that firm international guidelines will aid coun-
tries in preventing the global spread of any newly emerging
multiresistant bacterial pathogen. An ultimate prerequisite for
success is the commitment of the health-care personnel world-
wide to struggle for that important goal.
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Annual Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
Infection Risk and Interpretation of 
Clustering Statistics 
Emilia Vynnycky,* Martien W. Borgdorff,† Dick van Soolingen,‡ and Paul E.M. Fine*
Several recent studies have used proportions of tuberculo-
sis cases sharing identical DNA fingerprint patterns (i.e., isolate
clustering) to estimate the extent of disease attributable to
recent transmission. Using a model of introduction and trans-
mission of strains with different DNA fingerprint patterns, we
show that the properties and interpretation of clustering statis-
tics may differ substantially between settings. For some unin-
dustrialized countries, where the annual risk for infection has
changed little over time, 70% to 80% of all age groups may be
clustered during a 3-year period, which underestimates the pro-
portion of disease attributable to recent transmission. In con-
trast, for a typical industrialized setting (the Netherlands),
clustering declines with increasing age (from 75% to 15%
among young and old patients, respectively) and underesti-
mates the extent of recent transmission only for young patients.
We conclude that, in some settings, clustering is an unreliable
indicator of the extent of recent transmission.
tudies are increasingly using levels of clustering of isolates
from tuberculosis cases (proportion sharing identical DNA
fingerprint patterns) to estimate the extent of disease attribut-
able to recent transmission. To date, few studies have been
conducted in unindustrialized countries, where the impact of
tuberculosis and the proportion of disease attributable to recent
transmission are greatest. Whether or not the properties and
interpretation of clustering statistics in such settings are simi-
lar to those in industrialized populations is unclear. 
Studies in industrialized countries have found relatively
low overall levels of clustering (e.g., 30% to 40% during a 3-
year period [1–3]) but much higher levels among younger ver-
sus older patients. This age differential probably reflects past
trends in the annual risk for infection, which was high in the
early 20th century (e.g., > 2% per year before 1940 in the
Netherlands [4]) and is currently very low. Thus, a large pro-
portion of disease in older patients is attributable to reactiva-
tion of infections acquired many years ago, and, given the
short half-life of DNA fingerprint patterns (5), only a small
proportion of old patients share identical isolates with other
patients. In some unindustrialized countries, on the other hand,
where the annual risk for infection may not have changed
much over time, the age differential in clustering might be
small, given that a large proportion of disease even among
older persons may be attributable to recent (re)infection.
Understanding the effect of the magnitude of the annual risk
for tuberculous infection on clustering frequency helps deter-
mine how molecular epidemiologic data can be best applied to
estimate the extent of ongoing transmission of Mycobacterium
tuberculosis, and hence to identify optimal control strategies.
We explored how the magnitude and trend in the annual
risk for infection influence the age-specific proportion of clus-
tered cases and its relationship to the extent of disease attribut-
able to recent transmission. We use a model of the
transmission dynamics of M. tuberculosis previously cali-
brated to data from the Netherlands (6), where isolates from all
tuberculosis cases with onset since 1993 have been routinely
DNA fingerprinted (1). We describe the general epidemiologic
assumptions in the model and how it distinguishes between
cases according to the DNA fingerprint pattern of the strain
causing the disease episode, which is needed to calculate clus-
tering statistics.
Methods
Our analysis is based on a model developed recently to
interpret data on clustering of DNA fingerprint patterns in the
Netherlands (6). Equations describing the model’s formulation
are provided in the Appendix. 
Epidemiologic Assumptions in the Model
The model’s structure, parameters, and assumptions have
been published (6). Persons are assumed to be born uninfected.
Infected persons are divided into those in whom primary dis-
ease has not yet developed (defined by convention as disease
within 5 years of initial infection [7]), and those in the “latent”
class, who are at risk for endogenous reactivation or for rein-
fection, which can be followed by exogenous disease. Exoge-
nous disease is here defined as the first disease episode within
5 years of the most recent reinfection; endogenous disease
includes disease occurring >5 years after the most recent
(re)infection event, and second or subsequent disease episodes
occurring <5 years after the most recent (re)infection event.
(These definitions differ slightly from those of Sutherland et
al. (8) to include the assumption that once persons have recov-
ered from disease during the first 5 years after initial infection
*London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, England;
†Royal Netherlands Tuberculosis Association, The Hague, the Nether-
lands; and ‡National Institute of Public Health and the Environment,
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or reinfection, their risk of developing disease becomes the
same as that of developing disease through reactivation, until
they are newly reinfected.)
The infection and reinfection risks are assumed to be iden-
tical, but reinfection is less likely to lead to disease than is ini-
tial infection, due to some immunity induced by the prior
infection (9). We explored the implications of four assump-
tions for the magnitude (and trend) in the annual risk for infec-
tion, namely, that the risk for infection 1) declined over time,
as estimated for the Netherlands (from approximately 2% in
1940 to approximately 5/10,000 by 1979 [4,10]); 2) remained
unchanged over time at a very low level (0.1%); 3) remained
unchanged at 1%; or 4) remained unchanged at 3%. Infection
risks of 1% have been found in several populations (e.g.,
Malawi [11]). Infection risks of 3% are uncommon today but
have been reported in parts of South Africa (12). For simplic-
ity, we assumed that persons cannot be reinfected during the
period between initial infection (or reinfection) and onset of
the first primary episode (or exogenous disease).
The risks of developing disease depend on age and sex
(Figure 1A; [6]); they are based on previous analyses, in which
we fitted predictions of disease incidence to observed notifica-
tions in the U.K. (9). The risks of developing either a first pri-
mary episode or disease following exogenous reinfection also
depend on the time since infection and reinfection, respec-
tively (Figure 1B). The probability that a disease episode is
infectious (sputum smear/culture-positive) is age dependent
(Figure 1C) (9). The demography of the population described
in the model is assumed to be that for the Netherlands. Analy-
ses are restricted to respiratory (pulmonary) forms of tubercu-
losis, since these are far more likely than extrapulmonary
forms to lead to transmission. Although additional factors such
as immigration and HIV can influence the extent of clustering
in complicated ways (14), these factors are not considered
here, where the focus is upon the effect of the magnitude and
trend in the annual risk for infection on clustering. 
Derivation of Clustering Statistics
Recent studies suggest that the half-life of DNA finger-
print patterns based on IS6110 restriction fragment length
polymorphism (RFLP, which has been used for the DNA fin-
gerprinting conducted to date in most studies) is 2–5 years
(5,15). If the molecular clock speed for IS6110 RFLP patterns
of strains involved in latent infection (currently unknown)
were to be similar, this relatively short half-life implies that
most of the fingerprint patterns of the strains causing disease
today differ from those that caused disease many years ago.
Similarly, this short half-life implies that the M. tuberculosis
fingerprint types and cluster distributions in tuberculosis cases
today depend only loosely upon those that existed 50 years
ago. Based on this assumption, to derive clustering estimates
for a given population for recent years, we designed the model
to simulate the introduction and subsequent transmission of
strains with new DNA fingerprint patterns from a sufficiently
distant time in the past (taken to be 1950), so that a) all cases
with onset in recent years involved a strain whose DNA fin-
gerprint pattern had first appeared since then and b) no
assumptions would be required about the distributions of
strains that existed before 1950. The general steps in the calcu-
lations are outlined briefly below.
The numbers of persons of each age in each of the epide-
miologic categories for 1950 were calculated by using the
model, based on described equations (9). From 1950, each of
these age-sex classes was stratified to distinguish between
those who had, versus those who had not, been (re)infected
since 1950. Those who had been (re)infected since 1950 were
subdivided further according to the time of infection or rein-
fection. The transmission dynamics were tracked simulta-
neously for all persons with the equations described in the
Appendix and elsewhere (6), by using time steps of 6 months
and 1 year for calendar year and age, respectively.
In each interval, disease was assumed to develop in a pro-
portion of infected persons, and a proportion of these disease
episodes was attributed to a strain for which the DNA finger-
Figure 1. Summary of the main assumptions in the model relating to the risks of developing disease. A) General relationship between the risk of
developing the first primary episode (during the first year after infection) and age at infection. An identical relationship is assumed to hold between
the risk of exogenous disease and the age at reinfection and between the risk for endogenous disease and the current age of persons. B) Risk of
developing the first primary episode (or exogenous disease) in each year following initial infection (or reinfection), relative to that experienced in
the first year after infection. The relationship was derived by using data on the interval between tuberculin conversion and disease among persons
who were tuberculin negative at intake during the U.K. Medical Research Council BCG trial during the 1950s (13). C) Proportion of respiratory dis-
ease incidence manifested as sputum-positive (i.e., infectious) (pers. comm. K. Styblo, Tuberculosis Surveillance Research Unit, and K. Bjartveit,
Norwegian National Health Screening Service).RESEARCH
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print pattern differed from that of the strain with which the
persons were originally infected. This latter proportion
depended on the time since infection (see below), and each of
the new DNA fingerprint patterns was assigned a unique iden-
tity number. Each infectious patient with onset at a given time
was assumed to contact a different number of persons (see
Appendix and Figure 2). The frequency distributions of the
number of persons contacted by each patient were used to
derive the total number of persons who were newly
(re)infected at this time. The corresponding equations were
then applied to this number to determine the total number of
persons in whom disease developed at a later time, T, among
those who had been infected at time t. The DNA fingerprint
patterns of the strains in these diseased persons were then
determined by using the frequency distribution of the number
of persons contacted by each case-patient at time t. These cal-
culations are described further in the Appendix.
Estimating the Effect of the Annual Risk for Infection 
on Clustering as an Indicator of Recent Transmission
Our model was used to calculate the age-specific propor-
tion of disease attributable to primary and exogenous disease
from 1993 to 1997 for the Netherlands and for settings in
which the annual risk for infection is assumed to have
remained unchanged over time at 0.1%, 1%, and 3%. Primary
and exogenous disease involve disease occurring during the
first 5 years after the most recent (re)infection event, although
the majority of persons in whom primary or exogenous (rein-
fection) disease develops acquire the disease within 2–3 years
(Figure 1B). The clustering by sex and age for cases with onset
in different periods between 1993 and 1997 for the Nether-
lands, and for settings in which the annual risk for infection is
assumed to have remained unchanged over time at 0.1%, 1%,
and 3%,was also calculated by using the age and sex distribu-
tion of the cases with onset in that period (see equations in
[6]). For simplicity, we present age-specific levels of cluster-
ing for male patients only. Model predictions for male patients
generally compared better against the observed data in the
Netherlands than did those for female patients (6).
The predictive values of clustering for the identification of
recent transmission were calculated as follows. The positive
predictive value of clustering for identifying recent transmis-
sion in different age groups in different periods was calculated
as the proportion of case-patients who were in a cluster in a
given period who had been infected or reinfected <5 years
before disease onset. The negative predictive value of cluster-
ing for identifying recent transmission in different age groups
was calculated as the proportion of case-patients who were not
in a cluster in a given period who had been infected or last
reinfected >5 years before disease onset.
Results
Model Predictions of the Extent of Clustering 
and Disease Attributable to Recent Transmission
As shown in Figure 3, very different age patterns in the
proportion of disease attributable to recent transmission were
predicted for the Netherlands and for settings in which the
annual risk for infection has remained unchanged over time. In
the Netherlands, the proportion of disease attributed to recent
infection decreased dramatically with age, e.g., from 100% in
the young to approximately 50% and 10% for 45- to 54-year-
old patients and persons >65 years of age, respectively. The
proportion of disease attributed to recent reinfection was very
low for all age groups (<3%). For constant infection risk set-
tings, the predicted proportion of disease attributable to recent
Figure 2. Summary of the assumptions defining contact
between persons in the model. A, B, and C show the annual
risk for infection, estimates of the average effective contact
number in the model, and the average age-specific annual
incidence of infectious disease per 100,000 population
respectively in the various settings. For settings in which the
annual risk for infection has not changed over time, the effec-
tive contact number is obtained from the ratio between the
annual risk for infection and the incidence of infectious cases
predicted in the model. The values for the effective contact
number in the Netherlands are identical to those calculated in
reference 6. D shows the frequency distribution of the
assumed number of persons effectively contacted by each
infectious case-patient, if the population were to comprise
1,000 infectious cases and the average effective contact num-
ber was approximately 4, as assumed for the Netherlands for
recent years. This (negative binomial) distribution (defined by
a variance 20 times the mean) led to observed cluster distri-
butions that best compared against those observed in the
Netherlands (6). Contact between persons is assumed to be
assortative (so that, for example, those with a high-risk life-
style, mix preferentially with similar persons) and, for simplic-
ity, independent of age and sex.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 179
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transmission (i.e., recent infection or reinfection) was very
similar, falling from 100% in the young to 85%, 88%, and
90% in the oldest age groups for the 0.1%, 1%, and 3% infec-
tion risk scenarios, respectively. On the other hand, large dif-
ferences between settings were predicted in the proportion of
disease attributed to initial infection or to reinfection. In all
instances, the proportion attributed to reinfection was zero in
the youngest age groups, but this proportion increased with
age to 3%, 35%, and 80% for the 0.1%, 1%, and 3% annual
infection risk assumptions, respectively. The proportion attrib-
uted to recent initial infection in these settings decreased from
100% in the young to 80%, 50%, and 15%, respectively, in old
patients.
As shown in Figure 4A, for each setting, the overall clus-
tering (i.e., that seen among all age groups) was predicted to
increase with study duration, e.g., from 15% for the Nether-
lands for a 1-year period to approximately 25% for a 5-year
period. The clustering predicted for all the constant infection
risk scenarios was similar in magnitude for each study period
and increased from 60% to 70% for a 1-year period to 75% to
85% for a 5-year period. Since the overall clustering was not
predicted to increase much for study periods of more than 3
years, clustering is defined using a 3-year period in the
remainder of these analyses (represented by 1993–1995). As
shown in Figure 4B, the clustering predicted for each age
group was similar for each of the settings in which the annual
risk for infection remained unchanged over time, and declined
only slightly with age, e.g., from 83% for the youngest age
group to approximately 75% for the oldest age category. In
contrast, for the Netherlands, the clustering was predicted to
decrease dramatically with age, from approximately 75%
among young case-patients to approximately 15% in very old
patients. This prediction is consistent with observed data (Fig-
ure 4B).
Reliability of Clustering as a Measure 
of the Extent of Recent Transmission
For settings in which the annual risk for infection remained
unchanged over time at 0.1%, 1%, and 3%, the predicted clus-
tering in each age group underestimated the proportion who
had been recently infected or reinfected (Figure 5). In settings
with an annual risk for infection of 0.1%, at least 90% of cases
in each age group were predicted to have been recently
(re)infected, whereas the proportion clustered decreased from
about 85% in the youngest age group to approximately 70%
for the oldest persons. For the Netherlands (described else-
where [6]), clustering underestimated the proportion of disease
attributable to recent transmission in the young (by up to 43%)
and overestimated that for older patients (by up to 50%).
The positive and negative predictive values of being in a
cluster, as an indicator of recent transmission, depended both
on age and the study setting (Figure 6). For settings with a
high annual risk for infection that had remained unchanged
over time, model predictions suggested that most patients clus-
tered in each age group were likely to have been recently
(re)infected, corresponding to a positive predictive value of
clustering for recent transmission of almost 100% in each age
Figure 3. Model predictions of the proportion of disease attributable to
primary and exogenous disease during the period 1993–1997 in the
Netherlands and settings in which the annual risk for infection has
remained unchanged over time at 0.1%, 1%, and 3% per year.
Figure 4. Model predictions of A) the
overall percentage of cases clustered
during different time periods from 1993
to 1997 and B) the age-specific percent-
age of (male) cases clustered during the
period 1993–1995 in the Netherlands
and in settings in which the annual risk
for infection has remained unchanged
over time at 0.1%, 1%, and 3%. The
clustering observed in the Netherlands,
after excluding clusters involving immi-
grants, is also shown.RESEARCH
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group (Figure 6A). The positive predictive value was esti-
mated to decrease with age in the Netherlands from 100% in
the very young to about 20% for the oldest patients.
When unclustered cases were considered, the proportion of
clinical case-patients who were estimated to have been
infected >5 years previously was low (<5%) for young patients
and increased with age for all settings, approaching 100% for
patients >55 years of age in the Netherlands (Figure 6B).
Almost all case-patients of ages >55 years who were not in a
cluster in the Netherlands were therefore estimated to have
been infected >5 years previously and thus owed their disease
to reactivation of latent foci. Of the adult case-patients who
were not in a cluster in the other settings, the proportion who
had been infected >5 years previously was <45%, 35%, and
20% if the annual risk for infection was 0.1%, 1%, and 3%,
respectively.
Discussion
The availability of DNA fingerprinting techniques has led
to a large number of studies that measure clustering of isolates
from tuberculosis cases (1–3,16). Most of these studies have
been conducted in industrialized settings and have found rela-
tively low levels of clustering (30% to 40%) and decreases in
clustering with age. Our analyses indicate that those findings
have been influenced strongly by the large secular decline in
the annual risk for infection that occurred in industrialized set-
tings during the 20th century and that very different findings
are expected in settings where the annual risk for infection has
changed little over time. The clustering predicted is high
(>60% for 2-year periods) in such settings, similar for all age
groups, and may nevertheless still underestimate the extent of
disease that is due to recent transmission.
Our conclusions are based on a model of the transmission
dynamics of M. tuberculosis that includes several simplifica-
tions. The most obvious is our assumption that the risks for
disease, given infection in settings in which the infection risk
is high, are the same as those estimated for industrialized pop-
ulations. HIV influences these risks (17,18), although its effect
on clustering is not yet understood (14). Another simplifica-
tion is our assumption that the half-life of DNA fingerprint
patterns is identical for strains involved in active disease and
in latent infection. If latent infections are associated with a
slow rate of genetic change of the bacilli, our assumption
would have led to an underestimate of clustering but would not
have affected our conclusions for settings in which the annual
risk for infection has remained unchanged over time, where
only a small proportion of disease is attributed to reactivation
of a latent infection (Figure 3). The effect of this assumption
on clustering estimates for the Netherlands is discussed else-
where (6).
Our finding that the overall amount of clustering in popu-
lations with a low (constant) annual infection risk should be
similar to that observed in populations with a high (constant)
infection risk may appear paradoxical. Our finding follows
from the fact that in such populations any decline in the pro-
Figure 5. Comparison between model predictions of the clustering in
different age groups and the proportion of disease attributable to recent
infection or reinfection in the Netherlands and in settings in which the
annual risk for infection has remained unchanged over time at 0.1%,
1%, and 3%.
Figure 6. Summary of model predic-
tions of the A) positive predictive val-
ues of clustering (proportion of cases
who are in a cluster who have been
infected or reinfected <5 years before
onset) and B) negative predictive val-
ues of clustering (proportion of cases
who are not in a cluster who are
experiencing disease as a result of
infection or reinfection  acquired >5
years before onset) in different age
groups in the Netherlands and in set-
tings in which the annual risk for
infection has remained unchanged
over time at 0.1%, 1%, and 3%.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 181
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portion of disease attributable to recent primary infection with
age is compensated by increases in the proportion attributable
to recent reinfection with age (Figure 3). As a result, both the
overall and age-specific predicted proportions of disease
attributable to recent transmission in these populations are
very similar; this finding leads to predictions that the overall
and age-specific levels of clustering in these settings would
also be similar.
Previous model-based analyses (6) have indicated that in
industrialized settings such as the Netherlands clustering
among young case-patients will underestimate the extent of
disease attributable to recent transmission (because some
sources of infection have onset outside the study period and
because DNA fingerprint patterns can change between infec-
tion and disease onset), and clustering among old case-patients
may overestimate recent transmission (because clustering
among older case-patients is more likely to be attributable to
their being sources of infection rather than their being recently
reinfected). These analyses extend those findings and indicate
that in settings in which the annual risk for infection has not
changed much over time, the overall level of clustering in any
given age group is likely to underestimate the extent of recent
transmission (Figure 5). This underestimate follows from the
fact that in these settings, most disease in all age groups is
attributable to recent transmission, and some patients will have
been infected or reinfected immediately before the study
started and thus may not be in a cluster.
These analyses provide the first estimates of the positive
and negative predictive values of clustering. Overall, these
analyses highlight the fact that in settings in which the annual
risk for infection has not changed greatly over time, most clus-
tered case-patients are likely to have been recently infected or
reinfected (i.e., the positive predictive value of clustering is
high) (Figure 6). This finding suggests that in such settings,
application of the “n-1” rule (2), which assumes that each clus-
ter comprises an index case attributable to reactivation and the
other cases result (in)directly from that case, will lead to even
more unreliable estimates of the extent of recent transmission
than those based on the “n” rule. Similarly, estimates of the
proportion of disease attributable to reactivation will be unreli-
able if they are based on the proportion of patients who fail to
be in a cluster in a given period.
Our analyses demonstrate that the properties and interpreta-
tion of clustering statistics depend strongly on the trend and
magnitude in the annual risk for infection and thus will vary
between settings. For example, in settings in which the annual
risk for infection has remained unchanged at either a high or a
low level, the age differential in clustering is likely to be small,
in contrast with that in industrialized settings, and clustering is
likely to underestimate the extent of recent transmission in all
age groups. Given the growing importance of clustering stud-
ies, which, to date have been conducted in populations in which
the annual risk for infection declined dramatically over time
and is currently very low, these insights are important for an
improved understanding of the natural history of tuberculosis.
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Appendix 
Summary of Equations Used in Model
We use the notation summarized in the Table and reference 6 to describe the transmission dynamics of Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Note
that all of the variables are stratified by sex; for reporting convenience, we have omitted this stratification in the following description. The
equations are as follows:
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Boundary conditions:
U(0,t)=B(t)
IT(a,T,0) = i(T)U(a,T)
For notational convenience, we denote (1-d+(a)) by d_(a). The infection risk at time t (i(t)) is given by                          where N(t) is the
total population size at time t and F(t,n) is the frequency distribution of the number of persons contacted by the case-patients who had onset at
time t (Figure 2). The total number of infectious cases at time t is given by the total number of persons experiencing their first primary episode,
endogenous and exogenous disease, summed over all possible ages and times of infection T, i.e.,
Simulating Contact between Persons
For simplicity, we assumed that all effective contacts (defined as those sufficient to lead to infection by an infectious case-patient if the con-
tacted person has never been infected) occurred immediately after onset of (infectious pulmonary) disease in the source case. This assumption is
reasonable for industrialized countries in recent years (see, for example, 19) but is less realistic for some unindustrialized countries because of
longer diagnostic delays in such populations. The number of persons effectively contacted by each case-patient during the infectious period (the
effective contact number) was assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution, defined by a time-dependent mean and variance (Figure 2).
Though assumptions about contact patterns between persons influence the predicted cluster distributions, they do not affect the overall levels of
clustering (6). The data used for calibrating the model’s assumptions have been described (6). 
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Appendix table. Definitions of state variables used in the model 
Variable Definition
B(t)  No. of live births at time t. Obtained from the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (data available from 1892 to present). 
U(a,t)  No. of uninfected persons of age a at time t .
IT(a,t, )  No. of persons of age a at time t who were infected at time T and have been infected for time s (≤  5 years) without having yet developed disease.
PT(a,t, ) No. of persons of age a first infected at time T who are experiencing their first primary episode at time t, who have been diseased for time 
LT(a,t) No. of persons of age a at time t in the “latent” class (comprising those who have either just recovered from their first primary episode, or who have 
been infected for >5 years) whose most recent (re)infection event occurred at time T.
No. of persons of age a at time t, whose most recent reinfection occurred at time T, who have been reinfected for time s  (<5 years) and in whom 
exogenous disease has not yet developed.
No. of persons of age a with exogenous disease at time t, who have been diseased for time  and whose most recent reinfection occurred at time T.
No. of persons of age a with endogenous disease at time t, who have been diseased for time  and whose most recent reinfection occurred at time T.
s ˆ
s ˆ s ˆ
s ˆ
s ˆ
Calculating the Distribution of Strains among Cases at a Given Time
We assumed that all reactivations (which generally involve persons infected for >5 years) of infections acquired before 1950 were with
unique strains and that the strain isolated from persons who had been reinfected was from the most recent (re)infection event. The DNA finger-
print pattern of the strain causing disease among each of the case-patients with onset at time T and whose most recent (re)infection had occurred
at time t since 1950 was assumed to be identical to that with which the source of infection of that person (identified by using the algorithm
described in [6]) had been infected, unless the DNA fingerprint pattern had since changed through random mutations. The proportion of case-
patients who had been infected at time t for whom the DNA fingerprint pattern was assumed to have changed was given by the expression
1-e-0.21661(T-t) which describes a half-life of 3.2 years for DNA fingerprint patterns, as found in a recent study (5). These analyses assume
implicitly that clustered cases were involved, at some level, in the same chain of transmission and that clustering was not attributable, e.g., to
preferential insertion of IS6110 into any particular location in the genome.
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Endemic Babesiosis in Another Eastern 
State: New Jersey
Barbara L. Herwaldt,* Paul C. McGovern,† Michal P. Gerwel,‡ Rachael M. Easton,† and Rob Roy MacGregor†
In the United States, most reported cases of babesiosis
have been caused by Babesia microti and acquired in the
northeast. Although three cases of babesiosis acquired in New
Jersey were recently described by others, babesiosis has not
been widely known to be endemic in New Jersey. We describe
a case of babesiosis acquired in New Jersey in 1999 in an oth-
erwise healthy 53-year-old woman who developed life-threat-
ening disease. We also provide composite data on 40 cases of
babesiosis acquired from 1993 through 2001 in New Jersey.
The 40 cases include the one we describe, the three cases pre-
viously described, and 36 other cases reported to public health
agencies. The 40 cases were acquired in eight (38.1%) of the
21 counties in the state. Babesiosis, a potentially serious
zoonosis, is endemic in New Jersey and should be considered
in the differential diagnosis of patients with fever and hemolytic
anemia, particularly in the spring, summer, and early fall. 
n the United States, most of the hundreds of reported cases of
babesiosis have been caused by Babesia microti, a parasite of
small mammals transmitted by Ixodes scapularis (deer ticks);
these ticks also transmit Borrelia burgdorferi and Anaplasma
(Ehrlichia) phagocytophila. Most reported cases of babesiosis
have been acquired in the northeast, specifically in New York,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Another focus of
B. microti infection is in Wisconsin and Minnesota (1). 
Although three cases of babesiosis acquired in New Jersey
in 1998 were described by Eskow et al. (2), babesiosis has not
been widely known to be endemic in New Jersey. Of interest,
the index case-patient who acquired B. microti infection in the
northeast (on Nantucket Island in 1969) actually was hospital-
ized in New Jersey (3). We describe a case of babesiosis
acquired in New Jersey in 1999 and provide composite data
that include this case, the three cases previously reported by
Eskow et al. (2), and 36 other cases acquired in New Jersey
from 1993 through 2001. Our data strengthen the conclusion
that babesiosis is endemic in New Jersey. 
Methods
Case Detection and Definition
We learned of additional babesiosis cases because they
were reported to the New Jersey Department of Health and
Senior Services or because health-care providers contacted the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) about the
diagnosis or treatment of babesiosis. Although babesiosis is
not a nationally notifiable disease, some states have made
cases of babesiosis reportable. Cases became reportable in
New Jersey in 1985; however, reporting was discontinued in
1990 because no cases had been reported. Reporting was rein-
stated in 1995, and 1997 was the first year in which cases were
reported to the health department. 
We defined a case of babesiosis as an infection occurring in
a symptomatic person whose illness was consistent with babesi-
osis, most likely was acquired in New Jersey, and most likely
resulted from a tick bite rather than a blood transfusion. In addi-
tion, supporting laboratory data had to be provided and include
at least one of the following: identification by light microscopy
of intraerythrocytic Babesia  parasites in a peripheral blood
smear, isolation of the parasite from a whole blood specimen
(by inoculating hamsters [Mesocricetus auratus] intraperito-
neally and examining smears of blood obtained by tail snip,
weekly for up to 2 months), demonstration of B. microti DNA in
a whole blood specimen by polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
analysis at a reference laboratory, or demonstration of a Babe-
sia-specific antibody titer of at least 1:256 with an indirect fluo-
rescent antibody assay for total immunoglobulin (Ig) or IgG. If
only serologic data met the diagnostic criteria, the case was con-
sidered probable rather than confirmed.
Case Report
A previously healthy 53-year-old woman was admitted to
a community hospital on June 24, 1999, because she had had 1
week of fever (38.9°C–39.4°C), rigors, a nonproductive
cough, an occipital headache, and increasing malaise. Three
days before her hospitalization, she started therapy with
cefuroxime axetil for presumed bronchitis but did not
improve. She had a >50 pack-year history of smoking and
drank two to three beers per day. She lived in Burlington
County (Figure 1) in southcentral New Jersey and had not
traveled outside the county recently. Although she did not
recall recent exposure to deer ticks, she occasionally had seen
deer in her backyard and she gardened frequently.
On admission to the hospital, she had a temperature of
39.2°C, a blood pressure level in the 80/60 mm Hg range, and
otherwise unremarkable results on physical examination. She
was anemic and thrombocytopenic, with elevated total biliru-
bin and lactate dehydrogenase values (Table). On the basis of a
blood smear from June 24, which showed intraerythrocytic
ring forms in approximately 5% of the erythrocytes on her
*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA;
†University of Pennsylvania Health System, Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia, USA; and ‡New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services,
Trenton, New Jersey, USA
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peripheral blood smear, treatment for babesiosis was begun on
June 25. The treatment included intravenous clindamycin, 900
mg three times a day, and oral quinine, 650 mg three times a
day; and she was transfused with two units of packed erythro-
cytes. Also on June 25, hypoxic respiratory failure developed,
and she was intubated. A chest radiograph showed diffuse
alveolar infiltrates, which were attributed to the adult respira-
tory distress syndrome (ARDS). 
On June 28, she was transferred to the Hospital of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. When admitted, her blood pressure
was 84/52 mm Hg, despite therapy with dopamine. She contin-
ued therapy for babesiosis for a total of 15 days (the dose of
clindamycin was decreased to 600 mg three times a day on
June 28). Although the level of parasitemia had decreased to
0.3% by June 29, she had ongoing hemolysis and received six
more units of packed erythrocytes during her hospital stay
(Table). No parasites were noted on a blood smear on July 9,
the last day of antibabesial therapy. She had been successfully
weaned from inotropic blood-pressure support on July 2 and
underwent extubation on July 4.
Additional laboratory testing at CDC provided further evi-
dence that she was infected with B. microti. Serum specimens
assayed in parallel, in serial fourfold dilutions, by indirect flu-
orescent antibody testing for antibody to B. microti (4), had
titers of 1:1,024 (June 30, 1999) and 1:16 (July 16, 2000). In
addition, PCR analysis of whole blood from June 30, 1999, by
using  B. microti-specific primers (5), confirmed she was
infected with B. microti. Serologic testing performed at the
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania by enzyme immu-
noassay for antibody to Borr. burgdorferi was negative. 
Complications during her hospitalization unrelated to
babesiosis included nosocomial pneumonia, acute tubular
necrosis from hypoperfusion, bilateral deep venous throm-
boses, pulmonary embolism, and thrombocytopenia tempo-
rally associated with the initiation of heparin therapy (Table).
On July 23, after 30 days in the hospital, she was sent home.
She was continuing to do well as of October 2002.
Composite Data
The 40 cases in our analyses include the case described
above, the three cases previously described by Eskow et al.
(2), and 36 other cases. We did not include six other reported
tick-borne cases that occurred in New Jersey residents,
because the laboratory data did not meet our criteria or infor-
mation about the probable state in which infection was
acquired was not known or provided. 
The number of reported cases of babesiosis increased over
time (Figure 2); 28 (70.0%) of the 40 cases occurred in 2000
or 2001. The 40 cases were acquired in eight (38.1%) of the
state’s 21 counties (Figure 1). Burlington County, on the inner
coastal plain, and Ocean County, on the outer coastal plain,
which are neighboring counties in southcentral New Jersey,
accounted for 25 (62.5%) of the 40 cases; these two counties
are the 7th (Ocean) and 10th (Burlington) most populous
counties in the state. None of the cases were acquired in the
northernmost or southernmost counties of New Jersey. 
Most of the cases were in elderly persons (median age, 67
years; range, 11–87 years). Over half of the cases (22 [55.0%])
were in male patients. The median date of diagnosis was July
20 (range, June 10–September 9; n=36). Two patients (5.0%)
died: an 86-year-old man with multisystem organ failure and
an 80-year-old man with ARDS. The patient whose case we
described here also developed ARDS.
The following information about the patients was not col-
lected systematically. However, three patients were reported to
be asplenic, 18 to have recalled tick bites, 34 to have been hos-
pitalized, and three to have had Lyme disease (no details avail-
able). Underlying conditions included HIV infection in one
patient, who had a CD4 count of 50; diabetes in five patients; a
history of breast or prostate cancer in three patients (no details
available); and a condition that led to chemotherapy in one
person (no details available). 
Various types of laboratory tests were used to diagnose the
40 babesiosis cases. Not all patients were tested with the same
methods. However, 34 patients had positive blood smears; for
27 of these patients, the positive smear was the only laboratory
result that met our diagnostic criteria. All three cases reported
by Eskow et al. were in patients who had negative blood
Figure 1. Map of New Jersey showing its 21 counties. The eight coun-
ties in which reported cases of babesiosis were acquired from 1993
through 2001 are shaded in gray (the darker the gray, the more cases).
The number of cases reported per county is shown under the name of
the county.RESEARCH
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smears (2). One of the two patients who had whole blood inoc-
ulated into hamsters had positive results (i.e., the hamsters
became parasitemic). Four patients had positive PCR results
from a reference laboratory; for one of these patients, these
results were the only ones that met our diagnostic criteria.
Twelve patients had serologic data that met our criteria; for
four patients, the serologic results were the only data that met
our diagnostic criteria. These cases were considered probable
rather than confirmed. CDC confirmed the diagnosis of Babe-
sia infection in 11 (27.5%) of the 40 cases; specimens from the
other 29 case-patients were not sent to CDC. 
Discussion
Our report strengthens the evidence that New Jersey is one
of the eastern states in which babesiosis is endemic. In addi-
tion, the risk for acquisition of infection is widely distributed
in the state. Whether the fact that most of the reported cases
occurred in southcentral and northcentral counties reflects the
degree of endemicity of babesiosis in various areas of New
Jersey is unknown. 
The fact that babesiosis is endemic in New Jersey is not
surprising, given that Lyme disease, the etiologic agent of
which also is transmitted by I. scapularis, is highly endemic in
New Jersey (6,7) and given the geographic proximity of New
Jersey to areas in the northeast where babesiosis is highly
endemic. In a 1996 study, of 100 I. scapularis ticks collected
in Hunterdon County, New Jersey, 43 were infected with Borr.
burgdorferi, 5 were infected with B. microti, and 2 were
infected with both organisms (8). 
The increase in reported cases of babesiosis, which began
in 1998 (Figure 2) and was even more notable in 2000 and
2001, could indicate an increased risk for B. microti infection
and illness. If true, possible reasons for the increased risk could
include a growing abundance of local I. scapularis populations
or the introduction of a more virulent strain of B. microti (9).
However, the increased numbers of reported cases could sim-
ply represent an increased awareness of the disease and
increased reporting. Even so, the 40 cases of babesiosis that we
tallied probably represent only a fraction of the clinical cases
of  B. microti infection acquired in New Jersey from 1993
Table. Clinical data on selected dates for a patient who acquired babesiosis in New Jersey
Date
Temperature 
(°C)
Hematocrit 
(%)
Leukocyte 
count 
(109/L)
Platelet
 count 
(109/L)
Parasitemia 
level (%)
Creatinine 
level 
(mg/dL)a
Total 
bilirubin level 
(mg/dL)a
Lactate 
dehydrogenase 
level (U/L)a Comments
June 24 39.2 25 4.6b 92 5.0 1.1 2.2c 646 Hospitalized
June 25 38.2 — — — — — 3.2 — Antibabesial therapy 
started; intubated;
2 units packed erythrocytes 
transfused
June 26 40.0 31 6.0 55 — 1.1 2.9 1,019 —
June 28 — 28 8.6 93 — 0.9 2.7d — Transferred to the Hospital of 
the University of Pennsylvania
June 29 39.2 27 9.0 99 0.3 1.9 — 5,147 —
June 30 38.3 22 7.9 109 — 2.8 1.5 4,047 2 units packed erythrocytes 
transfused
July 1 38.7 26 9.7 138 — 3.5 1.9 4,140 —
July 2 38.0 26 9.0 139 — 2.9 1.6 3,669 2 units packed erythrocytes 
transfused
July 4 38.7 29 14.7 144 — 2.2 2.2 2,864 Extubated
July 7 38.2 28 19.3 277 — 1.5 — — Developed nosocomial 
pneumonia
July 8 38.1 23 16.3 308 — 1.7 2.1 2,008 2 units packed erythrocytes 
transfused
July 9 38.3 31 11.7 300 0.0 1.8 — — Antibabesial therapy stopped
July 11  Afebrile 28 15.3 310 — 1.8 — — —
July 16 Afebrile 29 15.8 396 — 1.5 1.0 — —
July 19 Afebrile 30 15.8 322 — 1.6 — 1,081 —
July 21 Afebrile 26 12.3 71 — 1.9 — — Developed heparin-associated 
thrombocytopenia
July 23 Afebrile 28 12.4 50 — — — — Sent home
aNormal ranges for community hospital (June 24–June 27): creatinine level, 0.6–1.3 mg/dL; total bilirubin level, 0.2–1.0 mg/dL; indirect bilirubin level, 0.2–1.2 mg/dL; lactate dehy-
drogenase level, 91–180 U/L. Normal ranges for the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania: creatinine level, 0.6–1.0 mg/dL; total bilirubin level, 0.0–1.2 mg/dL; indirect bilirubin 
level, 0.0-1.2 mg/dL; lactate dehydrogenase level, 313–618 U/L.
b25% segmented neutrophils, 33% band forms, 22% lymphocytes, 2% atypical lymphocytes, 8% monocytes.
cIndirect bilirubin level, 1.4 mg/dL.
dIndirect bilirubin level, 2.1 mg/dL; serum haptoglobin level, <38 mg/dL (normal range, 60–160 mg/dL); results of direct and indirect Coombs test, negative.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 187
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through 2001. Presumably, other symptomatic cases (as well as
many more subclinical cases) occurred but were not diagnosed
or reported. In fact, several other possible symptomatic cases
were reported that we did not count because we received insuf-
ficient information about them. Also, as is commonly true for
surveillance data, the amount and quality of the information
provided to the health department and CDC about the cases
varied widely; some of the information might have been inac-
curate, and not all of the cases were confirmed by reference
laboratories (e.g., not all of the blood smears that were reported
as positive were reexamined by a reference laboratory). 
The laboratory tests CDC offers for babesiosis, when indi-
cated, include examination of blood smears, hamster inocula-
tion, and PCR (5) for parasitologic diagnosis and an indirect
fluorescent antibody assay for total immunoglobulin for sero-
logic diagnosis (4). Using PCR for detection of DNA from
Babesia spp. has not yet become a routine diagnostic method,
and the analysis should be conducted by experienced reference
laboratories. 
Immunoblot testing for IgG and IgM is investigational.
However, an immunoblot test for IgG performed well in a
recent evaluation, with a sensitivity of 96% and a specificity of
99% (10). A positive serologic result for IgM (11) is insuffi-
cient for diagnosis without a positive result for IgG. If the IgM
result is positive but the IgG result is negative, a follow-up
specimen should be tested. If IgG seroconversion is not noted,
the IgM result likely was a false positive. Future serologic test-
ing might involve recombinant and synthetic antigens (12)
rather than whole parasites or soluble antigens.
The case we described in detail demonstrates that babesio-
sis can be life threatening (1,13,14). In fact, two (5.0%) of the
40 case-patients died. In the patient we described, the follow-
ing conditions developed: severe anemia, for which she was
transfused with eight units of packed erythrocytes; hypoten-
sion that required inotropic support; ARDS, which has previ-
ously been reported (13–17); and various nosocomial
complications. The fact that she was ill for approximately 1
week before therapy for babesiosis was initiated might have
contributed to the severity of her illness. Fortunately, treatment
for babesiosis was begun soon after she was hospitalized.
Although she was treated successfully with clindamycin and
quinine, a recent clinical trial indicated that the combination of
azithromycin and atovaquone is also effective (18). However,
patients with life-threatening babesiosis were excluded from
the study. Severely ill patients, particularly those with high
levels of parasitemia (e.g., >10%), may benefit from exchange
transfusion (1,19). 
In summary, babesiosis, a potentially serious zoonosis, is
endemic in New Jersey and should be considered in the differ-
ential diagnosis of patients with fever and hemolytic anemia,
particularly in the spring, summer, and early fall. 
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Molecular Typing of IberoAmerican 
Cryptococcus neoformans Isolates
Wieland Meyer,* Alexandra Castañeda,† Stuart Jackson,*‡ Matthew Huynh,* Elizabeth Castañeda,† 
and the IberoAmerican Cryptococcal Study Group1
A network was established to acquire basic knowledge of
Cryptococcus neoformans in IberoAmerican countries. To this
effect, 340 clinical, veterinary, and environmental isolates from
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela,
Guatemala, and Spain were typed by using M13 polymerase
chain reaction-fingerprinting and orotidine monophosphate pyro-
phosphorylase (URA5) gene restriction fragment length polymor-
phsm analysis with HhaI and Sau96I in a double digest. Both
techniques grouped all isolates into eight previously established
molecular types. The majority of the isolates, 68.2% (n=232),
were VNI (var. grubii, serotype A), which accords with the fact
that this variety causes most human cryptococcal infections
worldwide. A smaller proportion, 5.6% (n=19), were VNII (var.
grubii, serotype A); 4.1% (n=14), VNIII (AD hybrid), with 9 iso-
lates having a polymorphism in the URA5 gene; 1.8% (n=6),
VNIV (var. neoformans, serotype D); 3.5% (n=12), VGI; 6.2%
(n=21), VGII; 9.1% (n=31), VGIII, and 1.5% (n=5) VGIV, with all
four VG types containing var. gattii serotypes B and C isolates.
ryptococcosis is among the most prevalent life-threaten-
ing mycoses and has a worldwide distribution. The etio-
logic agent is the basidiomycetous yeast Cryptococcus
neoformans (1,2); three varieties are recognized: C. neofor-
mans var. grubii, serotype A (3), C. neoformans var. neofor-
mans, serotype D, C. neoformans var. gattii, serotypes B and
C, and the hybrid serotype AD (4).
Humans are infected by inhaling infectious propagules
from the environment, which primarily colonize the lung and
subsequently invade the central nervous system (4). C. neofor-
mans var. grubii/neoformans has been isolated worldwide
from soil enriched with avian excreta (4,5). More recently,
decaying wood from certain species of trees has been proposed
as environmental habitat for this variety (6). In contrast, the
distribution in nature for C. neoformans var. gattii is geograph-
ically restricted to mainly tropical and subtropical regions
(7,8). To date, specific host trees are represented by Eucalyp-
tus species, Moquilea tomentosa, Cassia grandis, Ficus micro-
capra, and Terminalia catappa (7–11). 
Worldwide, in immunocompromised hosts, most infec-
tions are caused by C. neoformans var. grubii (4,5). In con-
trast,  C. neoformans var.  gattii virtually always affects
immunocompetent hosts (8).
In the last decade, a number of DNA typing techniques
have been used to study the epidemiology of C. neoformans.
These techniques include karyotyping, random amplification
of polymorphic DNA, restriction fragment length polymor-
phism (RFLP), DNA hybridization studies, amplified frag-
ment length polymorphism (AFLP), and polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) fingerprinting (12–17). 
PCR fingerprinting has been used as the major typing tech-
nique in the ongoing global molecular epidemiologic survey of
C. neoformans (14,18), dividing >400 clinical and environ-
mental isolates into eight major molecular types: VNI (var.
grubii, serotype A), VNII (var. grubii, serotype A), VNIII
(serotype AD), VNIV (var. neoformans, serotype D), VGI,
VGII, VGIII, and VGIV (var. gattii, serotypes B and C). No
correlation between serotype and molecular type has been
found for C. neoformans var. gattii. The molecular types were
recently confirmed by RFLP analysis of the orotidine mono-
phosphate pyrophosphorylase (URA5) gene and the phospholi-
pase (PLB1) gene (19). 
Globally, most of the isolates recovered from AIDS
patients belong to the genotypes VNI and VNIV, whereas the
genotypes VNI and VGI are predominant throughout the
world for C. neoformans var. grubii and C. neoformans var.
gattii, respectively. The larger number of genotype VNI iso-
lates agrees with the fact that C. neoformans var. grubii causes
most human cryptococcal infections worldwide (18,19). 
The aims of this study were the following: 1) to extend the
molecular epidemiologic survey to other parts of the world, 2)
to establish a regional network of participating reference labo-
ratories, and 3) to apply PCR fingerprinting and URA5 RFLP
typing to investigate the genetic structure and possible epide-
miologic relationships between clinical and environmental iso-
lates obtained in Latin America and Spain. The results of this
study permitted us to determine the major molecular types and
their distribution within each participating country.
1Members of the IberoAmerican Cryptococcal Study Group: Argentina: Alicia Arechavala, Hospital
de Infecciosas Francisco J. Muñiz, Buenos Aires; Graciela Davel, Laura Rodero, Diego Perrotta,
Departamento Micología, Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Infecciosas “Dr. Carlos Gregorio
Malbrán,” Buenos Aires; Brazil: Marcia Lazera, Ricardo Pereira-Igreja, Bodo Wanke, Laboratorio
de Micologia Medica, Hospital Evandro Chagas, FundaVao Oswaldo Cruz, Rio de Janeiro; Maria
Jose Mendes-Giannini, Faculdade de Ciências Farmacêuticas, Universidade Estadual Paulista
(UNESP), Araraquara; Marcia S.C. Melhem, Adolfo Lutz Institute SeVao de Micologia, São Paulo;
Marlene Henning-Vainstein, Centro de Biotecnologia (UFRGS), Porto Alegre; Chile: Maria Cristina
Díaz, Programa de Microbiología y Micología, Universidad de Chile, Santiago; Colombia: Angela
Restrepo, Corporación para Investigaciones Biológicas, Medellín; Sandra Huérfano, Instituto
Nacional de Salud, Bogotá; Guatemala: Blanca Samayoa, Hospital San Juan de Dios, Guatemala
City; Heidi Logeman, Universidad de San Carlos, Guatemala City; Mexico: Rubén López Martínez,
Laura Rocío Castañon Olivares, Departamento de Microbiología y Parasitología, Facultad de
Medicina, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México City; Cudberto Contreras-Peres,
José Francisco Valenzuela Tovar, Instituto Nacional de Diagnóstico y Referencia Epidemiológicos,
Mexico City; Peru: Beatriz Bustamante, Instituto de Medicina Tropical Alexander Humboldt, Lima;
Spain: Joseph Torres-Rodriquez, Yolanda Morera, Grup de recerca en Micologia Experimental i
Clínica, Institut Municipal d’Investigació Médica, Univesitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona;
Venezuela: Belinda Calvo, Universidad del Zulia, Maracaibo.
*University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia; †Instituto Nacional de Salud,
Bogotá, Colombia; and ‡University of Western Sydney, Campbelltown,
Australia 
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Materials and Methods
Study Design
During the 12th International Society for Human and Ani-
mal Mycoses meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in March
2000, it was decided to establish an IberoAmerican Cryptococ-
cal Study Group under the coordination of E. Castañeda and
W. Meyer. Each of the participating laboratories was asked to
submit 10–30 isolates. For the clinical isolates, the following
data were requested: isolation date, demographic data (age and
gender of patient), collection location, risk factors, source and
variety, and serotype. For the environmental and veterinary
isolates, the data collected included isolation date, source, col-
lection location, variety, and serotype.
Fungal Isolates
An online appendix of cryptococcal isolates studied in this
study is available at: URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol9no2/02-0246_app.htm. The isolates were obtained by the
participating laboratories of the IberoAmerican Cryptococcal
Study Group and maintained on Sabouraud dextrose agar
slants at 4°C and as water cultures at room temperature. Iso-
lates were identified as C. neoformans by using standard meth-
ods (20). The variety was determined by the color reaction test
on L-canavanine-glycine-bromothymol blue medium (21), and
the serotype was determined, in selected isolates, by the use of
the Crypto Check Kit (Iatron Laboratories Inc., Tokyo, Japan).
The isolates were sent for molecular typing to the Molecu-
lar Mycology Laboratory at the University of Sydney at West-
mead Hospital, Sydney, Australia, either as water cultures or
on Sabouraud dextrose agar slants. For long-term storage, the
isolates were maintained as glycerol stocks at –70°C.
Reference Strains
A set of laboratory standard C. neoformans reference
strains representing each molecular type were used in PCR fin-
gerprinting and URA5 RFLP as follows: WM 148 (serotype A,
VNI), WM 626 (serotype A, VNII), WM 628 (serotype AD,
VNIII), WM 629 (serotype D, VNIV), WM 179 (serotype B,
VGI), WM 178 (serotype B, VGII), WM 161 (serotype B,
VGIII), and WM 779 (serotype C, VGIV) (14).
DNA Extraction
High-molecular-weight DNA was isolated as described
previously (14). Briefly, C. neoformans isolates were grown
on Sabouraud’s dextrose agar at 37°C for 48 h, a loopful of
cells from the culture was mixed with sterile deionized water
and centrifuged. The supernatant was discarded, and the tube
containing the yeast cell pellet was frozen in liquid nitrogen.
The pellet was ground with a miniature pestle. The cell lysis
solution (100 mg triisopropylnapthalene sulfonic acid, 600 mg
para-aminosalicylic acid, 10 mL sterile deionized water, 2.5
mL extraction buffer (1 M Tris-HCl, 1.25 M NaCl, 0.25 M
EDTA, pH 8.0) and 7.5 mL phenol saturated with Tris-EDTA
was preheated to 55°C, and 700 µL of this mixture was added
to the frozen, ground cells. The tubes were incubated for 2 min
at 55°C, shaken occasionally, and then 500 µL chloroform was
added, and the mixture was incubated for a 2 min at 55°C and
shaken occasionally. The tubes were centrifuged for 10 min at
14,000 rpm, and the aqueous phase was transferred to a new
tube. Then, 500 µL of phenol-chloroform-isoamyl alcohol
(25:24:1) was added, shaken for 2 min at room temperature,
and centrifuged as above. The aqueous phase was transferred
to a new tube, 500 µL of chloroform was added, shaken, and
centrifuged as above. To precipitate the genomic DNA, the
aqueous phase was again transferred to a new tube, and 0.03
volumes 3.0 M sodium acetate (pH 5.2) and 2.5 volumes cold
96% ethanol were added, and the mixture was gently shaken
and incubated at –20°C for at least 1 h or overnight. The solu-
tion was centrifuged for 30 min at 14,000 rpm to pellet the
DNA. The DNA pellet was washed with 70% ethanol and cen-
trifuged for 10 min at 14,000 rpm and air-dried. The DNA was
resuspended in 200 µL sterile deionized water at 4°C over-
night and stored at –20°C.
PCR Fingerprinting
The minisatellite-specific core sequence of the wild-type
phage M13 (5′  GAGGGTGGCGGTTCT 3′ ) (22) was used as
single primer in the PCR. The amplification reactions were
performed in a volume of 50 µL containing 25 ng high-molec-
ular-weight genomic DNA, 10 mM Tris-HCl, pH 8.3, 50 mM
KCl, 1.5 mM MgCl, 0.2 mM  each of the dATP, dCTP, dGTP
and dTTP (Roche Diagnostics GmbH, Mannheim, Mannheim,
Germany), 3 mM magnesium acetate, 30 ng primer, and 2.5 U
Amplitaq DNA polymerase (Applied Biosystems, Foster City,
CA). PCR was performed for 35 cycles in a Perkin-Elmer ther-
mal cycler (model 480) with 20 s of denaturation at 94°C, 1
min annealing at 50°C, and 20 s extension at 72°C, followed
by a final extension cycle for 6 min at 72°C. Amplification
products were removed, concentrated to approximately 20 µL
and separated by electrophoresis on 1.4% agarose gels (stained
with ethidium bromide, 10 mg/mL stock) in 1X Tris-borate-
EDTA (TBE) buffer at 60 V for 14 cm, and visualized under
UV light (14). Molecular types (VNI–VNIV and VGI–VGIV)
were assigned, according to the major bands in the patterns.
All visible bands were included in the analysis, independent of
their intensity (14,18).
URA5 Gene RFLP
PCR of the URA5 gene was conducted in a final volume of
50 µL. Each reaction contained 50 ng of DNA, 1X PCR buffer
(10 mM Tris-HCl, pH 8.3, 50 mM KCl, 1.5 mM MgCl2;
Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA), 0.2 mM each of dATP,
dCTP, dGTP, and dTTP (Roche Diagnostics GmbH), 3 mM
magnesium acetate, 1.5 U AmpliTaq DNA polymerase (Applied
Biosystems), and 50 ng of each primer URA5 (5′ ATGTCCTC-
CCAAGCCCTCGACTCCG 3′ ) and SJ01 (5′  TTAAGAC-
CTCTGAACACCGTACTC 3′ ). PCR was performed for 35
cycles in a Perkin-Elmer thermal cycler (model 480) at 94°C for
2-min initial denaturation, 45 s of denaturation at 94°C, 1 minEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 191
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annealing at 61°C, and 2-min extension at 72°C, followed by a
final extension cycle for 10 min at 72°C. Amplification products
were mixed with one fifth volume of loading buffer (15% Ficoll
400, 0.25% orange G, MilliQ water), 15 µL of PCR products
were double digested with Sau96I (10 U/µL) and HhaI (20 U/
µl) for 3 h or overnight and separated by 3% agarose gel electro-
phoresis at 100 V for 5 h. RFLP patterns were assigned visually
by comparing them with the patterns obtained from the standard
strains (VNI-VNIV and VGI-VGIV) (Jackson et al. unpub.
data).
Statistical Analysis
Initially, individual PCR fingerprints were visually com-
pared to those of the standard strains, amplified in parallel, to
determine the major molecular type for each isolate. The com-
puter program GelComparII, version 1.01 (Applied Maths,
Kortrijk, Belgium) was used to determine the genetic relation-
ship of the strains. DNA bands of each fingerprint pattern were
defined manually with a band-position tolerance of 0.9%,
being the optimal settings needed to define the molecular size
marker bands as 100% identical. Similarity coefficients were
calculated by using the Dice algorithm, and cluster analyses
were performed by the neighbor-joining algorithms by using
the “Fuzzy Logic” and “Area Sensitive” option of the Gelcom-
parII program.
Results
During the course of this investigation, a network was estab-
lished with 15 laboratories from nine countries participating in this
study. The participant countries were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Spain, and Venezuela.
A total of 340 C. neoformans isolates, comprising 266
clinical, 7 veterinary, and 67 environmental isolates were sub-
mitted for molecular typing. Of these, 57 were from Argentina
(53 clinical and 4 environmental), 66 from Brazil (56 clinical,
9 environmental, and 1 veterinary), 19 from Chile (15 clinical
and 4 environmental), 62 from Colombia (39 clinical and 23
environmental), 15 from Guatemala (all clinical), 69 from
Mexico (46 clinical and 23 environmental), 13 from Peru (all
clinical), 19 from Spain (9 clinical, 6 veterinary, and 4 envi-
ronmental), and 20 from Venezuela (all clinical). From the
total isolates investigated, 271 (79.6%) were C. neoformans
var. grubii/neoformans; 251 (92.6%) of them were C. neofor-
mans var. grubii, 6 (1.8%) were C. neoformans var. neofor-
mans, and 13 (4.8%) were AD hybrid isolates. The remaining
69 (20.4%) isolates were C. neoformans var. gattii.
All 340 isolates were typed by PCR fingerprinting by using
the minisatellite-specific oligonucleotide M13 as a single
primer and RFLP analysis of the URA5 gene with the restric-
tion enzymes Sau96I and HhaI in a double digest. The molecu-
lar types were determined for each isolate by comparing the
obtained PCR fingerprint profiles and URA5 RFLP patterns
with the respective standard patterns for each molecular type. 
The serotyping results (Iatron) correlated with the molecu-
lar subtyping results in all serotype B (n=31) and C (n=13) iso-
lates. Regarding serotype A, 99 from a total of 102 (97%)
isolates correlated; the remaining 3 were serotype A by the
Iatron and serotype AD by the molecular typing method.
Regarding serotype D, one of four reported was confirmed by
molecular typing; the other three were serotype AD. For sero-
type AD, two isolates were found when typed with the Iatron
kit and eight when typed with molecular typing techniques.
All the changes were found in the isolates from Spain. This
finding is not surprising, taking into account that problems
with the serotyping concerning potential serotype AD hybrids
are known (4). A list of  the characteristics of the studied iso-
lates by participating country, laboratory, laboratory code,
clinical, veterinary or environmental origin, isolate character-
istics (isolation year, isolation location, source, gender, age
and risk factor), variety, serotype and the molecular type iden-
tified during this study is available in an online appendix
(http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no2/02-0246_app.htm). 
Both molecular typing techniques grouped the isolates in
the eight previously established major genotypes (Figures 1 and
2). From the isolates investigated, 232 (68.2%) were molecular
type VNI (serotype A, var. grubii), 19 (5.6%) were molecular
type VNII (serotype A, var. grubii), 14 (4.1%) were molecular
type VNIII (serotype A/D, hybrid between the serotypes A and
D), with 5 having a RFLP pattern of the URA5 gene with seven
bands, indicated by VNIII in the online Appendix and Figure
3B and 4B, corresponding to a hybrid between VNI, VNII, and
VNIV and 9 isolates having an RFLP pattern of the URA5 gene
with six bands, indicated by VNIII* in the online Appendix and
Figure 4B and 5B, corresponding to a hybrid between VNII and
VNIV, 6 (1.8%) were molecular type VNIV (serotype D, var.
neoformans), 12 (3.5%) were molecular type VGI (serotypes B
and C, var. gattii), 21 (6.2%) were molecular type VGII (sero-
types B and C, var. gattii), 31 (9.1%) were molecular type
VGIII (serotypes B and C, var. gattii), and 5 (1.5%) were
molecular type VGIV (serotypes B and C, var. gattii). 
Figures 3A and 4A show examples of PCR fingerprints
obtained from Mexican and Spanish isolates; Figures 3B and
4B show the corresponding URA5 RFLP patterns for the same
isolates. The Mexican isolates were selected because they
were representative of the patterns observed from all the iso-
lates submitted by the Latin American participating laborato-
ries. The Spanish isolates were selected because they
represented a distribution of molecular types corresponding to
those observed in previous studies on European isolates (14). 
From the 340 isolates studied 277, marked with “#” in the
online Appendix, have been included in the GelComparII anal-
ysis. Sixty-three isolates were excluded from the analysis
since their PCR fingerprinting patterns were not sharp or had
been run under slightly different electrophoresis conditions,
making the band positions impossible to compare. Cluster
analysis of the PCR-fingerprinting profiles by using the
GelComparII program grouped all isolates into three major
clusters according to variety and into eight major groups
according to the molecular type. The overall homology
observed was 50.4% among isolates of C. neoformans var.RESEARCH
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grubii, 50.9% for C. neoformans var. neoformans, and 51.2%
for C. neoformans var. gattii (Figure 2). The homology within
a given molecular type was as follows: 54.8% VNI, 57.3%
VNII, 51.9% VNIII, 50.9% VNIV, 56.4% VGI, 56.4% VGII,
54.4% VGIII, and 68.3% VGIV. 
Besides grouping all isolates into the eight major molecu-
lar patterns, the molecular type VNI could be subdivided into
eight main subclusters, with most of these subclusters’ group-
ing isolates obtained from specific countries. The similarity
between isolates obtained from any individual country varied
from 65% to 82%. Most of the main subclusters within molec-
ular type VNI also contained isolates from different countries,
indicating gene flow and strain dispersal between South Amer-
ican countries, Spain, or both. However, all isolates could be
separated by their unique PCR-fingerprinting pattern, with the
highest homology being 84% between two unrelated environ-
mental isolates from Mexico City (LA 22, budgerigar [para-
keet] droppings, and LA 25, pigeon droppings). 
Of the 266 clinical isolates, 177 (66.5%) were obtained
from HIV-positive patients, with 139 (78.5%) being VNI, 14
(7.9%) VNII, 13 (7.4%) VNIII, 6 (3.4%) VNIV, 3 (1.7%) VGII,
and 2 (1.1%) VGIII. Most (86.4%) isolates from HIV-positive
patients belonged to the molecular types VNI and VNII, repre-
senting serotype A, C. neoformans var. grubii. Of these, 266
clinical isolates, 51 (19.2%) were recovered from patients with
no reported risk factors. From those, 23 (45.1%) were var. gru-
bii with the molecular type VNI (n=21) or VNII (n=2), and 28
(54.9%) were var. gattii with the molecular types VGI (n=3),
VGII (n=10), VGIII (n=14), and VGIV (n=1). For 26 of the
clinical isolates, no data concerning risk factors were available.
Six veterinary isolates were molecular type VGI, and one was
VGII. Most of the environmental isolates belonged to C. neo-
formans var. grubii with 73.1% being VNI (n=49) and 1.5%
VNIII (n=1) AD hybrids. The remaining 17 (25.3%) isolates
were C. neoformans var. gattii with the molecular type VGI
(n=1), VGII (n=3), VGIII (n=12), and VGIV (n=1).
Cryptococcal isolates included in the IberoAmerican study
were more frequently obtained from men than from women.
The male-to-female ratio was 2l1 to 41, i.e., cryptococcosis
was 5.1 times more common in men than in women. In the
HIV-positive population alone, the incidence of cryptococco-
sis was 5.5 times more frequent in men than in women, based
on the data obtained from the isolates investigated in this
study. The age of the patients with clinically manifested cryp-
tococcosis ranged from 4 to 73; 175 (65.9%) were between 21
and 40 years old.
The clinical isolates submitted to this study were collected
over a period of 41 years, 1961–2001; most (92.5%) of the iso-
lates were collected in the mid-1990s. The veterinary isolates
were recovered from goats in Spain in 1995 and from a parrot
in Brazil in 2000. The environmental isolates submitted were
collected over a period of 7 years, 1993–2000.
Discussion
This retrospective study of cryptococcosis in IberoAmer-
ica was set up in an effort to establish a network of medical
Figure 1.  Geographic distribution of the molecular types obtained from
IberoAmerican  Cryptococcus neoformans isolates by polymerase chain
reaction fingerprinting and URA5 gene restriction fragment length polymor-
phis analysis (total numbers studied per country given in parentheses).
Figure 2. Dendrogram of the polymerase chain reaction-fingerprinting
patterns obtained with the primer M13 from a selection of the
IberoAmerican isolates studied. All the isolates fall into eight major
molecular types, which fall into three major groups corresponding to
Cryptococcus neoformans var. grubii, serotype A, with two molecular
types VNI and VNII; C. neoformans var. neoformans, serotype D, with
the molecular type VNIV; and C. neoformans var. gattii serotypes B and
C, with the molecular types VGI, VGII, VGIII and VGIV. In addition to
the three major clusters we can see the intermediate molecular type
VNIII, representing the AD hybrids.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 193
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mycology laboratories to study the distribution of cryptococcal
isolates, including the varieties and molecular types within the
participating countries. The network was aimed at generating
PCR-fingerprint and URA5 RFLP patterns under standardized
conditions in the Molecular Mycology Laboratory of the Uni-
versity of Sydney at Westmead Hospital, for a subset of clini-
cal and environmental C. neoformans isolates from each
participating country. These reference profiles are now avail-
able to each participating laboratory so they can set up the
molecular typing techniques in their own laboratories, and to
serve as internal controls in future extended studies of crypto-
coccal isolates in each country. 
The data were obtained from a random selection of crypto-
coccal isolates from each participating country and laboratory,
which do not necessarily reflect the true situation in
IberoAmerica. Nonetheless, the data offer a general overview
of molecular types and variety distribution of C. neoformans
in IberoAmerica. For the first time, two different molecular
typing techniques, PCR-fingerprinting with the minisatellite
specific primer M13 and URA5 gene RFLP analysis, were
applied simultaneously to the same set of cryptococcal iso-
lates, demonstrating identical groupings to the eight major
molecular types previously described (14,18).
Previous pilot studies that used PCR-fingerprinting at the
University of Sydney at Westmead Hospital distributed more
than 400 clinical and environmental isolates obtained from
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Italy, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Thailand, Uganda,
and the United States in eight major molecular types, VNI and
VNII (serotype A), VNIII (serotype AD), VNIV (serotype D),
VGI, VGII, VGIII and VGIV (serotypes B and C) (14,18). At
the time of this original work, the molecular types VNI and
VGI were found to be the most common genotypes world-
wide. The present study, which includes more isolates from
Latin America, showed the same results as regards variety
grubii, with VNI being the predominant molecular type,
accounting for 68.2% of all isolates. However, the situation
changed drastically for variety gattii; as in this study, the pre-
dominant molecular type was VGIII, accounting for 9.1% of
all isolates, in contrast to previous studies which showed that
the molecular type VGIII was geographically restricted to
India and the United States (18,19). In the present study, VGIII
was also found in Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico
Figure 3. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) fingerprints generated with
the primer M13 (3A), and URA5 gene restriction fragment length poly-
morphism (RFLP) profiles identified by double digest of the gene with
Sau96I and HhaI (3B) obtained from a selection of Mexican Cryptococ-
cus neoformans isolates, given as a representative example for the
patterns obtained from clinical and environmental isolates from Latin
America. Standard patterns obtained from the reference strains of the
major molecular types by PCR-fingerprinting patterns with the micro-
satellite specific primer M13 as a single primer in the PCR (right-hand
side of 3A)  and  URA5 gene  RFLP profiles generated after double
digest with Sau96I and HhaI (right-hand side of 3B) (VNIII correspond
to the seven-band URA5 RFLP pattern and VNIII* correspond to the
six-band URA5 RFLP pattern).
Figure 4.  Polymerase chain reaction fingerprints generated with the
primer M13 (4A) and URA5 gene restriction fragment length polymor-
phism (RFLP) profiles identified via double digest of the gene with
Sau96I and HhaI (4B) obtained from the Spanish clinical, veterinary,
and environmental Cryptococcus neoformans isolates (VNIII corre-
spond to the seven-band URA5 RFLP pattern and VNIII* correspond to
the six-band URA5 RFLP pattern). 100bp MassRuler used as molecu-
lar marker in 4B.RESEARCH
194 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003
and Venezuela, suggesting that it is not as limited as previ-
ously suggested. The same was true for the molecular type
VGIV, previously assigned only to India and South Africa
(18,19); its presence in Colombia and Mexico, although in
very low numbers, indicates a wider geographic distribution.
In general, the most common variety was C. neoformans
var. grubii, 73.8% (n=251), followed by variety gattii, 20.3%
(n=69). Much less common were the AD hybrids, 4.1% (n=14)
and variety neoformans, 1.8% (n=6), which reflects the global
distribution previously established (14,18,23).
The overall grouping of the isolates into eight major
molecular types by PCR-fingerprinting with the minisatellite
specific primer M13, obtained in this study and the previous
pilot study by Meyer et al. 1999 (14) and Ellis et al. 2000 (18),
agrees with the findings by Boekhout et al. 2001 (23) and by
Cogliati et al. in 2000 (24). Boekhout et al. (23) used AFLP
analysis to study 206 global isolates of C. neoformans, and
grouped them into six major AFLP groups, whereas Cogliati et
al.  (24), using a slightly modified PCR-fingerprinting tech-
nique with the microsatellite specific primer (GACA)4,
grouped Italian isolates of C. neoformans var. grubii and var.
neoformans into four major molecular types. Comparable
molecular/genotypes, which where identified in the four cited
independent studies, are VNI = AFLP1 = Cogliati VN6 (sero-
type A, var. grubii); VNII = AFLP1A (serotype A, var. grubii);
VNIII = AFLP3 = Cogliati VN3 and VN4 (serotype AD,
hybrid between var. grubii and var. neoformans); VNIV =
AFLP2 = Cogliati VN1 (serotype D, var. neoformans); VGI =
AFLP4, VGII = AFLP6, VGIII = AFLP5 and VGIV (all corre-
sponding to serotypes B and C, var. gattii) (14,18,23,24).
The overall results show some clonality between isolates
obtained from a certain country or even between different
countries, suggesting partial clonal spread of the pathogenic
yeast within South America. However, the approximately
50%, overall similarity between C. grubii isolates, with the
highest being 82%, suggests that these South American iso-
lates are more varied than those obtained in a previous study
by Franzot et al. (25), in which they examined a limited num-
ber of isolates from Brazil by using less discriminatory molec-
ular techniques (CNRE-1 RFLP analysis and URA5
sequencing). In Franzot’s study, the highest similarity was
>94% between the Brazilian isolates, suggesting a higher
clonality than observed in the isolates obtained from New
York City studied in the same paper (25).
Interestingly, Chile and Spain share similar molecular
types. Both countries have a large number of molecular type
VNIII isolates (AD hybrids), 15.8% and 42.1%, respectively,
although VNIV serotype D isolates were present only in Chile
(26.3%). These groups are usually common in a number of
European countries, such as France and Italy (26–28). How-
ever, only these two countries show two different URA5 RFLP
patterns, one consisting of seven bands, indicating a hybrid
between VNI, VNII, and VNIV, and a second new hybrid
URA5 RFLP pattern, consisting of six bands, indicating a
hybrid between VNII and VNIV. As a result of the IberoAmeri-
can study, these hybrid patterns had recently been reported as
part of Jackson’s honor’s thesis work (Jackson and Meyer
unpub. data, 2000). The seven-band URA5 RFLP pattern was
exclusively found in Spain (n=3) and Chile (n=2). These strains
seem to be triploid, and cloning with subsequent sequencing of
the PCR product showed that they contain three different cop-
ies of the URA5 gene. The six-band URA5 RFLP pattern found
in Spain (n=5) and Chile (n=1), was also found in Mexico
(n=1) and Argentina (n=2), possibly due to the presence of the
molecular types VNII and VNIV in these countries (14). These
hybrid isolates are diploid at the URA5 locus and contain two
different copies of the gene (Jackson and Meyer, unpub. data). 
Further studies are needed to investigate the special rela-
tionship between isolates obtained from these two countries.
The similarity in the molecular types obtained from Spanish
and Chilean isolates provides further evidence, that the crypto-
coccal strains present today in South America could be intro-
duced during the European colonization. This idea had been
suggested by Franzot et al. (25) when investigating isolates
obtained from Brazil. The authors argue that the pigeon
(Columba livia), thought to provide a major reservoir of C.
neoformans in pigeon excreta, is believed to have originated in
southern Europe and northern Africa and has been dispersed
worldwide by human travel (29).
Most of the cryptococcal isolates in this study were recov-
ered from patients whose main risk factor was HIV infection.
Overwhelming numbers of these isolates corresponded to the
molecular type VNI, in accordance with previous findings,
showing that isolates of this molecular type are the major
source of infection in HIV-positive patients worldwide
(18,19). This finding highlights the fact that most human cryp-
tococcal infections are caused by C. neoformans var. grubii,
serotype A (4,5). A distinct picture emerged in the group of
isolates obtained from patients with no known risk factors, as
most were C. neoformans var. gattii isolates (n=28), with the
molecular types VGI (n=3), VGII (n=10), VGIII (n=14), and
VGIV (n=1), compared to 23 isolates belonging to the overall
most common molecular type, VNI (41.2%) of C. neoformans
var. grubii. This finding supports the conclusion that variety
gattii primarily infects immunocompetent patients as Chen et
al.  had  found when investigating Australian isolates (30).
These authors have proposed that aboriginal people living in
rural areas of Australia’s Northern Territory have a higher risk
of cryptococcosis because they live in close proximity to the
potential natural host of C. neoformans var. gattii, the eucalyp-
tus trees (30).
Despite the fact that isolates included in this study consti-
tuted a random sampling, the results show again that HIV
infection is the most important risk factor for cryptococcosis
(31). This conclusion is supported by the number of isolates
recovered from HIV-positive patients (n=177), the age distri-
bution, which peaks between 20 and 40 years of age, and the
date of isolation with a peak corresponding to the 1990s. 
Overall, the network of mycology laboratories established
in IberoAmerica provided, for the first time, a baseline knowl-Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 195
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edge of C. neoformans variety and molecular type distribution
in the participating countries, placing the IberoAmerican iso-
lates in the global picture of cryptococcosis. 
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Health and Economic Impact of 
Surgical Site Infections Diagnosed 
after Hospital Discharge
Eli N. Perencevich,*† Kenneth E. Sands,*† Sara E. Cosgrove,* Edward Guadagnoli,‡ 
Ellen Meara,‡ and Richard Platt§†‡
 Although surgical site infections (SSIs) are known to cause
substantial illness and costs during the index hospitalization, lit-
tle information exists about the impact of infections diagnosed
after discharge, which constitute the majority of SSIs. In this
study, using patient questionnaire and administrative data-
bases, we assessed the clinical outcomes and resource utiliza-
tion in the 8-week postoperative period associated with SSIs
recognized after discharge. SSI recognized after discharge was
confirmed in 89 (1.9%) of 4,571 procedures from May 1997 to
October 1998. Patients with SSI, but not controls, had a signifi-
cant decline in SF-12 (Medical Outcomes Study 12-Item Short-
Form Health Survey) mental health component scores after
surgery (p=0.004). Patients required significantly more outpa-
tient visits, emergency room visits, radiology services, readmis-
sions, and home health aide services than did controls.
Average total costs during the 8 weeks after discharge were
US$5,155 for patients with SSI and $1,773 for controls
(p<0.001). 
urgical site infections (SSIs), the second most common
cause of nosocomial infection after urinary tract infec-
tions, cause approximately 17% of all hospital-acquired infec-
tions (1) and lead to increased costs and worse patient
outcomes in hospital inpatients (2). The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention estimates that approximately 500,000
SSIs occur annually in the United States (3). Costs and out-
comes secondary to SSIs can vary by location and surgery
type. Infections in cardiac surgery have been estimated to add
from US$8,200 (1982 dollars) to $42,000 (1985 dollars) to the
cost of care after adjustments are made for preexisting ill-
nesses and conditions, and these increased costs are likely
attributable to excess hospital and intensive care unit stays (4–
6). Overall, SSIs may result in $1–$10 billion in direct and
indirect medical costs each year (3,7). 
With the current trends favoring a shortened postoperative
hospital stay, outpatient surgery, and same-day surgery, more
SSIs are occurring after discharge from the hospital and, there-
fore, beyond the reach of most hospital infection control sur-
veillance programs (8). Of all surgical procedures, 75% are
now estimated to occur in the outpatient or ambulatory setting,
and for those that do occur in the inpatient setting, postopera-
tive length of stay is decreasing (9). An estimated 47% to 84%
of SSIs occur after discharge; most of these are managed
entirely in the outpatient setting (8,10).
Given the high costs and adverse patient outcomes associ-
ated with SSIs, quantifying the clinical and economic impact
of SSIs recognized after discharge from the hospital is impor-
tant. Several studies have focused on the direct medical costs
borne by the hospital or insurer, but to our knowledge, no
study has assessed the full societal impact of SSIs, which
includes indirect costs, such as lost patient productivity and
diminished functional status (11,12). Additionally, no study
has addressed the costs of SSIs that arise from most of these
infections which now occur in the postdischarge setting and
for which patients are not readmitted to the index hospital. The
magnitude of these costs might not be known if ascertainment
were left solely to the index hospital’s information systems. 
Methods
This study used a matched cohort design to compare the
costs and illness of patients with an SSI to matched patients
who had surgery during the same period but in whom an SSI
did not develop. The study population was drawn from adult
members of Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates, a 250,000-
member multispecialty group practice, which at the time of the
study was a staff model component of Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care, a health maintenance organization. Study participants
were those who had undergone a nonobstetric inpatient or out-
patient operating room procedure at Brigham and Women’s
Hospital from May 18, 1997, through October 31, 1998. Cases
of SSI were identified prospectively by using an established
method of automated medical record screening for 102 diag-
nostic, testing, or treatment codes that may have indicated the
occurrence of an SSI in the outpatient setting (13). In addition,
pharmacy records were screened for antibiotic dispensing, and
claims were screened for hospital readmissions or emergency
room visits pertaining to an SSI. Surgeries were identified in
2-week cycles, and a total of 38 cycles were completed. An
investigator reviewed those records judged to indicate a post-
discharge SSI by initial screening, using the National Nosoco-
*Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts, USA;
†Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Eastern Massachusetts
Prevention Epicenter, Boston, Massachusetts, USA; ‡Harvard Medical
School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA; and §Brigham and Women’s
Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
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mial Infections Surveillance criteria during the 30-day
postoperative period to confirm infection (14). Patients who
had an SSI that occurred during the index hospitalization were
excluded. Case-patients were individually matched on surgery
type, age and duration of surgical procedure in a ratio of one
case-patient to two other members of the cohort. 
Questionnaire
Participants were enrolled 5–7 weeks after surgery. All
case-patients and matched pairs were mailed a 49-item ques-
tionnaire, an explanatory letter, and a consent form. The ques-
tionnaire contained three sections. The first section had
questions designed to assess illness, which were taken from
the National Health Interview Survey, and additional questions
designed to quantify care and resource use during the 8-week
postoperative period, including home visits, phone calls to
practitioners, missed days from work, and family members’
missed days from work (15). The second and third sections
were each designed to assess health-related quality of life by
using the Medical Outcomes Study 12-Item Short-Form
Health Survey (SF-12) during the 8 weeks after surgery and
the 4 weeks before surgery, respectively (16). Patients were
instructed to recall their overall health since surgery and their
health before surgery. Patients who did not return question-
naires were followed up with phone calls and re-mailing of the
survey. If they did not return the questionnaire within 90 days,
they were considered nonresponders. If questionnaires were
incomplete, the answers that were provided were included in
the analyses. SF-12 mental and physical scores (MCS-12 and
PCS-12, respectively) were normalized by using standard
methods to obtain mean scores (16). 
Administrative Databases
Four administrative databases were used to determine pro-
vider-level resource use associated with the 8 weeks after dis-
charge from the operation that led to entry into the cohort. The
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care demographic database was used
to capture patient date of birth, gender, and zip code. This
health maintenance organization maintains an automated
administrative claims system that houses all charges from ven-
dors, including hospitals, and outside the ambulatory-care cen-
ters. This database included the associated discharge date for
index surgery, from which we calculated the 8 weeks’ postop-
erative time window for our analysis and from which we
counted the resource utilization across all databases. This data-
base provided all charges between the vendor or facility and
the health maintenance organization, length of stay, procedure
codes, diagnosis codes, and pharmacy codes for all encounters
that occurred outside of the health plan. Thus, any readmis-
sion, emergency room visit, skilled nursing facility stay, or
home health aide charge appeared in this database. 
In addition, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care maintained an
automated ambulatory medical record system that captured all
ambulatory encounters and orders at its health centers. This
database allowed determination of the number of outpatient
visits, telephone calls, and most laboratory tests. This database
also captures the number of inpatient physician encounters
made by the health maintenance organization’s patients. Costs
associated with outpatient visits at the health centers were
imputed by using the costs for CPT Codes 99213–99215 from
the 1998 National Physician Fee Schedule Relative Value File
(available from: URL: http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/pufiles.htm).
The first visit for each case-patient with an SSI was assumed
to be an established-patient visit lasting 40 minutes (CPT
99215), and the first visit for those without an SSI was
assumed to last 25 minutes (CPT 99214). All subsequent visits
for all patients were assumed to last 15 minutes (CPT 99213).
Costs in 1998 for CPT codes 99213, 99214, and 99215 were
$41.46, $62.74, and $99.06, respectively.
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care also maintains a database that
captures all pharmacy prescriptions dispensed in the outpatient
setting (17). This database provided the standard wholesale
costs for all antibiotic prescriptions for the 8-week postopera-
tive period. 
Chronic disease scores, as a marker for patient preexisting
conditions and illnesses, have been shown to be predictors of
SSI and also of death, hospitalization, and resource utilization
(18–21). The chronic disease score, as used here, is a method
for controlling for preexisting conditions on the basis of
patient age, gender, and recent history of drug dispensing. This
score predicts for hospitalization (22) and SSI (19) and thus
would appear to be a useful adjuster for preexisting conditions
in our cost analysis. For each patient, a chronic disease score
was created by using patient age, sex, and presence or absence
of 29 chronic diseases, calculated from the 6-month preopera-
tive ambulatory pharmacy dispensing record (18,19). 
Attributable charges of SSI recognized after discharge
were calculated by taking the mean charges of case-patients
and subtracting the mean charges of control patients. Mean
charges were chosen for this comparison since the use of
medians would negate the effect that even a moderately rare
event (those that occur in <50% of the study population)
would have on health-care costs. For those areas of resource
utilization in which only charges were available, charges were
converted to costs by using a cost-to-charges ratio. Since this
study involved readmission and resource utilization at several
different hospitals, conversion to costs would have required
institution-specific ratios of costs to charge, to which we did
not have access. We have, therefore, chosen to use a published
ratio of costs to charges from a cohort of 4,108 patients admit-
ted in the same city to two hospitals, one of which was the
index hospital in this study, and during a similar period to this
study (23). 
Statistics
Student t test, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, or Fisher exact test
were used, where appropriate, for univariate comparisons.
Outcomes are presented as medians with interquartile range,
means with standard deviations, or proportions. Cases and
matched controls were compared by using the WilcoxonRESEARCH
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signed-ranks test for continuous outcomes with non-normal
distributions, continuous linear regression by forcing the
matching variable into the model for normally distributed vari-
ables, or the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel for matched binary
variables. Almost all assessed utilization outcomes, including
all charges, were non-normally distributed so both medians
with interquartile range and means with standard deviation are
reported. Multivariable unconditional logistic regression was
used to control for confounding variables in the analysis of the
questionnaire data, and all matched variables were forced into
the model to account for the matching process. 
Since combined total costs and charges (ambulatory, phar-
macy, and nonambulatory) of the entire cohort of 267 patients
were log-normally distributed, the total cost variable was ana-
lyzed by using a log-transformation of total costs in a matched
linear regression model. To estimate the effect that preexisting
conditions or index surgery duration might have on the attrib-
utable effect of SSI on total costs, a matched linear regression
with log-transformed total costs as the outcome was created
with the predictors SSI/no SSI, chronic disease score (CDS),
and index surgery duration entered as variables into the model.
Results are given as β -estimates of effect, R-square statistic,
and p value for five models (only SSI versus no SSI; only
CDS; both SSI versus no SSI and CDS; both SSI versus no SSI
and index surgery duration; and all three variables: SSI, CDS,
and duration of index surgery). All statistical tests were two-
tailed; p <0.05 was considered statistically significant. Statisti-
cal analyses were performed with SAS v 8.01 for Windows
(SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC).
During the anticipated study period, 3,000 surgeries would
be estimated to be performed and, given a 2.8% risk for infec-
tion beginning after discharge from the hospital (based on our
prior observations), 84 SSIs would be recognized after dis-
charge. This gave a power of 0.89 to detect >5 days lost from
usual activities. Our actual sample of SSIs recognized after
discharge was 89 (1.9%) from a sample of 4,571 procedures. 
All data collected were combined into one dataset for final
analysis, after which all unique identifiers were removed. In
addition, each patient provided a signed consent form before
completing the questionnaire and being enrolled in the study.
The Harvard Pilgrim Health Care institutional review board
approved this study. 
Results
SSI recognized after discharge was confirmed in 89 (1.9%)
of 4,571 procedures. One hundred seventy-eight patients with
similar age, procedure types, and surgical duration were
matched to the SSI patients in a ratio of one case-patient to two
controls (Table 1). No significant differences in age, gender, or
surgery type between case-patients and matched controls were
noted. Surgery duration was significantly longer for SSI
patients, despite having been matched for procedure duration.
This was expected because procedure duration is an important
risk factor for infection. 
Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of cohort in study of surgical site 
infections (SSI), Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, 1997–1998a
Characteristic
Case-patients
N (% or SDa)
Controls
N (% or SDa)p  v a l u e
Study cohort N=267 89 178
Demographics of complete cohort 
Age (yr) 55.8 (+/-14.6) 57.5 (+/-13.3) 0.33b
Male gender 43 (48.3) 94 (52.8) 0.52c
Surgery duration (min) 177 (+/-112) 137 (+/-74) 0.037d
Chronic disease score 3,058 (+/-2636) 2,148 (+/-2285) 0.005d
Surgery location (inpatient) 73 (82) 149 (83.7) 1.0c
Surgery type
 Cardiac 26 (29.2) 53 (29.8) 1.0c
 General 25 (28.1) 53 (29.8) 0.89c
 Gynecology 2 (2.3) 4 (2.3) 1.0c
 Neurology 4 (4.5) 8 (4.5) 1.0c
 Orthopedic 15 (16.9) 32 (18) 0.87c
 Other 2 (2.3) 3 (1.7) 1.0c
 Plastic 5 (5.6) 6 (3.4) 0.51c
 Urology 3 (3.4) 6 (3.4) 1.0c
 Vascular 7 (7.9) 13 (7.3) 1.0c
Description of questionnaire responders
Responder N=173 (65%) 50 (56.2) 123 (69.1) 0.042c
Age (yr) 57.3 (+/-13.7) 58.6 (+/-12.4) 0.54b
Male gender 25 (50) 69 (56.1) 0.50c
Surgery duration (min) 185 (+/-142) 144 (+/-81) 0.19d
Surgery type
 Cardiac 16 (32) 39 (31.7) 1.0c
 General 18 (36.0) 35 (28.5) 0.37c
 Gynecology 1 (2.0) 3 (2.4) 1.0c
 Neurology 1 (2.0) 6 (4.9) 0.67c
 Orthopedic 7 (14.0) 23 (18.7) 0.51c
 Other 1 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0.29c
 Plastic 2 (4.0) 3 (2.4) 0.63c
 Urology 1 (2.0) 4 (3.3) 1.0c
 Vascular 3 (6.0) 10 (8.1) 0.76c
Occupation (could check >1)
 Employed 26.6% 30.8% 0.61c
 Homemaker 29.8% 28.2% 0.85c
 Retired 42.9% 61.5% 0.07c
 Student 2.1% 2.5% 1.0c
Preexisting medical conditionse
 Congestive heart failure 12.2% 2.5% 0.018c
 Diabetes 24.5% 11.5% 0.057c
 Arthritis 38.8% 21.5% 0.034c
aResults are shown as no. (%) or mean +/- standard deviation, along with p value for 
comparison of cases with SSIs to controls without SSIs.
bStudent t test.
cFisher exact test.
dWilcoxon rank-sum test. 
eThirteen additional preexisting conditions were assessed, including chronic lung dis-
ease, vision or hearing impairment, asthma, peptic ulcer disease, chronic back pain, 
hypertension, angina, myocardial infarction, stroke, kidney disease, and cancer; all were 
not significantly different between cases and controls with p>0.05.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 199
RESEARCH
Impact on Health, Activities, and Perceived Care Needs
One hundred seventy-three (65%) of 267 questionnaires
were returned. Those who completed the questionnaire
(responders) were slightly older than those that did not
respond (58.2 years vs. 54.6 years, p=0.05). No other differ-
ences between questionnaire responders and nonresponders
were significant (Tables 2 and 3). Among patients who com-
pleted the questionnaire, no differences between case-patients
and controls were significant for age, sex, and procedure types
(Table 1), or in the baseline SF-12 assessment of mental and
physical health (Table 3). Reported occupations of patients and
controls did not differ, and few differences between case-
patients and controls existed with respect to self-declared dif-
ferences in pre-existing medical conditions (Table 1). Case-
patients did experience longer duration of surgery than did
controls. Case-patients were also more likely than controls to
report a history of congestive heart failure (12% vs. 2.5%,
p=0.02) and arthritis (39% vs. 22%, p=0.03). There was a
trend towards more case-patients having diabetes than controls
(24% vs. 12% p=0.06). 
In assessing time and productivity costs, we found that
case-patients (64%) were more likely than controls (42%) to
have spent at least 1/2 day in bed, thus missing planned regular
activities (p=0.04). However, differences between case-
patients and controls in other areas of lost productivity, such as
missed days of work and inability to complete regular activi-
ties, were not significant. 
Case-patients with an SSI (69%) were more likely than
controls (48%) to require home health provider visits (p=0.01).
Similar results were found after controlling for age, procedure
duration, and baseline SF-12 physical function. There were
trends for patients with SSI wanting more home health visits
than were provided and wanting a 24-hour hotline to contact a
health-care practitioner. Patients, but not controls, reported
significantly lower physical health and mental health compo-
nent scores on the SF-12 after surgery, compared to their own
baselines (p=0.003 and p=0.02, respectively). 
Health Resource Use in 8 Weeks after Surgery
Patients with SSI recognized after discharge required sig-
nificantly more resources within the outpatient setting than
those without SSI (Table 4). Significantly more patients with
SSI had at least one ambulatory-care visit, and their average
number of visits (7.5) was more than twice the average of
those without SSI (3.4). Additionally, case-patients were sig-
nificantly more likely to call their provider and to make more
phone calls to their provider than controls. The number of lab-
oratory tests ordered did not differ between cases and controls.
Estimated ambulatory outpatient visits costs generated were
on average $365 per case with an SSI and $160 per control
during the 8-week postoperative period (p<0.001). 
Patients with an SSI recognized after discharge also used
significantly more resources outside of the ambulatory-care
centers. More case-patients (31%) had at least one visit to an
emergency room compared to controls (9%), p<0.001, and
they generated significantly more emergency room charges
($333 vs. $114, p<0.001). 
Those with SSI were more likely to require a radiology test
(40% vs. 28%, p=0.02) and had higher radiology test charges
($1,076 vs. $587, p=0.02) than those without SSI. More
patients with an SSI received durable medical equipment than
did controls (37% vs. 22%, p=0.008) and generated higher
average durable medical equipment–related charges ($123 vs.
$69, p=0.01). A greater proportion of case-patients (62%) than
controls (47%) required home health services (p=0.009).
Charges related to home health services were higher for those
with an SSI ($827) than for those without an SSI ($579),
p=0.007. Twice as many case-patients required a stay in a
skilled nursing facility (9% vs. 4.5%, p=0.09). There was a
nonsignificant trend towards higher average skilled nursing
charges for case-patients ($460 vs. $204 p=0.14); however, the
average number of days in a skilled nursing facility was the
same for case-patients and controls.
Patients with an SSI recognized after discharge generated
higher standard wholesale costs for antibiotics than did con-
trols without an SSI. Case-patients had an average cost of $60
for antibiotics, while controls had costs of $13.60 per person
(p<0.001). Patients with an SSI were more likely to be read-
mitted to the hospital (34%) than those without an SSI (12%),
p<0.001. These rehospitalizations led to $7,925 charges per
person with an SSI compared with charges of $2,079 for those
without an SSI (p<0.001). After the conversion of charges to
costs, an SSI diagnosed after discharge was associated with
excess costs of $2,573 ($3,489 minus $916) from rehospital-
Table 2. Comparison of questionnaire responders to nonresponders, 
surgical site infection (SSI) studya
Characteristic
Responder 
N (% or SDa)
Nonresponder 
N (% or SDa)p  v a l u e
Study cohort N=267 173 94
Demographics
Age (yr) 58.2 (+/- 12.7) 54.6 (+/-15.2) 0.05b
Male gender 94 (54.3) 43 (45.7) 0.20c
Surgery duration (min) 152 (+/-91) 139 (+/- 98) 0.14d
Surgery type
 Cardiac 55 (31.8) 24 (25.5) 0.33c
 General 53 (30.6) 25 (26.6) 0.57c
 Gynecology 4 (2.3) 2 (2.1) 1.0c
 Neurology 7 (4.1) 5 (5.3) 0.76c
 Orthopedic 30 (17.3) 17 (18.1) 0.89c
 Other 1 (0.6) 4 (4.3) 0.054c
 Plastic 5 (2.9) 6 (6.4) 0.20c
 Urology 5 (2.9) 4 (4.3) 0.72c
 Vascular 13 (7.5) 7 (7.5) 1.0c
aResults are shown as no. (%) or mean +/- SD, along with p value for comparison of 
cases with SSI to controls without SSI.
bStudent t test.
cFisher exact test.
dWilcoxon rank-sum test.RESEARCH
200 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003
ization across the entire population who developed an SSI,
regardless of readmission status.
Total estimated costs per person incurred during the 8
weeks after discharge from the hospital associated with the
index procedures were $5,155 for case-patients with SSI and
$1,773 for controls without an SSI (p<0.001). Therefore, costs
were $3,382 or 2.9 times greater in patients with SSI recog-
nized after discharge. The subsets of these costs that occurred
in those 216 patients never readmitted to any hospital (includ-
ing the index hospital) were, on average, $928 in case-patients
and $621 in controls (p<0.001). Therefore, patients with SSI
had on average $307 additional costs that would not have been
captured by an infection control surveillance system limited to
the inpatient setting. Additionally, in this particular cohort of
patients, 23% of all re-admissions and 18% of all emergency
room visits occurred at institutions other than the index hospi-
tal; such visits and admissions would not have been captured
by standard inpatient infection control surveillance. 
The mean chronic disease score was significantly higher
among case-patients (3,058) than controls (2,148) (p=0.005),
as expected on the basis of the higher prevalence of selected
chronic diseases in those at risk for an SSI. To determine if
preexisting conditions could account for some of the costs
associated with SSI recognized after discharge, we used a
matched linear regression model; the calculated chronic dis-
ease score was the predictor for log-transformed total costs
(Table 5). Although the chronic disease score was a strong
independent predictor of postoperative resource use, even in
this matched cohort, it was not a meaningful confounder of the
impact of SSI on resource utilization. The parameter estimate
for being a case was 1.30 for log-transformed costs in the
unadjusted model and 1.20 for log-transformed costs in the
adjusted model when chronic disease score was included. This
finding suggests that, even after preexisting conditions are
adjusted for, SSIs recognized after hospital discharge are sig-
nificantly associated with higher total costs. 
Even though we matched case-patients and controls on
duration of index surgery, patients with SSI recognized after
hospital discharge had significantly longer duration of surgery.
To measure if duration of index surgery could confound the
total attributable costs of SSI recognized after hospital dis-
charge, we used a matched linear regression model with dura-
tion of index surgery and SSI as predictors for log-transformed
total costs. The addition of duration of index surgery into the
model did not significantly confound the attributable impact
that SSI had on higher total costs (Table 5).
Discussion
SSIs recognized after discharge from the hospital were
associated with significantly higher direct medical costs and
indirect costs. With respect to direct medical costs, SSIs diag-
nosed after hospital discharge incurred significantly more
attributable use of resources than matched controls in each of
the following categories: outpatient visits, inpatient care, phar-
macy, radiology, home health aide care, and durable medical
equipment. When all sources of direct medical costs were
combined, SSIs recognized after discharge were associated
with $3,382 in excess costs over those without SSI. This dif-
ference was significant after preexisting conditions and index
surgery duration were controlled for. Importantly, in the linear
regression models (Table 5), SSIs recognized after discharge
explained one-half the variation in total costs (R2=0.49), and
this finding was not altered by the addition of chronic disease
score or index surgery duration.
Direct medical costs have been postulated to be low in
patients who do not require readmission after a postdischarge
SSI has developed (10). When readmission costs attributable
to SSI ($2,573) were subtracted from total costs attributable to
SSI ($3,382), we found that the mean charge manifest outside
of the inpatient hospital setting attributable to SSI recognized
after discharge was $809. Therefore, 24% of costs attributable
to the SSI recognized after discharge would typically occur
beyond the cost accounting systems of most index hospitals in
which the initial surgical procedure was performed. This 24%
would be the minimum fraction of the costs missed if all read-
missions occurred at the index hospital. In our study, 23% of
Table 3. Univariate analysis of questionnaire respondents, surgical 
site infections (SSIs) studya
Case-patient
N (% or SDa) 
(N=50)
Control 
N (% or SDa) 
(N=123) p value
HRQOL with SF-12
Preoperative MCS-12 51.7 (+/-9.6) 51.5 (+/-9.9) 0.96b
Postoperative MCS-12 47.6 (11.6) 52.4 (+/-9.2) 0.025b
Preoperative PCS-12 41.1 (+/-12.7) 45.0 (+/-10.9) 0.058b
Postoperative PCS-12 33.9 (+/-10.0) 38.7 (+/-9.8) 0.003b
Change MCS-12 with surgery –4.1 (+/-11.0) 0.9 (+/-9.6) 0.004b
Change PCS-12 with surgery –7.2 (+/-10.6) –6.3 (+/-13.3) 0.67b
Additional questions
Time and productivity costs
 If employed, missed work 66.7% 62.3% 0.81c
 Average no. missed days at work 61.2 (+/-38.6) 57.5 (+/-40.6) 0.95c
 Unable to do regular activities 60.6% 69.5% 0.39c
 Missed activities, in bed >1/2 day 63.6% 41.8% 0.043c
 Average no. days missed activities 49.6 (+/-41.3) 50.1 (+/-42.0) 0.90d
Additional costs
 Provider made home visits 69.4% 47.5% 0.011c
 Could have used home visits 30.8% 12.8% 0.068c
 Used paid housekeeper 6.3% 5.8% 1.0c
 Used 24-hr hotline 12.2% 5.7% 0.20c
 Could have used 24-hr hotline 21.4% 8.9% 0.052c
aResults are shown as mean (+/- SD) or % of total responders, along with p value for 
comparison of cases with SSIs to controls without SSIs. Abbreviations used: HRQOL, 
Health Related Quality of Life; SF-12, Medical Outcomes Study 12-Item Short-Form 
Health Survey; MCS, Mental Health Component Score of SF-12; PCS, Physical Health 
Component Score of SF-12.
bStudent t test. 
cFisher exact test.
dWilcoxon rank-sum test.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 201
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the readmissions occurred at settings other than the index hos-
pital. Therefore, approximately $1,409 (42%) of all costs
attributable to SSI were unknown to the index hospital. Kirk-
land et al. found that patients with an SSI had an increased risk
of readmission and death associated with SSIs recognized dur-
ing the initial hospitalization (11). No patients in our study
died during the 8-week postdischarge follow-up period.
The matched cohort-design has been associated with selec-
tion bias when stringent matching criteria prevent some cases
of SSI from being included in the study analysis (24,25).
Selection bias was not a factor in this study because all cases
of SSI were included.
We recognize that we were unable to assess all societal
costs of SSI, such as individual patient transportation costs.
Table 4. Univariate analysis of 8-week postoperative resource utilization, surgical site infections (SSIs) studya
Cases N=89 Controls N=178
Medians 
or proportions Means
Medians 
or proportions Means p value
Outpatient visit use
Required outpatient visit 85 (96) 153 (86) <0.001b
Outpatient visits per patient 5 [4, 9] 7.5 (+/-6.3) 3 [1, 5] 3.4 (+/-3.0) <0.02c
Estimated outpatient visit costs $265 [$223, $430] $365 (+/-264) $146 [$63, $229] $160(+/-128) <0.001c
Lab test ordered by provider 69 (78) 143 (80) 0.66b
No. of lab tests ordered 1 [1, 3] 2.1 (+/-2.5) 1 [1, 2] 2.0 (+/-2.3) 0.58c
Patient phoned provider 77 (87) 125 (70) 0.002b
No. of phone calls made 3 [2, 6] 4.7 (+/-4.8) 1 [0, 4] 3.0 (+/-3.8) 0.00c
Pharmacy use
Standard wholesale costs  for antibiotics per patient $34.2 [$78.6, 10.6] $60 (+/-71.6) $0 [$0, $0] $13.6 (44.2) <0.001c
Emergency room use
Patient visits to emergency room 28 (31) 16 (9) <0.001b
Emergency room charges per patient $0 [$0, $370] $333 (+/-729) $0 [$0, $0] $114 (+/-470) <0.001c
Radiology services use
Patients who had a radiologic test 36 (40) 49 (28) 0.023b
Radiology charges per patient $0 [$0, $242] $1,076 (+/-3,845) $0 [$0, 124] $587 (+/-2,365) 0.022c
Rehospitalization 
Patients rehospitalized 30 (34) 21 (12) <0.001b
Total rehospitalization charges $0 [$0, $4,370] $7,925 (+/-22,321) $0[$0, $0] $2,079 (+/-11,222) <0.001c
Total rehospitalization costs $0 [$0, $1,924] $3,489 (+/-9,827) $0[$0, $0] $916 (+/-4,941) <0.001c
Visited by provider in hospital 46(52) 61(34) 0.008b
Inpatient provider visits 1 [0, 6] 3.5 (+/-4.5) 0 [0, 3] 2.2 (+/-5.3) <0.001c
Skilled nursing facility use
Skilled nursing facility used 8 (9) 8 (4.5) 0.09b
Days in skilled nursing facility 0 [0, 0] 0.21 (+/-0.83) 0 [0, 0] .21 (+/-1.8) 0.97c
Skilled nursing charges per patient $0 [$0, $0] $460 (+/-2,198) $0 [$0, $0] $204 (+/-1,651) 0.14c
Home health aide use
Home health aide used 55 (62) 84 (47) 0.009b
Home health charges per patient $110 [$0, $605] $827 (+/-1,765) $0 [$0, $275] $579 (+/-2,812) 0.007c
Durable equipment use
Durable medical equipment used 33 (37) 39 (22) 0.008b
Durable medical charges per patient $0 [$0, $102] $123 (+/-436) $0 [$0, $0] $69 (+/-223) 0.013c
Total costsd $1,240 [$445, $4,594] $5,155 (+/-10,8570 $300 [$146, $795] $1,773 (+/-6,344) <0.001c
aResults are shown as no. (%), mean (+/- standard deviation) or median [interquartile range] along with p value for comparison of cases with SSI to controls without SSI.
bCohran-Mantel-Haenszel.
c Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.
dTotal costs encompass all emergency, radiology, readmission, skilled nursing, home health, and durable medical charges that have been converted to costs with a cost-to-charge ratio 
and all estimated outpatient visit and antibiotic costs. RESEARCH
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However, in addition to the direct medical costs, we found that
patients with SSI recognized after discharge had a significant
decline in the mental health component of the SF-12. The
magnitude of this drop, compared to results for controls, was
similar to one reported for those who have experienced their
first myocardial infarction (26). Case-patients were also more
likely to spend more than one-half day in bed, missing their
regular activities. The economic impact of spending this extra
time in bed, however, appears to be minimal since we found no
significant differences in other measures of productivity. The
indirect costs of lost time at work could not be determined in
this cohort since fewer than one-third of respondents were
employed at the time of the study. A similar magnitude of use
of home health aide providers was reported in the question-
naire and in the electronic claims database. This correspon-
dence provides some evidence that respondents were
representative of the entire cohort. Although patients were not
asked about their use of resources in the 4 weeks before sur-
gery until weeks after the surgery took place, we have found
that for scaled scores, such as the SF-12 used in this study,
patients consistently reported similar results during the hospi-
tal stay and 3 months later (27).
We conclude that SSIs diagnosed after hospital discharge
were associated with significant impairment of physical and
mental health. These SSIs also incurred substantial excess
resource utilization across the spectrum of health care. These
findings support the need to prevent SSIs that occur after dis-
charge.
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Applying Network Theory to 
Epidemics: Control Measures for 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae Outbreaks
Lauren Ancel Meyers,*† M.E.J. Newman,*‡ Michael Martin,§ and Stephanie Schrag§
We introduce a novel mathematical approach to investigat-
ing the spread and control of communicable infections in
closed communities. Mycoplasma pneumoniae is a major
cause of bacterial pneumonia in the United States. Outbreaks
of illness attributable to mycoplasma commonly occur in closed
or semi-closed communities. These outbreaks are difficult to
contain because of delays in outbreak detection, the long incu-
bation period of the bacterium, and an incomplete understand-
ing of the effectiveness of infection control strategies. Our
model explicitly captures the patterns of interactions among
patients and caregivers in an institution with multiple wards.
Analysis of this contact network predicts that, despite the rela-
tively low prevalence of mycoplasma pneumonia found among
caregivers, the patterns of caregiver activity and the extent to
which they are protected against infection may be fundamental
to the control and prevention of mycoplasma outbreaks. In par-
ticular, the most effective interventions are those that reduce
the diversity of interactions between caregivers and patients.
athematical modeling has a rich and growing tradition in
epidemiology (1–3). Because experimental approaches
to epidemic interventions are often impractical, and in some
cases unethical, mathematical models can provide otherwise
unobtainable insights on the spread and control of disease.
Recently, considerable interest has been shown in the effect of
contact networks on the spread of disease, and particularly in
using the so-called percolation theory to model epidemics (4–
10). Agent-based simulation is also being used increasingly to
help epidemiologic investigations (11). In this paper, we use
both of these tools to assess the effects of epidemic interven-
tions in closed health-care facilities. 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae is a major cause of bacterial
pneumonia in the United States (12). This bacterium, the
smallest self-replicating organism capable of cell-free exist-
ence, is spread both by direct contact between an infected per-
son and a susceptible person, and by airborne droplets
expelled when an infected person sneezes, coughs, or talks.
Large, sustained outbreaks of M. pneumoniae have occurred in
closed and semi-closed populations such as hospitals, psychi-
atric institutions, military and religious communities, and pris-
ons (13–15). Public health officials and health-care providers
struggle, often with little success, to control mycoplasma out-
breaks because of the long incubation period of the organism,
late detection of outbreaks, and an incomplete understanding
of the effectiveness of various infection control strategies. 
Effective measures to control mycoplasma outbreaks are
needed to limit the associated illness and substantial costs.
Previous work has addressed candidate strategies, including
infection control practices to prevent the exchange of respira-
tory droplets between patients and caregivers, cohorting mem-
bers of the community who display symptoms of a respiratory
infection, and antibiotic prophylaxis of asymptomatic mem-
bers of the community (14–16). The costs of these strategies
include curtailed social interactions because of cohorting,
undesirable side effects or allergic reactions to prophylactic
antibiotics, and a potential increase in the risk for infections
caused by antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Studies of these control
measures have been limited by incomplete information and
participation.
Using a network model approach, we show how data on
interactions in real-world communities can be translated into
graphs—mathematical representations of networks—and how
to predict the course of an epidemic from the structure of a
graph. We found that the assignment of caregivers to patient
groups is more critical to the course of an epidemic than the
cohorting of patients. Within our models, the most effective
interventions are those that reduce the diversity of interactions
that caregivers have with patients. For example, an institution
with many wards can avoid a large outbreak by confining care-
givers to work in only one or very few wards. 
The Model
Here we model  an institution with spatially disjointed
wards. Patients are confined to a single ward, and caregivers
work in one or more wards. Each person or ward is repre-
sented by a “vertex” in the graph. “Edges” connect people to
the wards in which they reside or work. Figure 1 shows the
graph for an institution with four wards, each with three or
four patients and two to four caregivers. 
A key property of graphs is their degree distribution. The
degree of a vertex is the number of other vertices to which it is
connected. In Figure 1, for example, the degree of all patients
is one; the degree of each caregiver ranges from one to four;
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and the degree of the wards ranges from six to seven, indicat-
ing the number of inhabitants and caregivers working there.
Direct transmission of M. pneumoniae can only occur between
two vertices if an edge connects them. 
Throughout this model, we allow transmission to occur
between people and places. We do not mean that bacteria actu-
ally infect a space by residing on inanimate objects or in the
air. Rather, we mean that the person has transmitted the bacte-
ria to another person who resides or works in that place. Con-
versely, when a place transmits to a person, we mean that the
bacterium is transmitted to an uninfected person living or
working in that place.
We begin by considering only the caregivers and wards.
Later we add the patients to the model. (All notations are
defined in the Table.) A probability generating function (pgf)
is a mathematical quantity that describes a probability distribu-
tion, and thereby summarizes a large amount of useful infor-
mation about the network architecture. We can define pgfs that
capture the distribution of the number of wards assigned to
each caregiver and the distribution of the number of caregivers
working in each ward. 
Pgfs can be mathematically manipulated to give many use-
ful results. For example, the derivative gives the average of the
distribution, e.g., the mean number of wards assigned to a car-
egiver, or the mean number of caregivers working in a ward.
We can also answer the following question using pgfs: If an
infected caregiver exposes a ward, how many other caregivers,
Figure 1. Health-care institution network. Each vertex represents a
patient, caregiver, or ward, and edges between person and place verti-
ces indicate that a patient resides in a ward or a caregiver works in a
ward.
Table. Notation for epidemiologic interaction network model 
Notation Definition
W Number of wards in the facility
C Number of caregivers working in the facility
µw Average no. of caregivers working in a ward
µc Average no. of wards in which a caregiver works
r Probability that a given caregiver works in a given ward
pk Probability that a caregiver works in k wards
qk Probability that a ward has k caregivers working in it
f0 (x) Probability generating function (pgf) for the degree distribution of caregivers
g0 (x) pgf for the degree distribution of wards
f1 (x) First select a random ward, and then select a random caregiver working there. This expression represents the pgf for the number of other 
wards in which that caregiver works.
g1 (x) First select a random caregiver, and then select a random ward associated with that caregiver. This expression represents the pgf for the 
number of other caregivers working in that ward.
τ w Probability of transmission from a ward to a caregiver
τ c Probability of transmission from a caregiver to a ward
Φ 0 (x) pgf for the number of wards affected by transmission from a random caregiver
Φ 1 (x) First select a random ward and assume that it is affected by the bacterium, then select a random caregiver working there. This expression 
represents the pgf for the number of other wards affected by that caregiver.
Γ 0 (x) pgf for the number of caregivers affected by transmission from a random ward
Γ 1 (x) First select a random caregiver and assume he/she is infected, then select a random ward in which that caregiver works. This expression 
represents the pgf for the number of other caregivers infected by individuals working/living in that ward.
〈s〉 Average number of wards affected in an outbreak
1–Sc The size of the caregiver giant component—the largest set of infected caregivers that are all connected through work in common wards
1–Sw The size of the ward giant component—the largest set of affected wards that are all connected through common caregivers
β w(x) pgf for the number of patients in affected ward w who contract the bacterium
B(x) pgf for the total number of patients in the facility who are infected during an epidemicRESEARCH
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on average, will be vulnerable to infection because they also
work in that ward? Appendix A (online only) defines our pgfs
and describes the derivations that answer this question.
Transmission through the Graph
Transmission of M. pneumoniae occurs when people
occupy the same physical space for some period of time.
Therefore, in our model, transmission can occur between per-
sons if the vertices representing them are connected to the
same ward. 
We derive two complementary estimates for the size of an
outbreak. The first is appropriate for conditions not conducive
to large outbreaks, such as a pathogen with low transmissibil-
ity, or an institution with few interpersonal interactions. The
second applies to conditions that favor large outbreaks. 
We begin with two questions. If a healthy caregiver works
in an infected ward, how many other wards will eventually
become infected as a result of that caregiver’s interaction with
that ward? Similarly, if an infected caregiver works in a yet
uninfected ward, how many other caregivers will eventually
become infected as a result of that caregiver’s activity in that
ward? Answers to these questions vary from ward to ward and
from caregiver to caregiver. Therefore, we calculate probabil-
ity distributions for the spread, which we represent by using
pgfs. 
First, consider an edge linking an infected ward to a care-
giver. Figure 2 breaks down the possible scenarios. First, the
caregiver may not become infected. Second, the caregiver
might become infected but not transmit to any other wards.
Third, the caregiver might transmit infection to one or more
other wards in which he or she works. In Appendix B (online
only), we construct a pgf by summing up the probabilities of
these different outcomes. 
Next, we start with an edge from an infected caregiver to a
ward. As shown in Figure 3, there may be no transmission
along the edge in question to the ward, no further transmission
from the ward to other people, or transmission to one or more
other people who spend time in the ward.
With these two pgfs, we derive the average size of a small
outbreak, starting from a single infection:
  
   [1]
where f ′   denotes the first derivative of f with respect to its
argument. Thus, the average size of the outbreak is 1 (the orig-
inal patient) plus a function of the two transmission rates (from
caregivers to wards, τ c, and from wards to caregivers,τ w ), and
the average number of wards assigned to a caregiver (f0'(1)).
The term f1'(1) assumes that we choose any ward at random
from the entire network, then choose one of the edges con-
nected to that ward at random, then follow that edge to a care-
giver, and finally calculate the number of other wards assigned
to the caregiver. On average, that will be f1'(1). Likewise g1'(1)
is the average number of other caregivers working in a ward
that we reach by first choosing a caregiver at random and then
randomly choosing one of the wards in which the caregiver
works. These terms contain information not only about the
average degrees of caregivers and wards but also about the
probability that a given caregiver or node will become infected
in the first place.
The expression for 〈s〉 diverges when 
[2]
This expression represents the transition between a regime in
which only small isolated outbreaks of disease can occur and
one in which a full-blown community-wide epidemic can
occur. A community will cross that transition point if trans-
mission rates are sufficiently high (τ w and τ c ) or the interac-
tions among wards and caregivers are sufficiently dense
( f1'(1) and g1'(1) ). Equation no. 1 provides an estimate of the
epidemic size below the threshold only. It is based on the
assumption that interactions are rare enough that a person or a
place only encounters the infection once. When interactions
are more common and the community lies above the epidemic
transition, we must use a different estimate for the size of the
outbreak. 
The “giant component” of the graph is the largest con-
nected set of vertices that have all been infected. The size of
the outbreak above the epidemic transition is exactly equal to
the number of vertices in this giant component. We calculate
the size of the giant component (the number of caregivers
affected) by calculating the fraction of vertices not contained
in it:
,[ 3 ]
where Φ 0(1) is the probability that an infected caregiver will
produce no further infections (Appendix B, online only). A
similar expression describes the number of wards affected in
an epidemic:
.[ 4 ]
These expressions reflect both the fraction of the population
infected and the probability that an outbreak will reach epi-
demic proportions in the first place. Since Sc and Sw are often
much less than 1, not all outbreaks turn into epidemics, even
above the epidemic transition.
Degree Distributions
Equation nos. 3 and 4 allow us to estimate the size of an
epidemic on the basis of transmission probabilities and the
degree distribution of caregivers to wards. To make specific
numerical predictions, we must first calculate pgfs for the
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Figure 2. Future transmission diagram I, summing all possible future
transmissions stemming from a caregiver who works in an infected
ward.
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degree distributions. Here we make the simple assumption
that the degree distributions follow a Poisson distribution for
both the number of wards associated with a given caregiver
and the number of caregivers associated with a given ward.
This assumption is equivalent to requiring that all caregivers
have an equal likelihood of working in any ward and that a
caregiver is assigned to any given ward independent of his or
her other ward assignments. In the absence of more specific
information about assignment to wards, this assumption
seems a reasonable first step. This distribution assumes an
infinite population and is generally applied to very large pop-
ulations. Although perhaps not the ideal model for small insti-
tutions, this distribution is used here because it yields pgfs
with convenient mathematical properties (see Appendix C,
online only). 
Case Study
Data gathered by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) during a recent mycoplasma outbreak allowed
us to extract values for the parameters in our theory. In 1999,
an outbreak of mycoplasma pneumonia occurred in a psychiat-
ric institution (14). All 15 wards at the institution were
affected, with 60 of 257 residents and 82 of 440 employees
diagnosed with mycoplasma-like illness. In the following sec-
tions, we predict the epidemic threshold for this institution.
The threshold is a function of the degree distribution of care-
givers and transmission rates, the size of the epidemic above
the threshold, and a range of realistic transmission rates for M.
pneumoniae in this outbreak. 
We assumed that each patient was confined to a single
ward. While this was not true for all patients at the institution,
it simplified the mathematics and allowed us to make a reason-
able approximation of the epidemiology. Interactions between
patients in separate wards will increase the threat of a full-
blown epidemic and make early intervention all the more criti-
cal. Including such interactions in the model is possible by
adding edges to the graph that connect patients to multiple
wards. This scenario can be solved exactly by using tech-
niques similar to those presented here. 
Epidemic Threshold
If we assume that the degree distributions for wards and
caregivers are Poissonian, the epidemic threshold (equation
no. 2) is equivalent to
.
In other words, when the product of the transmission rates, the
average number of caregivers per ward, and the average num-
ber of wards per caregiver exceeds 1, epidemics become possi-
ble. In the psychiatric institution,W = 15  and C = 440 , hence  
       and the threshold becomes                        .
Figure 4 illustrates the epidemic threshold for five different
demographic scenarios (µc = 1,2,3,4,5). For the most densely
connected case, when each caregiver works in five wards on
average, the epidemic threshold is crossed at very low rates of
transmission. When the community is less densely connected,
it can withstand much higher infectivity without giving rise to
epidemics.
Calculating the Size of the Epidemic
Combining equation no. 2 with equations 5, 6, 7, and 8
from online Appendix C, we derived the following:
 [9]
Given values for demographic parameters µ c and µ w, we
search for the value of Φ 0(1) that satisfies equation no. 9
numerically. Then, the predicted number of caregivers infected
during an epidemic is Sc = 1 - Φ 0(1). (The number of affected
wards is similarly derived.) Since we know neither the exact
distribution of caregivers in wards nor the transmission rates
between caregivers and wards, we solve for the size of the epi-
demic outbreak in a range of values of the three independent
parameters µ c, τ c and τ w.
Figure 5 shows both the fraction of wards and caregivers
infected in our model as a function of the number of wards per
caregiver (µc), and the fraction of wards and caregivers
Figure 3. Future transmission diagram II, summing all possible future
transmissions stemming from a ward in which an infected caregiver
works.
1 wc w c ττ µµ=
440
15 wc µµ =
2 440
15 1 cw c µττ =
[ ] 00 (1) exp (1 exp[ (1 (1) 1] 1) . wc c cw w µ ττ µ ττ Φ= − + − + Φ− −
Figure 4. Epidemic thresholds. Each line assumes a different value for
µc (the average number of wards per caregiver), and graphs the combi-
nation ofτ c and τ w and (transmission parameters) above which the pop-
ulation crosses the epidemic threshold. From top to bottom, the lines
represent µc = 1, µc = 2, µc = 3, µc = 4, and µc = 5.RESEARCH
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infected in the actual outbreak. We assume transmission rates
of τ c = 0.6 and τ w = 0.6 (discussed below). The top dashed
line indicates that 100% of the wards were affected during the
actual epidemic. The lower horizontal lines depict the upper
and lower bound empirical estimates for the number of care-
givers affected (TB Hyde, unpub. data). As µ c increases, so
does the possibility of transmission from one ward to another
through caregivers that work in both. The number of wards
affected climbs sharply to 100% (as actually occurred in this
outbreak), whereas the number of caregivers climbs more
gradually, passing through the realistic range at relatively low
values of µ c.
This analysis suggests that the likelihood of an epidemic
and the eventual size of an epidemic, should one occur, are
highly sensitive to the degree distribution for caregivers.
Transmission of M. pneumoniae is limited, and the extent and
duration of the outbreak are reduced if each caregiver’s activi-
ties are confined to just a few wards. 
The derivations given here are exact in the limit of large
network size. To assess their accuracy on networks like these
with a few hundred vertices, we have constructed specific
graphs that realize these distributions and performed com-
puter simulations of the spread of epidemics on them. Each
simulation constructs a network with 15 wards and 440 care-
givers, where the degree distribution of each caregiver is
binomial with n = 15, and p such that np = µc. We assume
constant infection periods of δ c = 14 days (for caregivers)
and δ w = 21 days (for wards) and that contact between a car-
egiver and a ward occurs independently of any other such
contact. Initially a single, randomly chosen caregiver is
infected. Every day, transmission occurs from an infected
caregiver to a connected ward with probability τ c. Thus, the
probability that the caregiver will transmit the infection to
the connected ward at all is 1 - (1 - τ c)δ c. Likewise, the daily
transmission rate from an affected ward to a healthy care-
giver that works there is 1 - (1 - τ w)δ w . 
Figure 6 shows a frequency distribution of the sizes of epi-
demics for 1,000 runs of the simulation. Figure 7 compares
these results with the predictions of our analytic theory.  As the
figure clearly shows, the agreement between simulation and
theory is excellent.
Inferring Transmission Rates
Our numeric method also allows us to pinpoint transmis-
sion rates that are consistent with the empirical observations.
Assuming the average caregiver works in one to four wards,
we identify transmission rates that predict the observed num-
bers of affected caregivers and wards. We find that τ c ∈ [0.2,1]
and τ w ∈ [0.03,0.1]. Transmission from an infected caregiver
to at least one patient in a ward must therefore be about 10
times more likely than transmission from a ward with sick
patients to a caregiver who works in that ward. Remarkably,
caregivers are not likely to become infected, yet when they are
infected, they become the primary vehicles for spreading bac-
teria from ward to ward. Hence the most effective interven-
tions will be those that prevent transmission to caregivers.
The Patients
Based on the outbreak data, the probability that a particular
patient will become infected if at least one other patient in the
ward is infected is 0.15 (0.02) for confirmed cases or 0.23
(0.02) when probable cases are included.1 Figure 8 shows the
within-ward transmission rates and ward size for the 15 wards.
Figure 5. Size of epidemic. Predicted and actual number of caregivers
and wards affected in an outbreak. These predictions assume that the
transmission rate from caregivers to wards isτ c = 0.6  and from wards
to caregivers is τ w = 0.06.
Figure 6. Simulated outbreak sizes. Frequency distributions of the
numbers of wards and caregivers affected in 1,000 epidemic simula-
tions are shown for µc = 1,2,3.
Figure 7. Comparing derivations to simulation. This graph compares
the analytical predictions to the size of a simulated outbreak averaged
over 1,000 simulations for each value of µ c.
1We calculate these rates by averaging the fraction of infected patients per
ward across the 15 wards and compute the error by taking the standard
deviation of these fractions, divided by the square root of the sample size.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 209
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Although not shown, ward size and the transmission rate are
not correlated.
We simulate the spread of M. pneumoniae among patients,
assuming the ward size distribution shown in Figure 8, and
assuming that the number of patients infected per ward follows
a binomial distribution with probability parameter p. (The Pois-
son approximation is inappropriate as it only applies to very
large wards with small transmission rates.) That is, all 15 wards
are assumed to be affected, and each patient in a ward becomes
infected with probability p. Figure 9 shows frequency distribu-
tions for the fraction of patients infected in 100,000 simulations
at three values of p  (p = 0.2,0.25,0.3). These distributions
resemble the actual frequency distribution shown in Figure 8,
and thereby support the binomial approximation. 
Discussion
Network theory enables epidemiologists to model explic-
itly and analyze patterns of human interactions that are poten-
tial routes for transmission of an infectious disease. The
statistical properties of an epidemic graph determine the extent
to which an infectious agent can spread. By manipulating the
structure of a graph, we can identify interventions that may
dramatically alter the course of an epidemic, or even prevent
one altogether, and translate them into measures that make
sense in a real community. In this paper, we have used network
methods to model the spread of a respiratory tract infection in
a health-care facility.
How might this be applied to a real outbreak? We have
considered data from a recent investigation of an outbreak of
M. pneumoniae in a residential psychiatric institution (14). In
that investigation, standard infection control practices, includ-
ing strict respiratory droplet precautions, cohorting of ill
patients, and employee education about mycoplasma illness
and symptoms were instituted at the facility. Unfortunately, M.
pneumoniae has a long incubation period (1–4 weeks), during
which time an asymptomatic, infected person can transmit the
bacterium to an uninfected person. This long incubation period
limits the beneficial effect of cohorting, since infected persons
are only identified and taken out of the community after they
have passed through the incubation period. 
In both the outbreak and our model (assuming parameters
based on this particular institution), caregivers are less likely
to become infected than are patients. This observation may
mislead investigators and lead to inappropriate recommenda-
tions. Although caregivers are less likely to become ill, they
are the primary vectors of infection in the facility. Our model
suggests that transmission rates from patients to caregivers are
lower than transmission rates from caregivers to patients.
Therefore, once a caregiver is infected with M. pneumoniae,
the likelihood is high that they will transmit the infection to
their patients. These data support infection control strategies
that limit transmission of M. pneumoniae to caregivers. 
We suggest two complementary strategies: limit the num-
ber of wards with which caregivers interact, and reduce the
probability that caregivers become infected through, for exam-
ple, respiratory droplet precautions. This strategy limits the
time and cost of laboratory testing as well as the risks for anti-
biotic use in uninfected persons. The activity of some ancillary
staff (e.g., physical therapists and nutritionists) cannot be lim-
ited to a select number of wards. In these cases, alternative
precautions against transmission of M. pneumoniae are
required. 
We conclude with three caveats. First, the epidemic model
includes all infections, even those that do not result in symp-
toms. Most persons with M. pneumoniae infections have rela-
tively mild disease, only a cough or sore throat or no
symptoms at all (17). When applying the model to the out-
break investigation, we considered only symptomatic carriers.
While including asymptomatic carriers would change the esti-
mates for the rates of transmission, our qualitative recommen-
dations for intervention would remain the same.
Second, for mathematical tractability, our model assumes
random (Poissonian) assignment of caregivers to wards. The
quantitative (but probably not qualitative) results would differ
under different degree distributions. In the future, we hope to
analyze distributions taken from actual health-care institutions,
when available. 
Third, because of the long incubation period of M. pneu-
moniae infection, interventions are often initiated well into the
Figure 8. Distribution of transmission rates and ward sizes in the psy-
chiatric institution.
Figure 9. Simulated spread of Mycobacterium pneumoniae among
patients within a ward.RESEARCH
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outbreak. Since epidemics can last months, and in the psychi-
atric institution at least half of the wards were not affected
until 6 weeks after the first case-patient was diagnosed, we are
optimistic that intervention of the type proposed will have a
positive impact.
The theoretical tools are in place for building community-
specific networks and analyzing the transmission of infectious
diseases on these networks. Our approach enables mathemati-
cal experiments, in which the inputs are interventions—struc-
tural reorganization, cohorting, treatment, and the like—and
the output is predictions about the spread of a disease (or lack
thereof) on the network. This approach can both aid the devel-
opment of general measures and lend insight into specific sce-
narios in which intervention is still possible. 
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Using Hospital Antibiogram Data To 
Assess Regional Pneumococcal 
Resistance to Antibiotics 
Cheryl R. Stein,* David J. Weber,* and Meera Kelley*
Antimicrobial resistance to penicillin and macrolides in
Streptococcus pneumoniae has increased in the United States
over the past decade. Considerable geographic variation in
susceptibility necessitates regional resistance tracking. Tradi-
tional active surveillance is labor intensive and costly. We col-
lected antibiogram reports from North Carolina hospitals and
assessed pneumococcal susceptibility to multiple agents from
1996 through 2000. Susceptibility in North Carolina was consis-
tently lower than the national average. Aggregating antibio-
gram data is a feasible and timely method of monitoring
regional susceptibility patterns and may also prove beneficial in
measuring the effects of interventions to decrease antimicrobial
resistance.
treptococcus pneumoniae is a leading cause of commu-
nity-acquired illness, resulting in an estimated 3,000 cases
of meningitis, 50,000 cases of bacteremia, 500,000 cases of
pneumonia, and 7 million cases of otitis media each year in the
United States (1). Even with appropriate antimicrobial therapy,
case-fatality rates for high-risk patients can be as high as 40%
for bacteremia and 55% for meningitis (1). Surveillance sys-
tems have shown decreasing antimicrobial susceptibility
among pneumococci (2–13). A comparison of susceptibility
among combined respiratory and invasive isolates from respi-
ratory seasons 1994–1995 and 1999–2000 showed a decrease
in both penicillin susceptibility (from 76% to 66%) and eryth-
romycin susceptibility (from 90% to 74%) (8). An examina-
tion of only invasive isolates from 1997 and 2000 also showed
a decline in isolates’ susceptibility to penicillin (from 75% to
73%) and to erythromycin (from 85% to 78%) (2,5).
Many of the current surveillance systems monitoring
emerging drug resistance detect susceptibility patterns over
large areas, such as an entire country (2,6,9,13). Results may
not be generalizable to all locations within the study area (1).
For example, although the overall proportion of penicillin-
nonsusceptible pneumococci within a seven-region, popula-
tion-based, active surveillance program was 25%, the propor-
tion ranged from 15% in Maryland to 38% in Tennessee (14).
Data are typically gathered from a limited number of medical
establishments within a specified region; national surveillance
systems may not collect data from every state. Monitoring
trends in pneumococcal susceptibility over smaller geographic
areas is necessary to aid clinicians in choosing the best drug
treatment for empiric therapy (1). This local information can
also help evaluate efforts to decrease resistance rates through
judicious antibiotic use.
Chin et al. compared antimicrobial susceptibility results
from active and antibiogram surveillance of pneumococcal
isolates at 12 hospitals in the Portland, Oregon, area in 1996
(15). Active surveillance was defined as collecting isolates and
patient data from participating hospitals and performing sus-
ceptibility testing at a centralized laboratory (15,16). Antibio-
gram surveillance is quite different. Clinical laboratories
assess the antimicrobial susceptibilities of bacterial isolates
and summarize all susceptibility results for a specified period
on an antibiogram report. Antibiograms conform to the sus-
ceptibility testing practices of individual laboratories, include
information on both sterile and nonsterile isolates, may
include duplicate isolates from a single patient, and lack an
epidemiologic characterization of the patient or isolate. The
data contained on laboratory-specific antibiograms, however,
can be compiled to assess regional susceptibility, monitor
trends over time, and assess effects of interventions designed
to reduce antibiotic resistance through judicious antibiotic use.
Chin et al. found no statistically significant difference in
results obtained by the two methods for any of the four drugs
tested at the 12 Portland area hospitals, except for a single
drug at a single hospital where erythromycin susceptibility
was reported at 97% by active surveillance and 84% from the
antibiogram (chi square p=0.01) (15). The cost difference
between the active and antibiogram surveillance systems was
substantial: $52,000 for active surveillance and $700 for anti-
biogram surveillance. The authors concluded that although
antibiogram surveillance produced less information than
active surveillance, “antibiograms provided accurate, commu-
nity-specific drug-resistant S. pneumoniae data.” 
We examined the practicability of collecting hospital anti-
biogram data in North Carolina, a state with a population of
8,049,313 people and a land area of 48,711 square miles
divided into 100 counties (17). We also assessed pneumococ-
cal susceptibility to multiple antimicrobial agents using the
aggregated antibiogram data.
Methods
This study was conducted in North Carolina from April to
September 2001. A study packet was mailed in April 2001 to
the directors of clinical microbiology laboratories at all 114
*The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina
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North Carolina hospitals identified by the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS). Hospitals subsequently
identifying themselves as specialty hospitals (e.g., psychiatric,
drug treatment) were excluded from all analyses. The packet
included a letter describing the project, a questionnaire on hos-
pital characteristics and laboratory testing methods, a request
for submission of S. pneumoniae antibiogram data for each
year from 1996 to 2000, and a prepaid, preaddressed, return
express mail envelope. The nature of the information provided
on hospital antibiograms does not necessarily allow for identi-
fication of duplicate specimens from the same patient, differ-
entiation of susceptibility results by source of specimen, or
determination of conformance to National Committee for
Clinical Laboratory Standards (NCCLS) guidelines for sus-
ceptibility cut points. 
From the antibiograms, the numbers of pneumococcal iso-
lates tested and numbers of isolates testing susceptible were
added across all hospitals for each antimicrobial agent for each
year of data to create statewide summary totals. Data for drugs
that predictably elicit the same susceptibility result were com-
bined: penicillin/oxacillin, cefotaxime/ceftriaxone, and levof-
loxacin/ofloxacin. Antibiogram data from each hospital for
each year of data were assessed for inclusion. Data from anti-
biograms reporting 1) testing results cumulative over >1 year,
2) percentages of susceptible isolates without providing the
total number of isolates tested, 3) more than one susceptibility
value for the same drug for the same period, or 4) results by
nursing unit or named patient were all excluded for the year
and drug in question. We also excluded data for drugs other
than penicillin if more isolates were tested for penicillin sus-
ceptibility than for the other drugs, and the antibiogram did not
clearly indicate that the subgroup selected for additional test-
ing was based on the source of the specimen (i.e., blood-
stream). Testing only penicillin-nonsusceptible isolates for
susceptibility to other drugs could yield misleading results
because penicillin-resistant isolates are more likely to be resis-
tant to other drugs as well (8). 
The aggregated statewide summary totals were used to cal-
culate yearly susceptibility proportions for nine different anti-
biotics for the entire state. Nonsusceptible isolates
encompassed those identified as either intermediate- or high-
level resistant. Susceptibility proportions for penicillin were
also stratified by geographic region of the state. Hospitals
were categorized into three regions (west, central, east) by the
county the respondent listed on the questionnaire. The Com-
mittee on the Protection of the Rights of Human Subjects, Uni-
versity of North Carolina School of Medicine, granted
Institutional Review Board approval.
North Carolina’s pneumococcal susceptibility pattern from
1997 through 2000 was compared to patterns shown by
national surveillance systems tracking S. pneumoniae suscepti-
bility. Data from published reports were included if they cov-
ered a period of no more than 12 months and identified the
source of isolates as respiratory, invasive, or both. If the sur-
veillance period overlapped two calendar years while covering
one respiratory season, the data were classified by the latter
year. For instance, isolates collected from October 1999
through April 2000 were labeled as year 2000 data.
We used the Cochran-Armitage trend test, which tests for
trends in binomial proportions across levels of an ordinal
covariate, to evaluate temporal patterns in the data. A two-
sided p-value <0.05 was considered statistically significant.
Trend tests were performed by using SAS version 8.1 (SAS
Institute, Inc., Cary, NC). Exact binomial 95% confidence
intervals were calculated for proportions by using Stata ver-
sion 7.0 (Stata Corporation, College Station, TX). 
Results
Overall, 60 of the 110 (55%) potentially eligible hospitals
replied to the survey, although ultimately fewer hospitals were
able to contribute pneumococcal susceptibility data. Thirty of
the 114 CMS-identified hospitals responded to the initial
request for information within the first month. After follow-up
telephone calls to the remaining 84 hospitals, 30 additional
hospitals responded. Four hospitals were excluded: one listed
under two different names, one psychiatric hospital, one ortho-
pedic hospital, and one alcohol treatment center. North Caro-
lina hospitals not enumerated on the CMS list, and hence not
invited to participate in this study, included five military, four
Veterans Affairs, and two prison hospitals, as well as several
long-term care and rehabilitation centers. Additionally, small
hospitals that were part of a health-care system dominated by
one large hospital were frequently omitted from the CMS list.
These noninvited hospitals were primarily rural, community
facilities.
The proportion of responding hospitals was similar across
the three regions of the state: 17/30 (57%) hospitals in the
west, 27/51 (53%) in the central region, and 16/29 (55%) in
the east. The average number of beds was 257 (range 40 to
>1,000). The central region contained most of the state’s large,
academic hospital centers as well as most of its urban counties.
No discernable difference was evident between the 50 poten-
tially eligible hospitals that did not participate and the 60 that
did, except that all major academic centers participated. 
The primary source of pneumococcal isolates was speci-
mens from hospitalized patients in 74% of hospitals and outpa-
tients in 12%. The remaining specimens came from emergency
departments, nursing homes, and physicians’ offices. Among
the hospitals describing susceptibility testing methods, 51%
used E-test, 47% oxacillin screening, 36% MIC broth dilution,
and 20% disk diffusion. Many hospitals performed more than
one type of susceptibility testing. Although 11 hospitals
reported differentiating sterile from nonsterile isolates, only 7
hospitals provided this stratification on their antibiograms.
Eleven of the 60 (18%) hospitals responding to the study
request did not provide antibiogram data. Of these hospitals,
nine did not perform on-site susceptibility testing, and two
gave no explanation for not submitting antibiograms. One
additional hospital reporting off-site testing made antibiogram
information available through a reference laboratory. AlthoughEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 213
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49 hospitals contributed antibiogram data for at least one drug
for at least 1 year, not all of the data from these antibiograms
qualified for inclusion in the analyses. Susceptibility data were
excluded for at least one class of drugs for >12 months from
1996 to 2000 for the following reasons: 1) seven antibiograms
provided data for a period of more than 12 months, 2) four
antibiograms reported susceptibility rates without numbers of
isolates tested, 3) one antibiogram listed more than one sus-
ceptibility result for the same drug for the same period, 4) two
antibiograms provided results by nursing unit or named
patient, and 5) 12 antibiograms reported more isolates tested
for penicillin susceptibility than for susceptibility to other
drugs without explaining the drop-off in isolate number, there-
fore, requiring exclusion of the nonpenicillin data. After
accounting for the aforementioned exclusions, the number of
antibiograms with usable data for any single drug for a given
1-year period ranged from 1 (levofloxacin, 1996 and 1997) to
42 (penicillin, 2000).
Although most hospitals submitted susceptibility testing
results for 2000, fewer did so for earlier years. The numbers of
hospitals providing data on penicillin susceptibility were 18
hospitals (1,854 isolates) for 1996, 24 hospitals (2,406 iso-
lates) for 1997, 33 hospitals (2,827 isolates) for 1998, 36 hos-
pitals (3,562 isolates) for 1999, and 42 hospitals (3,497
isolates) for 2000 (Table 1). The numbers of hospitals submit-
ting data on macrolide susceptibility also increased over the
years: four hospitals (488 isolates) for 1996, 11 hospitals (786
isolates) for 1997, 17 hospitals (1,095 isolates) for 1998, 20
hospitals (1,397 isolates) for 1999, and 27 hospitals (1,762 iso-
lates) for 2000 (Table 1).
From 1996 to 2000, the proportion of S. pneumoniae iso-
lates testing susceptible to penicillin decreased (p<0.001) (Fig-
ure 1). Although 65% of isolates were reported as susceptible
to penicillin in 1996, only 52% were susceptible in 2000
(p<0.001). This pattern of decreasing susceptibility was also
evident when stratifying by region of the state (p<0.001 for
each region) (Figure 2). From 1997 on, no statistically signifi-
cant difference in susceptibility was found between either the
west and eastern regions or the west and central regions. How-
ever, penicillin susceptibility was significantly lower (10%) in
the east than in the central region during this time period. 
A subanalysis of the 15 hospitals for which usable infor-
mation on penicillin susceptibility was available for each year
produced a comparable trend. Although with this reduced
amount of data susceptibility was higher in 1996 (69%) than in
the full analysis (65%) (chi square p=0.03), the trend over time
remained consistent (p<0.001). By 2000, 54% of the isolates
reported at these 15 hospitals were susceptible to penicillin,
compared to 52% in the entire study group (chi-square
p=0.13). 
Among penicillin-nonsusceptible isolates, the proportions
intermediate and resistant were available from 5 hospitals (419
isolates) in 1996, 6 hospitals (592 isolates) in 1997, 11 hospi-
tals (849 isolates) in 1998, 12 hospitals (1,184 isolates) in
1999, and 11 hospitals (1,055 isolates) in 2000. These repre-
sented between one-quarter and one-third of all isolates tested
for penicillin susceptibility, depending on the year. During the
5-year period, the proportion of susceptible isolates appeared
to decrease, the proportion of resistant isolates increased, and
the proportion of intermediate isolates showed little change
(Figure 3). 
Macrolide susceptibility decreased from 78% in 1996 to
61% in 2000 (p<0.001). From 1996 to 2000, the proportion of
S. pneumoniae isolates susceptible to cefotaxime decreased
8%. Although third-generation cephalosporins did not show a
consistent decrease in susceptibility each year, the decline dur-
ing the 5-year period was still significant (p<0.001). Suscepti-
bility to quinolones and vancomycin remained high, despite
the fact that two hospitals, one for two different years, reported
a total of five isolates as vancomycin-resistant. The low level
of levofloxacin susceptibility in 1998 (92%) was based on
only 237 isolates. Larger numbers of isolates available in sub-
Table 1. Streptococcus pneumoniae susceptibility to nine antimicrobial agents, North Carolina, 1996–2000
Year
% of all isolates susceptible toa
Penicillin Erythromycin Cefotaxime Levofloxacin Tmp-smxb Tetracycline Clindamycin Vancomycin Chloramphenicol
1996 65 (18; 1,854) 78 (4; 488) 85(9; 985) 100 (1; 205) 64 (5; 626) 96 (2; 254) 90(4; 492) 100 (7; 580) 93 (2; 381)
1997 63 (24; 2,406) 69 (11; 786) 80 (13; 1,272) 100 (1; 283) 57 (11; 786) 79 (4; 66) 76 (7; 655) 100 (11; 903) 95 (3; 117)
1998 56 (33; 2,827) 64 (17; 1,095) 83 (20; 1,970) 92 (4; 237) 51 (16; 975) 83 (10; 402) 88 (11; 606) 100 (19; 1,202) 89 (10; 520)
1999 54 (36; 3,562) 61 (20; 1,397) 80 (22; 2,062) 94 (5; 525) 51 (16; 1,068) 84 (10; 406) 85 (13; 1,017) 100 (21; 1,308) 92 (9; 540)
2000 52 (42; 3,497) 61 (27; 1,762) 77 (27; 2,296) 98 (12; 822) 50 (20; 1,292) 81 (14; 717) 88 (18; 1,238) 100 (26; 1,648) 94 (12; 730)
aValues in parentheses are number of hospitals contributing data and total number of isolates reported, respectively.
bTmp-smx, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole.
Figure 1. Streptococcus pneumoniae penicillin susceptibility, North
Carolina, 1996–2000. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.RESEARCH
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sequent years did not support a pattern of greatly reduced sus-
ceptibility.
Discussion
Aggregating hospital antibiogram data from the state of
North Carolina appears to be a feasible, practical method for
monitoring trends in pneumococcal susceptibility. Large num-
bers of isolates are available for annual comparisons with con-
sistent reporting on penicillin, albeit less consistent reporting
on other drugs. Susceptibility to clinically important antibiot-
ics was shown to decrease significantly. 
The observed progression of both penicillin and macrolide
resistance is of particular concern. The increase in penicillin
resistance appears to correlate with an increase in high-level
rather than intermediate-level resistance and high-level peni-
cillin resistance has been associated with worse outcomes for
pneumococcal infections (18). The increased macrolide resis-
tance is most likely mediated by a low-level efflux pump since
clindamycin susceptibility remained stable over the study
period (19). Erythromycin susceptibility generally predicts
that of azithromycin and clarithromycin (20). Increased mac-
rolide resistance is disturbing since erythromycin, azithromy-
cin, and clarithromycin are some of the most commonly
prescribed antibiotics for outpatient treatment of community-
acquired pneumonia and low-level macrolide resistance has
been associated with clinical failure (21–23).
Pneumococcal resistance rates tend to increase moving
along the spectrum of isolates obtained from bloodstream to
lower respiratory tract to upper respiratory tract (8). This fact
potentially confounds point comparisons of resistance rates
since a marked increase in resistance can result from testing a
preponderance of upper respiratory isolates, rather than
reflecting a true increase in the burden of resistant pneumo-
cocci. We were unable to assess the extent to which the source
of the specimen may have produced spurious results since only
seven hospitals identified the specimen source on their antibio-
grams. If the relative distribution of isolates remained the
same, however, the trend would not be altered.
Although Chin et al. showed that antibiogram surveillance
and active surveillance yield comparable results, national data
may not be directly comparable to our findings (15). The
national data used for comparison to this study result from
active surveillance use different reporting periods, and in some
cases focus solely on invasive isolates that have consistently
higher susceptibility than respiratory isolates (8). Pneumococ-
cal susceptibility in North Carolina is nonetheless lower than
reported national averages and appears to be decreasing more
quickly (Table 2). This finding is consistent with compara-
tively low antibiotic susceptibilities previously described for
the Southeast. Active surveillance for year 2000 susceptibility
in the southeastern United States ranged from 56% to 57% for
penicillin and from 61% to 67% for erythromycin (8,12,13).
Antibiogram surveillance is cost efficient. Expenses for
collecting and analyzing five years worth of data from an
entire state were limited to mailings and paper materials
(<$1,000) and the support of one graduate student. Chin et al.
spent $52,000 for 1 year of active surveillance in 12 hospitals.
The antibiogram surveillance had several potential limitations,
however. First, a 55% response rate may be adequate for cer-
tain surveys, but full participation from all N.C. microbiology
laboratories would be the best way to ensure that surveillance
data accurately reflect susceptibility patterns. Furthermore, all
participating hospitals did not submit an antibiogram for each
year nor did all data on each antibiogram meet inclusion crite-
ria. Yet our data included many more hospitals in this study
locale than any previously published surveillance system. Sec-
ond, many hospitals were unable to access data from past
years for a variety of reasons, including changes in testing and
computer systems. Collecting antibiogram reports on a yearly
basis should allow more hospitals to more easily contribute
their data. Third, specimens are increasingly sent to referral
hospitals or reference laboratories. For instance, 9 of the 60
participating hospitals did not have antibiogram data, and we
were able to get results from a reference laboratory for only a
single hospital. The lack of availability of antibiograms at hos-
pitals that use reference laboratories is disconcerting since
information needed to guide local antibiotic decisions is not
accessible. Lastly, testing and reporting procedures were
inconsistent, such as drugs tested, identification of specimen
source, breakdown of intermediate and high-level resistance,
and period covered by the antibiogram. We hope that provid-
ing N.C. microbiology laboratories with these study findings
Figure 2. Streptococcus pneumoniae penicillin susceptibility by geo-
graphic region, North Carolina, 1996–2000. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 3. Streptococcus pneumoniae penicillin susceptibility among
isolates differentiating nonsusceptibility levels, North Carolina, 1996–
2000.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 215
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will encourage participation in continued surveillance activi-
ties as well as more uniform testing and reporting procedures. 
The submitted data appeared to be consistent despite the
fact that the population under study changed from year to year
as more data became available. The sub-analysis, reflecting
solely those hospitals providing information for each year
from 1996 to 2000 yielded results comparable to those found
in the overall study. Additionally, the observed susceptibility
results generally support known resistance patterns, such as
the correlation of penicillin and ceftriaxone susceptibility,
lower levels of macrolide than clindamycin susceptibility, and
near universal vancomycin susceptibility (24). 
Combining hospital antibiogram data appears to be an
effective method of tracking antimicrobial susceptibility
among Streptococcus pneumoniae, both in North Carolina and
within regions of the state. To further develop this antibiogram
surveillance system, we are partnering with the North Carolina
State Laboratory of Public Health to establish an electronic
network of microbiology laboratories to enhance interlabora-
tory communication. We hope to share practices, encourage
testing consistent with current NCCLS guidelines, and support
standardized, efficient, annual, electronic submission of anti-
biograms. We also hope that knowledge of N.C. resistance pat-
terns will both guide treatment decisions and motivate
judicious antibiotic prescribing behavior.
Judicious use of antibiotics is essential for their continued
effectiveness. Not only have regional trends in antibiotic resis-
tance been linked to antibiotic use (25–29), but decreasing
antibiotic use has resulted in declining levels of resistance
(30). After an aggressive campaign to educate its population
on the need for shrewd use of antibiotics, the rate of penicillin-
resistant pneumococci in Iceland declined from nearly 20% in
1993 to 16.9% in 1994 (31,32). Regional surveillance can
identify areas most in need of interventions aimed at decreas-
ing resistance and can monitor the progress of these interven-
tions. Aggregating antibiogram data appears to be an easy,
inexpensive, effective way of accomplishing these goals.
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Influence of Role Models and 
Hospital Design on Hand Hygiene of 
Health Care Workers
Mary G. Lankford,*† Teresa R. Zembower,‡ William E. Trick,§ Donna M. Hacek,*† 
Gary A. Noskin,*†‡ and Lance R. Peterson*†‡
We assessed the effect of medical staff role models and the
number of health-care worker sinks on hand-hygiene compli-
ance before and after construction of a new hospital designed
for increased access to handwashing sinks. We observed
health-care worker hand hygiene in four nursing units that pro-
vided similar patient care in both the old and new hospitals:
medical and surgical intensive care, hematology/oncology, and
solid organ transplant units. Of 721 hand-hygiene opportuni-
ties, 304 (42%) were observed in the old hospital and 417
(58%) in the new hospital. Hand-hygiene compliance was sig-
nificantly better in the old hospital (161/304; 53%) compared to
the new hospital (97/417; 23.3%) (p<0.001). Health-care work-
ers in a room with a senior (e.g., higher ranking) medical staff
person or peer who did not wash hands were significantly less
likely to wash their own hands (odds ratio 0.2; confidence inter-
val 0.1 to 0.5); p<0.001). Our results suggest that health-care
worker hand-hygiene compliance is influenced significantly by
the behavior of other health-care workers. An increased num-
ber of hand-washing sinks, as a sole measure, did not increase
hand-hygiene compliance.
ne of the key components for limiting spread of health-
care–associated infectious disease is adequate infection
control practice. A cornerstone of infection control is ensuring
that health-care workers wash their hands at appropriate times.
The Association for Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology (APIC), the Guidelines for Handwashing and
Hospital Environmental Control (1985, 2001) from the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Hospi-
tal Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee each
highlight specific indications for handwashing compliance (1–
4). Although CDC guidelines state that handwashing is the
single most important procedure to prevent nosocomial infec-
tion (2,4), studies continue to report unacceptable health-care
worker hand-hygiene compliance rates (5–12). Efforts to
improve hand-hygiene behavior that have focused on broad-
based educational and motivational programs have had mini-
mal sustained success (11–14).
Factors perceived as contributing to poor hand-hygiene
compliance include unavailability of handwashing sinks, time
required to perform hand hygiene, patient’s condition, effect of
hand-hygiene products on the skin, and inadequate knowledge
of the guidelines (10,15–21). In addition, some reports suggest
that role models, group behavior, and the level of managerial
support influence reported levels of compliance (17,21–24).
One measure recommended to improve the hand-hygiene rate
is enhanced access to hand-hygiene facilities (15–17,25).
However, few studies have prospectively evaluated the associ-
ation between hand-hygiene compliance and building design
(16,26). We assessed the effect of medical staff role models
and the number of health-care worker sinks on hand-hygiene
compliance before and after construction of a new hospital
designed for increased access to handwashing sinks. We also
evaluated whether the frequency of health-care worker hand
hygiene was influenced by the behavior of senior medical-care
providers.
Methods
Setting and Study Participants
The old hospital had 683 private and semi-private rooms.
Observations were made in the 33-bed hematology/oncology
unit, the 23-bed solid organ transplant unit, the 16-bed surgical
intensive-care unit (SICU), and the 11-bed medical intensive-
care unit (MICU). Sink-to-bed ratios in the units were 8:33 in
the hematology/oncology unit, 4:23 in the solid organ trans-
plant unit, and 1:1 in both ICUs.
Sinks were located in various sites in the old hospital. The
non-ICUs had a limited number of handwashing sinks for
health-care worker use located on walls in the middle of each
hallway, in clean storage rooms, and in soiled-linens utility
rooms. The hematology/oncology unit had a single handwash-
ing sink located in each of three hallways, two handwashing
sinks located in each corridor for the bone marrow transplant
patient rooms, and a handwashing sink in the anteroom to the
bone marrow transplant suite. The solid organ transplant unit
had a single handwashing sink located in each of two hall-
ways. ICUs had private rooms with a sink located inside the
entrance of every patient room but no hallway sinks. 
The new hospital opened with 492 individual (private)
patient rooms. Observations in the new facility were done in
*Northwestern Prevention Epicenter, Chicago, Illinois, USA; †North-
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the 30-bed hematology unit, the 30-bed oncology unit, 30-bed
solid organ transplant unit, the 12-bed SICU, and the 17-bed
MICU. A sink dedicated for hospital personnel use is located
inside every patient room. No sinks are available in the hall-
ways. 
Hand-Hygiene Definition
We defined hand hygiene as any duration of washing with
soap and water. No waterless alternatives were available for
other types of hand hygiene during the study. We recorded
hand-hygiene compliance on room entry and after each hand-
hygiene opportunity. The definitions of hand-hygiene opportu-
nities, patient contact, and invasive procedures used for this
analysis are consistent with APIC or CDC guidelines (Table
1). Inanimate objects considered likely to be contaminated
included endotracheal tubes, suction equipment, urinary col-
lection devices, rectal tubes, thermometers, bed linens, and
biohazardous waste containers.
Periods of Observation
During the two study periods, 1-hour observation periods
were conducted weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
The first observation period (period I; 25 weeks) took place
from October 8, 1998, to April 29, 1999, in the old facility.
The second observation period (period II; 24 weeks) took
place in the new building from July 7 to December 23, 1999. A
physician, two infection-control professionals, and a microbi-
ologist were trained to individually observe, as follows: 1)
protocol guidelines and study definitions were explained in
detail from a printed handout that could be carried to the floor
for reference during the study, and the data collection form
was discussed; 2) the new observer accompanied the physician
to a study unit and observed how to perform surveillance and
complete the data collection form; 3) after observing several
handwashing opportunities, the new observer made and
recorded observations along with the physician; 4) the physi-
cian and new observer compared observations, and discrepan-
cies were discussed to assess understanding of the protocol
guidelines and study definitions; and 5) side-by-side compari-
sons were performed on a subsequent day, and the training was
considered complete. 
After entering the nursing unit, observers followed the ini-
tial worker or group of health-care workers they encountered
who went into a patient room. To maintain health-care worker
anonymity, individual identities were not recorded; therefore,
we could not eliminate or control for repeat observations dur-
ing analysis. The first persons entering a room were observed
until departure from the room. We then went back into the
hallway, and the next new persons entering a room were fol-
lowed for the next observation, thus avoiding repeat observa-
tions of an individual health-care worker on any single
observation day. Although health-care workers were not
informed regarding the purpose of this study, if questioned
during hand-hygiene observations, the investigators replied
that infection-control measures were being monitored. No
immediate feedback was provided to the health-care workers
regarding hand-hygiene behavior.
Data gathered during observations included time of day,
type and number of health-care workers entering the room,
patient or equipment contact, compliance with hand-hygiene
practices, glove use, invasive procedures, nursing unit and hos-
pital, and whether isolation precautions had been posted.
Health-care workers were designated as one of the following
categories: physician; registered nurse; patient-care technician;
respiratory, physical, or occupational therapist; pharmacist;
radiology, electrocardiogram, or ultrasound technician; dieti-
cian; food service worker; unit secretarial staff; housekeeping
staff; transportation staff; student; chaplain; volunteer staff; or
technical sales support. Each physician was further classified as
an attending or fellow, resident, or medical student.
A hierarchy was defined to assess the effect of other medi-
cal staff on hand-hygiene compliance. Health-care workers
were ranked in the following order: 1) attending physician or
fellow, 2) resident or intern, 3) nurse, 4) technical staff consist-
ing of respiratory therapists, physical, or occupational thera-
pists, radiology, electrocardiogram, ultrasound technicians,
pharmacists, or dieticians, 5) patient-care technicians, and 6)
housekeeping or transportation staff. Because the number of
observations of medical students was small and determining
the proper rank for medical students was difficult, we did not
include students in the analysis of the influence of other per-
sonnel in the room. During analysis of the influence of other
Table 1. Definitions used to determine hand-hygiene opportunities, patient contact, and invasive proceduresa
Hand-hygiene opportunities Patient contact Invasive procedures
Patient contact Contact with patient’s skin Phlebotomy
Performance of an invasive procedure Contact with blood or body fluids Intravenous or intramuscular injection of a medication
Placement of an intravascular device or urinary catheter Contact with mucous membranes Wound care
Visible soiling of hands Urinary catheterization
Contact with body fluids
Glove removal
Contact with a likely contaminated environmental surface
aPatient contact and invasive procedure are not mutually exclusive categories.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 219
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health-care workers present in the room, each health-care
worker room entry was placed in one of the following catego-
ries: single person, highest ranking person in the room, in the
room with a higher ranking person who performed hand
hygiene, in the room with a higher ranking person who did not
perform hand hygiene, in the room with a peer who performed
hand hygiene, or in the room with a peer who did not perform
hand hygiene. Peer status was defined as two or more health-
care workers in the same category listed above (e.g., two
nurses in the room together would be classified as peers).
Hierarchy status was related to a purely theoretical belief of
clinical expertise and knowledge held by the health-care
worker.
Changes in accessibility and availability of hand-hygiene
products and supplies between the two study periods included
product modifications of soap, hand lotion, towels, and gloves.
In general, products were more accessible in the new hospital.
A para-chloro-meta-xylenol soap, (Medi-Scrub, Huntington
Laboratories/Ecolab, St. Paul, MN) was the hand-hygiene
agent in the ICUs and hematology/oncology unit in the old
hospital. A 5-chloro-2-[2,4-dichlorophenoxyl, triclosan prod-
uct (Healthstat, Richmond Laboratories, Huntington, IN) was
used in the solid organ transplant unit in the old hospital and is
now used in all units of the new hospital. An aloe vera lotion
with triclosan was available in clean utility rooms of the old
hospital (Accent Plus 1, Huntington Laboratories/Ecolab). In
the new hospital, an amino lotion product is mounted at every
health-care worker sink next to the soap dispenser (Tender
Touch, Richmond Laboratories). Single-unit paper towel dis-
pensers were available at each handwashing sink in both hos-
pitals (Big Fold, Fort James Corp., Deerfield, IL, and Kleenex,
Kimberly-Clark, Irving, TX, respectively). In the old hospital,
various glove sizes were kept in clean utility rooms. In the new
hospital, three sizes of gloves are located in wall-mounted dis-
pensers next to towels and sinks. Powder-free gloves were
available only for staff requiring them in the old hospital. Pow-
der-free gloves are used exclusively in the new hospital by all
personnel.
Statistical Analysis
Data were collected on standardized forms and entered in
Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA). To evalu-
ate predictors for hand-hygiene compliance after a hand-
hygiene opportunity, we compared categorical variables using
chi-square or Fisher’s exact test; odds ratios (OR) and 95%
confidence intervals (CI) were calculated by using Epi Info
version 6.04c (27). All variables with p<0.1 by univariate
analysis were evaluated by stepwise logistic regression for
inclusion in the final logistic regression model. To evaluate the
effect of group behavior on individual health-care workers, we
performed a separate analysis. Using stepwise logistic regres-
sion, we constructed a model and entered all health-care
worker groups into the final model. Single-person room entry
was the referent group to which all other groups were com-
pared. SAS software was used for all multivariate analyses
(SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC). 
Results
Observation Data
Observations were performed on 49 separate occasions for
a total of 45 hours (range 9.6–13.5 h/U). A total of 560 health-
care worker–patient interactions were observed, resulting in
729 hand-hygiene opportunities. A total of 305 (41.8%) hand-
hygiene opportunities were observed in the old hospital and
424 (58.2%) in the new hospital. Of the 560 health-care
worker–patient interactions observed, 237 (42.3%) of the
workers were registered nurses, 190 (33.9%) were physicians,
and 133 (23.8%) were other health-care workers. The old and
new hospitals were similar in performance of invasive proce-
dures and health-care worker type. In the older facility, health-
care workers were more likely to wear gloves or touch a
patient during the hand-hygiene opportunity.
Hand-hygiene compliance on room entry was significantly
greater in the old hospital at 12% (36/304) compared to the
new hospital at 6% (26/424) (p=0.006). After all hand-hygiene
opportunities were assessed, we found that hand-hygiene com-
pliance was significantly better in the old hospital compared to
the new hospital (161/304 [53%] vs. 97/417 [23%]; p<0.001).
Hand-hygiene compliance was significantly better after a
hand-hygiene opportunity (258/721; 35.7%) compared to
before a hand-hygiene opportunity (62/727; 8.5%; p<0.001).
By univariate analysis, characteristics significantly associated
with hand-hygiene compliance after a hand-hygiene opportu-
nity included working at the old hospital, having patient con-
tact, performing an invasive procedure, using gloves, and
performing hand hygiene on room entry. A key finding was
that when a higher ranking person in the room did not perform
hand hygiene, other health-care workers were significantly
less likely to wash their hands (Table 2). 
During multivariate analysis, we identified the following
independent predictors of hand-hygiene compliance: using
gloves, performing an invasive procedure, working at the old
hospital, performing hand hygiene on room entry, and having
patient contact. Again, health-care workers present in the room
with a higher ranking person or peer who did not perform hand
hygiene were significantly less likely to wash their hands
(Table 3). 
When we further evaluated group behavior, we found that
compared to single person room entry, health-care workers in a
room with a higher ranking person who did not wash were sig-
nificantly less likely to wash their own hands. In each of these
episodes, the higher ranking person was a physician or nurse.
Surprisingly, if either a higher ranking person or peer was in
the room and performed hand hygiene, then the frequency of
hand hygiene for others in the group was no better than that of
a room which only one person entered (Table 4). This observa-
tion suggests that the effect of a role model is highly signifi-RESEARCH
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cant but most potent in negatively influencing hand-hygiene
behavior. 
Discussion
Despite construction of a new hospital with an increased
number of sinks, we found that hand-hygiene compliance in
the new facility decreased substantially. We demonstrated that
health-care workers were significantly less likely to wash their
hands if they were in a room with a peer or higher ranking per-
son who did not perform hand hygiene. Not unexpectedly,
hand-hygiene compliance was better after patient contact, per-
forming an invasive procedure, and removing gloves.
Health-care workers were much less likely to perform
hand hygiene if a peer or a higher ranking person in the room
did not perform hand hygiene. Compared to health-care work-
ers who entered a room alone, group behavior did not seem to
improve if the higher ranking person or peer did wash their
hands. Although these findings suggest that hand-hygiene
behaviors can be affected by role model or peer hand-hygiene
compliance, learned behaviors or time constraints may nega-
tively influence group compliance with hand-hygiene proce-
dures. 
As suggested by some studies, physician hand-hygiene
compliance has an impact on peer and group behaviors
(25,28). A recent evaluation of learned physician behaviors
found that only 8.5% medical student candidates washed after
patient contact (28). Since medical students may someday be
influencing future hand-hygiene compliance behaviors of
other health-care workers, the importance of hand hygiene
should be incorporated into the medical school curriculum.
Our observations also suggest that health-care worker
hand-hygiene compliance may improve when health-care pro-
viders perceive risk for their own health. In particular, hand
hygiene before patient contact in our study was significantly
worse than hand hygiene after patient contact. Whereas
patients may be protected from acquisition of pathogenic
organisms if health-care workers perform hand hygiene before
patient contact, health-care workers may perceive a risk to
themselves after patient contact; they respond by washing their
hands. In addition, health-care workers were more likely to
perform hand hygiene after an invasive procedure, which does
not benefit the individual patient, but rather the health-care
worker, who may be concerned about acquiring a pathogen
present in body fluids. Finally, glove use could be a marker for
hand-hygiene compliance if health-care workers are concerned
about the personal risk from transmission of pathogens, and
thus are more likely to wear gloves and cleanse their hands.
The hand-hygiene compliance we observed (finding that
nearly 50% of our workers washed their hands after patient
contact) was similar to the frequency of hand-hygiene compli-
ance reported by other investigators (5,7,10–12). Even though
we saw no improvement, our baseline rate was comparable to
that of a recent report by Bischoff and associates after they
improved hand hygiene compliance by using accessible alco-
hol-based antiseptics and increased hand-hygiene compliance
(41% to 48%) after patient contact (5).
Table 2. Comparison of characteristics for health-care workers who performed hand hygiene to those who did not perform hand hygiene, North-
western Memorial Hospital
Variable 
Hand hygiene
Odds ratio 
(95% confidence interval) p value Yes (n=258) (%) No (n=463) (%)
Glove use 176 (68) 127 (27) 5.7 (4.0 to 8.0) <0.001
Hand hygiene on room entrya 42 (16) 18 (3.9) 4.8 (2.6 to 8.9) <0.001
Invasive procedure performed 34 (13) 25 (5.4) 4.4 (2.3 to 8.7) <0.001
Old hospital 161 (62) 143 (31) 3.7 (2.7 to 5.2) <0.001
Patient contact 130 (50) 132 (29) 2.6 (1.8 to 3.5) <0.001
Nurse 135 (52) 219 (47) 1.2 (0.9 to 1.7) 0.2
Physician 60 (23) 127 (27) 0.8 (0.6 to 1.2) 0.2
In room with a higher ranking person who did not perform hand hygiene 12 (4.7) 77 (17) 0.2 (0.1 to 0.5) <0.001
aNot recorded for a single observation.
Table 3. Comparison of characteristics and their effect on hand-
hygiene compliance, by multivariate analysisa
Variable
Odds ratio 
(95% confidence 
interval) p value
Glove use 3.5 (2.4 to 5.1) 0.003
Invasive procedure performed 2.7 (1.4 to 5.1) 0.003
Hand hygiene performed on room entry 2.4 (1.2 to 4.5) 0.01
Patient contact 2.1 (1.4 to 3.1) <0.001
Health-care workers with a higher ranking health-
care worker or peer who did not wash hands
0.4 (0.2 to 0.6) <0.001
Hospital unitsb
Old hospital, non-ICU  1.0 --
Old hospital, ICU  1.0 (0.6 to 1.8) 0.89
New hospital, non-ICU  0.4 (0.2 to 0.7) 0.002
New hospital, ICU  0.4 (0.2 to 0.7) <0.001
aHospital units grouped as intensive-care unit (ICU) or non-ICU units and by old or new 
hospital. All variables displayed in the table were included in the final model.
bAll hospital unit groups were compared to the two non-ICUs in the old hospital, i.e., the 
referent group, which had the lowest sink-to-bed ratios (1:6 and 1:11). All other units 
had a sink-to-bed ratio of 1:1.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 221
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While some studies (5,15), and health-care worker surveys
(29) suggest that sink access is an important determinant of
hand-hygiene compliance, we found access is not the sole
requirement needed to increase hand-hygiene compliance.
Few reports address the impact of hospital design on hand-
hygiene compliance. Kaplan and McGuckin (15) compared
two units and demonstrated a greater hand-hygiene frequency
among nurses in an MICU having a 1:1 sink-to-bed ratio com-
pared with an SICU having a 4:1 sink-to-bed ratio (76% vs.
51%; p<0.01). However, a study by Preston and colleagues
evaluating hand hygiene after the number of sinks in an ICU
was increased found that improved sink access had no effect
on hand-hygiene frequency (26). Possible explanations for the
decreased hand-hygiene compliance we observed include: 1)
more patient-days (5.2%) and more admissions (11.7%) per
month occurred for study period II compared to study period I;
2) disrupted work flow because of the new and unfamiliar
environment of the new hospital; 3) removal of hallway sinks;
and 4) addition of new or temporary nursing staff because of
the increased number of patients. Patient:nurse ratios are con-
sidered an important determinant in hand-hygiene compliance
(6). In our study, we believe the ratios were similar in the old
and new hospitals, but these data were only formally available
for the ICUs. The average patient:nurse ratio during the obser-
vation periods in the new MICU was 1.42 (standard deviation
[SD] 0.15) and in the old MICU, the ratio was 1.43 (SD =
0.05). We found similar data in the SICU areas, where average
patient:nurse ratio during our observation periods in the new
unit was 1.03 (SD = 0.24); in the old unit, the ratio was 1.22
(SD = 0.14). Thus, the ICU staffing patient:nurse ratio was
similar during the observation shift for the ICUs in the old and
new hospitals (p>0.2). 
Because of changes in unit size throughout the new hospi-
tal, the study units used nursing staff from areas of the hospital
with decreased staff requirements.  Nursing personnel were
reassigned to appropriately staff the newly configured larger
patient-care areas. Specifically, nurses were transferred to
units requiring the same education and skill sets (i.e., medical
unit to medical unit, surgical unit to surgical unit, and inten-
sive care to intensive care). To ensure adequacy of training,
institutional education activities are systematic. All new
employees are required to attend a hospital orientation that
includes general information on infection-control issues. On
the first day of work in the department, new and transferred
employees also participate in individual departmental orienta-
tion. The orientation includes a review of policies and proce-
dures, job-specific responsibilities, performance expectations,
and unit-specific infection control measures (Northwestern
Memorial Hospital Orientation Program, Human Resources
Policy 4.96). For agency and float pool nursing staff, a 3-hour
orientation is provided, which includes a review of policies,
procedures, and paperwork. Float pool nurses have at least 1
year of experience before being hired and are required to com-
plete annual competencies that incorporate infection-control
measures. While they are used throughout the hospital, only
nurses having cardiac-care certification may work in the ICUs.
Our study had several limitations. First, the two study peri-
ods were in different seasons and involved different house
staff. A greater proportion of observations in the older hospital
were conducted in the winter months, which we postulated
would decrease hand-hygiene compliance because of
increased skin dryness (30,31). However, hand-hygiene com-
pliance was better in the old hospital, despite more observa-
tions’ being performed during the winter. Hand-hygiene rates
were consistently lower in the new hospital for all types of
health-care workers; a change in house staff (residents) was
unlikely to have influenced our overall results. While nurse-to-
patient ratios were not specifically measured on all units, we
noted no obvious change in staffing levels, and when we com-
pared ICUs, the staffing ratios were similar (p>0.2). Since we
did not perform observations at night or on the weekends, and
duration or efficacy of hand hygiene was not evaluated during
our study, we cannot comment on hand-hygiene compliance
for these shifts or on the effectiveness of health-care workers’
hand-hygiene technique.
Most units changed soap products between the old and
new facilities, with the exception of the solid organ transplant
unit. On this unit, the handwashing compliance dropped from
62% in the old hospital to 23% in the new hospital (data not
shown); however, the decrease was similar to that observed in
other monitored units, which suggests any change in soap
product was not the major factor. Additionally, a change from
powdered to nonpowdered gloves may have negatively influ-
enced hand hygiene. Reviewing our data set for the potential
influence of this factor, we found that if gloves were worn and
removed, then hand-hygiene frequency in the old hospital was
131/176 (74%), whereas in the new hospital, the frequency
was 76/128 (59%) (p=0.005). If gloves were not worn, then
hand-hygiene frequency in the old hospital was 30/116 (26%),
and in the new hospital 21/260 (8%) (p<0.001). Thus, both the
absolute and relative decreases in hand-hygiene frequency
Table 4. Effect of behavior of other health-care workers in the room on 
health-care workers’ hand-hygiene compliance, by multivariate analy-
sis, Northwestern Memorial Hospitala 
Variableb
Odds ratio 
(95% confidence 
interval) p value
Room entry alone (n=291) 1.0 –
In a room when a peer performs hand hygiene 
(n=48)
1.1 (0.6 to 2.3) 0.7
In a room when a higher ranking person per-
forms hand hygiene (n=64)
0.8 (0.4 to 1.3) 0.3
Highest ranking person in the room (n=144) 0.6 (0.4 to 1.0) 0.07
In a room when peer does not perform hand 
hygiene (n=41)
0.4 (0.2 to 1.0) 0.05
In a room when higher ranking person does not 
perform hand hygiene (n=111)
0.2 (0.1 to 0.5) <0.001
aAdjusted for variables significantly associated with increased hand-hygiene compli-
ance, i.e., health-care worker glove use, hand hygiene on room entry, invasive proce-
dures, patient contact, and old versus new hospital.
bNurses and physicians accounted for most observations for all categories.RESEARCH
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were greater for the nongloved health-care workers, which
suggests that powder in the gloves was not the reason for
diminished hand hygiene.
Pittet has posed the problem of hand-hygiene compliance:
How can we change the behavior of health-care workers and
how can we maintain such a change (32)? We strongly agree
and believe the time has come to “think outside the box” for
solutions to poor hand hygiene by health-care workers.
Obtaining simple feedback by measuring soap and paper towel
levels was recently shown not to have an impact (33). Our
observations also show that another straightforward mea-
sure—improving health-care worker access to sinks—used as
a sole measure, does not result in increased hand-hygiene
compliance. However, the new facility is now ideally equipped
to determine what is needed to improve hand-hygiene perfor-
mance among health-care workers (34). To substantially
improve hand-hygiene compliance, additional factors must be
considered, including improving health-care workers’ skin
conditions and using alcohol-based alternatives (a factor
recently demonstrated to improve hand-hygiene compliance
[35]), focusing on educational interventions, and providing
administrative support. Since hand-hygiene compliance was
significantly worse in groups where a ranking member of the
group did not perform hand hygiene, a greater focus on
improving compliance among physicians and nurses who are
important role models may also result in better hand-hygiene
compliance among all health-care workers.
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Aeromonas Isolates from 
Human Diarrheic Stool and 
Groundwater Compared by 
Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis
Mark A. Borchardt,* Mary E. Stemper,† and Jon H. Standridge‡
Gastrointestinal infections of Aeromonas species are gen-
erally considered waterborne; for this reason, Aeromonas
hydrophila has been placed on the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency Contaminant Candidate List of emerging
pathogens in drinking water. In this study, we compared pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis patterns of Aeromonas isolates from
stool specimens of patients with diarrhea with Aeromonas iso-
lates from patients’ drinking water. Among 2,565 diarrheic stool
specimens submitted to a Wisconsin clinical reference labora-
tory, 17 (0.66%) tested positive for Aeromonas. Groundwater
isolates of Aeromonas  were obtained from private wells
throughout Wisconsin and the drinking water of Aeromonas-
positive patients. The analysis showed that the stool and drink-
ing water isolates were genetically unrelated, suggesting that in
this population Aeromonas gastrointestinal infections were not
linked with groundwater exposures.
he Safe Drinking Water Act amendment of 1996 requires
the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to establish a list of contaminants of public health con-
cern that are known or anticipated to occur in drinking water
systems and may require future regulation under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. The list, known as the Contaminant Can-
didate List, is intended to generate scientific research that will
assist the EPA in creating new regulations to protect the public
from health risks associated with drinking water. Currently, the
putatively emerging enteric pathogen, Aeromonas hydrophila,
is included in the list because it has the potential to grow in
water distribution systems, especially in biofilms, where it
may be resistant to chlorination (1). However, the role of
drinking water consumption in Aeromonas  infections is
unclear.
Three phenotypically defined species, A. hydrophila,  A.
caviae, and A. veronii biotype sobria, constitute 85% of all
clinical isolates involved with gastrointestinal and extraintesti-
nal infections (2). Whether Aeromonas is indeed a causative
agent of gastroenteritis has been debated. Numerous case
reports have described isolating Aeromonas from patients with
acute diarrhea, but the bacterium can also be isolated from
stool of healthy persons (3). Determining the enteropathoge-
nicity of Aeromonas has been inconclusive, probably because
of differences in diarrheagenic potential among strains. A con-
sensus appears to be growing that certain strains are likely
human enteric pathogens (2,4).
Aeromonas is ubiquitous in water, including chlorinated
drinking water (5–7). In surface water, Aeromonas abundance
peaks in the warm summer and fall months (8,9). In one
municipality, the seasonal increase in Aeromonas detection in
the drinking water supply matched the peak occurrence of
clinical isolates (8). Aeromonas also occurs in groundwater
(6,10,11), and in a single well, the same strain can persist for
years (11). Some strains of Aeromonas isolated from water
have been shown to possess virulence traits, such as adhesions,
hemolysins, and cytotonic enterotoxins, presumably involved
with human pathogenicity (3,12,13).
If Aeromonas enteric infections are transmitted by drinking
water and symptomatic infections are strain-specific, then the
same strains isolated from patients with acute gastroenteritis
should be found in drinking water. The objective of this study
was to isolate Aeromonas from patients with acute diarrhea
and, by using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), com-
pare the molecular fingerprints of these isolates with isolates
from the patients’ drinking water.
Methods
Fecal Specimens
This study was reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board of Marshfield Clinic. All diarrheic stool speci-
mens submitted by physicians to Marshfield Laboratories, a
clinical reference laboratory, for routine microbiologic analy-
sis were screened for Aeromonas during two periods, July 28–
November 13, 1998, and June 2–October 18, 1999. Specimens
were plated for Aeromonas within 2–3 days after submission.
Stool in Cary-Blair transport media was directly streaked to
sheep blood agar containing 10 µg/mL ampicillin (14) (Remel,
Lenexa, KS) and incubated at 35°C. Presumptive Aeromonas
isolates were screened for standard phenotypic traits (β -
hemolysis, oxidase positive, indole positive), and species iden-
*Marshfield Medical Research Foundation, Marshfield, Wisconsin,
USA; †Marshfield Laboratories, Marshfield, Wisconsin, USA; and ‡Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, State Laboratory of Hygiene, Madison, Wisconsin,
USA
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tity was determined by using the API-20E identification sys-
tem (10th edition, analytical profile index, bioMérieux,
Marcy-‘Etoile, France).
Drinking Water Samples
Patients with positive results for Aeromonas were asked to
allow a trained technician to collect a water sample from their
residence. Samples were collected within 1–3 weeks after the
clinical isolate was identified. Aeromonas was directly cul-
tured from two 100-mL water samples by using ampicillin
dextrin agar in a membrane filtration technique (15). One sam-
ple was incubated at 30°C and the other at 35°C. Yellow oxi-
dase-positive colonies were streaked for purity and confirmed
as Aeromonas by using the API-20E (bioMérieux) identifica-
tion system. Stool and water isolates were stored in Microbank
cryovials (Pro-Lab Diagnostics, Richmond Hill, Ontario, Can-
ada) at –70°C for subsequent PFGE.
PFGE
The PFGE procedure for Aeromonas was modified from
methods previously described (16,17). Isolates were grown
overnight in 5 mL of brain heart infusion broth at 37°C, har-
vested by centrifugation, and washed with 1 mL resuspension
buffer (10 mM Tris-HCl [pH 7.6], 1 M NaCl). Pelleted cells
were adjusted to a concentration of 1 x 109 CFU/mL in resus-
pension buffer by using a Vitek colorimeter (Hach Co., Love-
land, CO), mixed with an equal volume of 2% low melt
agarose (FMC BioProducts, Rockland, ME), dispensed into
plug molds (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, CA), and
allowed to solidify 10 min at room temperature. Plugs were
incubated in 3 mL lysis buffer (6 mM Tris-Cl, 1.0 M NaCl, 0.1
M EDTA, 0.5% Brij 58, 0.5% sarkosyl, 0.2% deoxycholate, 1
mg/mL lysozyme) at 37°C for 4 h. Lysis buffer was replaced
with proteinase K solution (0.5 M EDTA, 1% N-lauroyl sar-
cosine, 1mg/mL proteinase K) followed by incubation at 55°C
overnight. Plugs were washed 3 times in Tris-EDTA buffer (10
mM Tris-HCl, 0.1 M EDTA [pH 8.0]) and stored at 4°C.
Genomic DNA was digested with 30 U XbaI (Promega Corp.,
Madison, WI) at 37°C overnight. Electrophoresis was per-
formed in 1% Seakem agarose (FMC Bioproducts) by using
the CHEF-DRIII system (Bio-Rad Laboratories) in 0.5×  TBE
buffer (45 mM Tris, 45 mM boric acid, 1 mM EDTA [pH 8.0])
at 14°C. The running parameters were 150 V for 12 h with 20-
sec pulses and 17 h with 5- to 15-sec pulse times. One A.
hydrophila isolate (isolate 1320) was run in multiple lanes of
each gel as a DNA global reference for standardizing runs.
DNA band size was determined from Staphylococcus aureus
strain NCTC 8325 DNA, digested with SmaI. DNA banding
patterns were visualized with 0.1% ethidium bromide and dig-
itally photographed. Molecular Analyst Fingerprinting Plus
software (version 1.12, Bio-Rad Laboratories) was used to
compare the genetic similarity among isolates and construct a
similarity dendrogram by using the Dice coefficient and the
UPGMA algorithm (unweighted pair-group method with arith-
metic mean) with a position tolerance of 1.5%.
Results
Cultures for Aeromonas were performed on 2,565 diar-
rheic stool specimens from 2,310 patients. The median age of
the patient population was 37 years (range 4 days to 97 years),
and 55% were female. Most specimens (97.6%) were from
patients residing in Wisconsin, primarily the central portion of
the state, where groundwater, either from a municipal system
or private well, is the source of drinking water (Figure 1).
Some specimens came from communities along Lake Michi-
gan where lake water is the source of drinking water.
Seventeen specimens (0.66%) from 17 patients (0.74 %)
tested positive for Aeromonas. Three stool isolates were iden-
tified as A. hydrophila and 14 isolates were A. caviae. All pos-
itive specimens were from Wisconsin residents. The median
age of Aeromonas-positive patients was 27 years (range 1
month to 87 years) and 59% were male. Five Aeromonas-posi-
tive patients were coinfected with one other enteric pathogen
(two patients with Campylobacter, one with Salmonella, one
with Cryptosporidium, and one with Clostridium difficile toxin
A), suggesting that in these patients Aeromonas may have
been a transient colonizer.
Fourteen of the Aeromonas-positive patients agreed to
have their drinking water sampled. Five patients resided in a
household with a private well, eight were served by municipal
wells, and one lived in a municipality that used Lake Michigan
for its drinking water. Except for one system, all municipal
water was chlorinated. One drinking water source, a private
well, tested positive for A. hydrophila. Designing this study,
we assumed that the fecal carriage rate of Aeromonas would be
  Figure 1. Location of Wisconsin residents who submitted diarrheic stool
specimens to Marshfield Laboratories. The symbol     indicates the
location of Marshfield, WI. Symbol size is proportional to the number of
specimens. (For reference, the symbol for Marshfield = 208 speci-
mens.)RESEARCH
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similar to its carriage rate in another study conducted in the
Midwest (18) and, based on the ubiquitous occurrence of Aer-
omonas in water, we anticipated that a number of isolates
would be collected from patients’ drinking water. Since only
one was collected, additional drinking water isolates were
obtained by combining samples from 1,500 private wells
throughout Wisconsin that had been submitted to the Wiscon-
sin State Laboratory of Hygiene between September and
November 1998 for routine coliform testing. The composite
samples (composed of 4–10 well samples) were membrane fil-
tered and cultured for Aeromonas as described above. This
process yielded an additional 37 A. hydrophila and 17 A. cav-
iae isolates.
PFGE of the stool and groundwater Aeromonas isolates
yielded 10–20 well-resolved genomic DNA bands, ranging in
size from approximately 10–400 kb (Figure 2). Six isolates
(one stool, five groundwater) were not amenable to XbaI
digestion, resulting in poorly resolved DNA fragments. PFGE
patterns indicated extensive genetic diversity. The 65 isolates
analyzed by PFGE had 58 distinct patterns. Five patterns
grouped two or more identical isolates. Three of those groups
included only isolates derived from the same composite water
sample, suggesting multiple isolations of the same strain. Ana-
lyzing all pairwise comparisons among the 65 isolates, the
median similarity was 59% (range 16% to 100%, n=2,080).
Isolates from the same ecologic source also exhibited high
genetic diversity. The median similarities of stool and ground-
water isolates were 58% (range 30% to 76%, n=120) and 60%
(range 25% to 100%, n=1,176), respectively. Among the 12
isolates from diarrheic stool specimens that were negative for
other enteric pathogens, the median similarity was 58% (range
30%–76%, n=66).
None of the stool isolates was genetically indistinguishable
from the groundwater isolates (Figure 2). The two isolates that
appeared epidemiologically related, the patient stool isolate
(isolate 0209) and the isolate from his private well (isolate
1320), were 72% similar by the Dice coefficient and differed
by nine bands, which, following the criteria of Tenover et al.
(19), would be generally interpreted as being genetically unre-
lated. The highest similarity between a stool and water pair of
isolates was 88%, between isolates 1251 and 2094, which dif-
fered by four bands (Figure 2). However, the stool isolate was
from a patient simultaneously positive for Cryptosporidium
oocysts, suggesting that the Aeromonas was transient. The sec-
ond highest similarity was 86%, a four-band difference
between isolates 0949 and 1294 (Figure 2). Of the 784 paired
comparisons between stool and water isolates, 776 (99%) had
similarities <80%, and the median similarity was 58% (range
16% to 88%).
Discussion
The prevalence rate in this study was lower than rates from
other large surveillance studies in the United States for Aero-
monas in stool. Aeromonas was cultured from 2,848 diarrheic
stool specimens submitted to a Los Angeles, California, hospi-
tal in the early 1980s and 80 (2.8%) were positive (20).
Among 1,821 patients with diarrhea visiting a clinic in La
Crosse, Wisconsin, during an 18-month period, Agger et al.
(21) identified 20 (1.1%) that were positive for A. hydrophila.
Moyer (18) examined 3,334 diarrheic stool specimens submit-
ted by physicians over a 2-year period to an Iowa public health
laboratory and found 238 (7.1%) positive for either A. caviae,
A. hydrophila, or A. sobria. Isolation in the latter study
included an alkaline peptone water enrichment step, which
may explain the higher prevalence rate. In our study, the speci-
men prevalence rate was 0.66%, and this rate was likely biased
upwards because stool specimens were collected only in the
summer and fall months when the incidence of Aeromonas
gastrointestinal infections is reportedly highest (18,21). The
data, albeit limited, do not suggest that the prevalence of Aero-
monas enteric infections is increasing in the United States.
Worldwide, the isolation rate of Aeromonas from diarrheic
stool has been reported as high as 10.8% (22) and as low as
0% (23). In the latter study, recently conducted in Melbourne,
Australia, during a 68-week observation period, 795 fecal
specimens were collected from city residents with highly cred-
ible gastroenteritis. Aeromonas was not detected in any of the
fecal specimens, even though 50% of water samples drawn
weekly from the drinking water distribution mains serving the
study participants were Aeromonas-positive (23).
The A. hydrophila and A. caviae species designations were
equivocal in this study. Except for stool isolate 0858, all iso-
Figure 2. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns and similarity den-
drogram of genomic DNA from Aeromonas hydrophila and A. caviae
isolates from diarrheic stool (S) and groundwater (W). The number
refers to the isolate number. DNA molecular weight scale derived from
Staphylococcus aureus NCTC 8325. Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 227
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lates from stool identified by the API-20E system as A. caviae
were  β -hemolytic, suggesting that they were A. hydrophila
instead. When the Vitek automated microbe identification sys-
tem (bioMérieux) was used,  all stool and water isolates were
identified as the A. hydrophila/caviae group. If the most recent
edition of the API analytical profile index were used with the
A. caviae profiles derived during the study, the new species
designation would be A. hydrophila group 1. Some profiles
determined in this study are not listed in the most recent index
and, given the ever-changing taxonomy of aeromonads (4), we
opted for a consistent one-index approach, reporting the spe-
cies designations for all stool and water isolates on the basis of
the index available at the time of the study.
The high level of genetic diversity observed in our study
among clinical and environmental strains of Aeromonas has
been corroborated by other nucleic acid–based subtyping
methods, such as amplified fragment length polymorphisms
(11) and ribotyping (24). Talon et al. (17) subtyped 10 epide-
miologically unrelated strains of A. hydrophila by PFGE and
reported that the median similarity (calculated by using the
Pearson correlation coefficient) was 28.4% (range 9.3% to
44.3%). The variation is not likely due to genetic lability,
because the PFGE patterns of Aeromonas reportedly do not
become unstable during frozen storage and long-term labora-
tory culture (17,25). As a control in this study, isolate 1320
was digested and underwent electrophoresis five independent
times, and each time yielded the same PFGE pattern. The
PFGE patterns also did not correspond to phenospecies. Mill-
ership and Want (26) reported a similar finding based on
whole-cell protein fingerprinting.
The capacity for human enteropathogenicity among clini-
cal isolates may be derived from a unique set of genes that
were acquired or evolved in a common ancestor. Alternatively,
enteropathogenicity may have arisen independently among
several genotypes. In either scenario, one might expect the
subset of Aeromonas strains that are pathogenic to have less
genetic variation than the environmental strains. In this study,
the level of genetic diversity was similar between environmen-
tal and clinical strains, even when the clinical strains were
restricted to the subset from stool specimens that were nega-
tive for other enteric pathogens. One explanation is that some
clinical strains were transient gastrointestinal colonizers, and
only a few strains are truly diarrheagenic. This issue will likely
remain unresolved until the pathogenicity mechanisms of Aer-
omonas are better understood.
PFGE is a reproducible, highly discriminatory subtyping
method capable of identifying the transmission source of bac-
terial infections (19). If the Aeromonas-positive patient with
the positive well acquired the infection from his drinking
water, the molecular fingerprints of the stool and water isolates
should at least have been closely related (i.e., <3-band differ-
ence). Likewise, if drinking water is a frequent source of Aero-
monas infections in this study population, one would expect at
least a few of the stool and water isolates to be more closely
related than a four-band difference. The analysis for this study
was weighted towards identifying similar stool and water iso-
lates. The 1.5% position tolerance that was selected for band
calling resulted in matching bands that differed by as much as
17 kb, and the Dice coefficient gives greater weight to match-
ing bands compared to other similarity coefficients.
The study had several limitations, however, that need to be
considered when interpreting the data. Only one isolate per
stool specimen or water sample was analyzed by PFGE. Multi-
ple strains may have been present in water, and by chance the
enteropathogenic strains were not selected for PFGE analysis.
Kühn et al. found multiple Aeromonas strains in a single drink-
ing water source, although only one or a few strains were
numerically dominant, and these could persist for years (6,11).
When duplicate water samples (incubated at 30°C and 35°C)
both yielded Aeromonas, then PFGE was performed on a col-
ony from each plate. Some of these isolate pairs were indistin-
guishable by PFGE, and some were unrelated, showing that
some composite water samples had at least two different
strains. Both strains were included in the genetic similarity
analysis. Another study limitation was that if diarrheagenic
Aeromonas strains are very rare in groundwater, the sample
size might have been insufficient to find those strains, even
though the composite water samples tested represented 1,500
wells. The stool and water isolates were collected from the
same geographic area and during the same period, which
should have increased the odds of finding genetically similar
isolates if the two ecologic sources are linked. Finally, the
drinking water sample volume for Aeromonas isolation was
100 mL. Since the study was conducted, the EPA has devel-
oped and validated Method 1605 for detecting Aeromonas in
drinking water, which specifies a minimum sample volume of
1 L (27). Possibly, if the sample volume had been 1 L, more
patient wells would have been Aeromonas positive.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to use PFGE to
compare  Aeromonas strains from human stool with strains
found in groundwater. Other studies have compared the relat-
edness of strains from drinking water and stool by fatty acid
methyl ester profiles (28), ribotyping (29), and randomly
amplified polymorphic DNA (30), all highly discriminatory
subtyping methods, and found little similarity between clinical
and environmental isolates. Aeromonas isolates from stool and
drinking water have been linked by biotyping (31) and whole-
cell protein fingerprinting (25), but the discriminatory power
of these methods with Aeromonas is questionable (28,30).
Thus, the evidence to date from using highly discriminatory
subtyping methods suggests that human enteropathogenic
strains are rare in drinking water. In the group of primarily
Wisconsin residents in this study, Aeromonas was identified
infrequently in diarrheic stool specimens and drinking water
from a groundwater source did not appear to be an Aeromonas
transmission route.
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Risk Factors for Sporadic Giardiasis: 
A Case-Control Study in 
Southwestern England 
James M. Stuart,* Hilary J. Orr,* Fiona G. Warburton,† Suganthiny Jeyakanth,† Carolyn Pugh,‡ 
Ian Morris,‡ Joyshri Sarangi,§ and Gordon Nichols¶
To investigate risk factors for sporadic infection with Giardia
lamblia acquired in the United Kingdom, we conducted a
matched case-control study in southwest England in 1998 and
1999. Response rates to a postal questionnaire were 84%
(232/276) for cases and 69% (574/828) for controls. In multi-
variable analysis, swallowing water while swimming (p<0.0001,
odds ratio [OR] 6.2, 95% confidence intervals [CI] 2.3 to 16.6),
recreational fresh water contact (p=0.001, OR 5.5, 95% CI 1.9
to 15.9), drinking treated tap water (p<0.0001, OR 1.3, 95% CI
1.1 to 1.5 for each additional glass per day), and eating lettuce
(p=0.01, OR 2.2, 95% CI 1.2 to 4.3) had positive and indepen-
dent associations with infection. Although case-control studies
are prone to bias and the risk of Giardia infection is minimized
by water treatment processes, the possibility that treated tap
water is a source of sporadic giardiasis warrants further investi-
gation.
iardia lamblia, a flagellate waterborne protozoan para-
site, is a common cause of gastrointestinal disease in
industrialized and unindustrialized countries (1). Most infor-
mation on risk factors for giardiasis has come from investiga-
tion of outbreaks. Water is the most frequently identified route
of transmission (1,2), through drinking contaminated tap water
(3,4) or recreational exposure in lakes, rivers, or swimming
pools (5). Person-to-person spread is well documented in day-
care centers and among male homosexuals (6,7), and food may
also be a vehicle of infection (8). 
The relative contribution of these routes of transmission to
sporadic cases of giardiasis is unknown, and further studies
have been recommended in the United States (9). In the U.K.,
recreational exposure to fresh water and swimming pools has
been identified as a possible risk factor (10–12), as well as
travel to developing countries (11). We set out to determine
risk factors for giardiasis in residents of southwest England
who had not recently traveled outside the U.K.
Methods
Our study was conducted from April 1, 1998, to March 31,
1999 in southwest England, including Cornwall and Isles of
Scilly, Devon, Somerset, Dorset, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Isle of
Wight, Avon, Gloucestershire, and Herefordshire. Laborato-
ries used for the study were the microbiology laboratories
(managed by National Health Service trust or Public Health
Laboratory Service) in the study area that routinely screened
for Giardia cysts in all stool specimens submitted from per-
sons with history of diarrhea. Study laboratories were located
in Torbay, Exeter, Yeovil, Dorchester, Poole, Bournemouth,
Salisbury, Basingstoke, Winchester, Portsmouth, Newport
(Isle of Wight), Weston-super-Mare, Bristol/Bath, Frenchay,
Cheltenham, and Hereford. All microbiology laboratories in
the study area that fulfilled the study criteria (16/24) agreed to
participate. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from
the Public Health Laboratory Service Ethics Committee, the
Southwest Multicentre Research Ethics Committee, and 16
Local Research Ethics Committees.
Case-patients were defined as residents of the study area
with a history of diarrhea and Giardia cysts in their stool spec-
imen seen by light microscopy (13) in the study period. Case-
patients were excluded if they had traveled outside the U.K. in
the 3-week period before onset of diarrhea or if a household
member had diarrhea in the 3-week period before the patient’s
onset of diarrhea. Controls were persons registered at the same
general practice as patients, of the same gender, and in the
same broad age band (0–5 years, 6–15 years, >16 years). Con-
trols were excluded if they had traveled outside the U. K. dur-
ing the 3 weeks before interview or if they had diarrhea in the
3 weeks before interview.
The study questionnaire was derived from an instrument
used in a case-control study of cryptosporidiosis in the north of
England (S. Goh, pers. comm.). The questionnaire covered
personal details, recent illness, travel, water contact, water and
food consumption (food history focusing on dairy produce,
salads, fruit), and contact with animals, farms, and day nurser-
ies. Adults were asked for details of occupation. The question-
naire was modified from a pilot study; the wording of some
questions was simplified, and a question about previous infec-
tion or treatment of Giardia infection was added. Patients were
asked about exposures in the 3 weeks before onset of illness,
*PHLS Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (Southwest),
Gloucester, U.K.; †PHLS Statistics Unit, London, U.K.; ‡Public Health
Laboratory, Bristol, U.K.; §Avon Health Authority, Bristol, U.K.; and
¶PHLS Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, London, U.K. 
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and controls were asked about exposures in the 3 weeks before
completion of the questionnaire. In questions about drinking
unboiled tap water and bottled water, patients and controls
were both asked about usual consumption patterns. 
Cases were reported on identification to the principal
researcher by fax or post. Health authorities, through the con-
sultant in communicable disease control, randomly selected
three controls for each case selected from the Health Authority
population age-sex register. If the general practitioner had no
objection to contacting patients and controls, the questionnaire
was sent out with a covering letter. One month after the first
questionnaire was posted, nonresponders were sent one
reminder. 
A required sample size of 192 cases was estimated by
using Generalised Linear Interactive Modelling (GLIM) (14).
This size was based on a case-control ratio of 1:3, with 95%
confidence and 80% power to detect an odds ratio (OR) of at
least 3 for the variable under investigation. Data were double
entered onto a microcomputer, and single variable conditional
logistic regression was carried out by using GLIM (15). Vari-
ables with p<0.2 in the single variable analysis were then
included in a multivariable conditional logistic regression
analysis. A series of models were fitted; clearly nonsignificant
terms were eliminated to maximize the number of subjects that
could be used in the regression modeling. As a large number of
observations were “don’t know” or “missing” for the “swal-
lowing water while swimming” variable, an extra level was
included for this variable. This addition resulted in a final
main effect model that included 655 subjects (95% of the 689
available). All the 2-way interactions were tested, including
those involving age and sex. 
Results
Questionnaires were returned from 232/276 case-patients
and 574/828 controls, response rates of 84% and 69%, respec-
tively. Two additional patients were not included because their
general practitioners did not agree to participate in the study.
After the exclusion criteria were applied, data from 192 cases
and 492 controls were available for analysis, a ratio of 1:2.5.
Of the 40 case-patients excluded, 18 had traveled outside the
U.K., 15 were possible secondary case-patients, and 7 did not
report diarrhea. Of the 82 excluded controls, 43 reported diar-
rhea, 38 had traveled outside the U.K., and reasons for exclu-
sion were missing for one. The incidence of giardiasis
fulfilling the study criteria was 4.7/100,000 during the 12-
month study period. Seasonal variation was not marked, and
no outbreaks were detected during the study. Cases were most
frequent in the 30- to 39-year age group. Although frequency
matching had been used to obtain controls with similar age
distribution to the case-patients, some differences were
observed in those remaining for analysis: 17% of the patients
and 22% of the controls were <16 years of age. Eighty-seven
(44%) of the case-patients were male, and 109 (56%) were
female. Among the nonresponders, a higher proportion were
male (33/44,) but the age distribution was similar. Social class
distribution was similar in adult case-patients and controls
(p=0.1). 
By definition, all case-patients (192) had diarrhea. One
hundred and forty-eight (77%) case-patients had abdominal
pain, 73 (38%) reported vomiting, 53 (28%) had a fever, 12
(6%) noted blood in stools, and 90 (47%) reported other symp-
toms, including tiredness, weight loss, nausea, and headache.
The median reported duration of illness was 21 days (range 1–
305). Thirteen patients reported that they were still unwell at
the time of completing the questionnaire. 
In the single variable analysis, a dose-response relationship
existed between reported number of glasses of tap water usu-
ally drunk per day and risk of illness (p<0.0001, Table 1). No
evidence of a dose-related response existed for those who
drank only bottled water. The homes of >98% of patients and
controls were on public water supply (provided by one of the
seven statutory water companies in the study area). Most case-
patients (73%) were supplied by the same water treatment
works as their matched controls. Home water supply was
purely surface water for 40% of cases and 41% of controls,
and purely ground water for 39% of cases and 33% of con-
trols; data on water supply at work were not available. Several
exposures relating to swimming in chlorinated water and fresh
water contact were significantly associated with illness (Table
2). In a wide range of questions on food consumption, eating
lettuce was the only variable significantly (p<0.05) associated
with infection (OR 2.3, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.3 to
4.1, p=0.003). Visiting a farm was more frequent among case-
patients (OR 2.2, 95% CI 1.2 to 4.1, p=0.01), but none of the
associations with specified animal exposures (dogs, cats,
horses, cows, sheep) was statistically significant. Case-patients
were more likely to have contact with a nursery (OR 2.2, 95%
CI 1.2 to 4.2, p=0.01). 
In the multivariable analysis, swallowing water while
swimming, recreational contact with fresh water, dose
response to drinking tap water, eating lettuce, and not eating
ice cream were independently associated with illness (Table
3). For swallowing water while swimming, the “don’t know/
missing” category had an OR of 5.3 (95% CI 1.9 to 14.8). If
analysis of the water swallowing variable was restricted to
those who specified chlorinated water, the association
remained highly significant in the model (p=0.006, OR 3.9,
95% CI 1.3 to 11.4). Attributable fractions were estimated as
14% for swallowing water, 9% for fresh water contact, 35%
for drinking three or more glasses of tap water per day, and
40% for eating lettuce. 
Discussion
We found an association between drinking tap water and
giardiasis in persons who had not recently traveled outside the
U. K. This finding had a high level of statistical significance
and was unexpected. U.K. public water supplies are thought to
be at low risk for transmitting Giardia infection because of the
lower resistance of Giardia cysts to chlorination compared
with Cryptosporidium oocysts (16,17), their easier removal byEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 231
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filtration (18), and the few outbreaks of giardiasis attributed to
drinking water (19). A causal link cannot, however, be
excluded, as Giardia cysts have been frequently found in U. K.
surface waters (D. Sartory, pers. comm.), and outbreaks attrib-
uted to chlorinated water in the United States are well docu-
mented (3,20). The association with drinking water might have
been overestimated because of changes in water consumption
after illness or because of bias. Information bias is a recog-
nized problem in case-control studies; such bias was not
found, however, in a case-control study conducted during and
after a giardiasis outbreak in Nevada (21). The matched design
of our study reduced the risk of error from confounding factors
but also resulted in close matching on home water supply such
that assessing the effect of drinking water quality indicators on
outcome was not possible. 
Another new finding was an increased risk for giardiasis
associated with eating lettuce (green salad). A true risk is cer-
tainly plausible, as irrigation and fertilization practices may
lead to contamination with Giardia and other organisms
(22,23). Outbreaks of giardiasis in the United States have been
attributed to eating salad contaminated by food handlers (24).
The negative association between illness and eating ice cream
is unlikely to represent a true protective effect. This finding
may have arisen from study biases, but preference for ice
cream could simply be a marker for those who are less likely
to eat salads, which are at higher risk of Giardia contamina-
tion. An apparently false protective effect of soft drinks has
been observed in outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis attributed to
tap water (25).
The association between giardiasis and swallowing water
while swimming is not surprising; several outbreaks of giar-
diasis have been linked with exposure to chlorinated water in
swimming pools (3,5). If those who did not know if they swal-
lowed water were more likely to have actually swallowed
Table 1. Single variable analysis of risk factors for giardiasis: drinking water exposures
Risk factor
Cases 
(n=192)
Controls 
(n=492)
Matched odds ratio 
(95% CI)a p value
Consumed tap water No  17  79
Yes 174 410 2.3 (1.1 to 4.9) 0.02
Usual no. of glasses of tap water consumed per day 
(glass=approx 1/3 pint)
0.0 17 79
0.5–1.0 22 71
1.5–2.0 52 150
2.5–3.0 23 46
3.5–4.0 23 41
4.5–5.0 20 41
>5.0 33 61 1.2 (1.1 to 1.4)b <0.0001
Consumed bottled water No 154 406
Yes  38  83 1.6 (0.9 to 2.9) 0.1
Usual no. of glasses of bottled water consumed per day 0 154 406
1  12  29
2  19  32
3   5  13
4   1   8 1.2 (0.9 to 1.6)b 0.3
Used water filter at home No 157 387
Yes  34 104 0.9 (0.5 to 1.7) 0.8
Type of water supply Public  187 483
Private   3   3 0.05 (0.002 to 1.11) 0.04
Had a disruption in the water supply  No 124 447
Yes   6  11 3.6 (0.6 to 20.8) 0.2
aCI, confidence intervals.
bFor each additional glass.RESEARCH
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water, this could explain the high OR in this category. A higher
risk of exposure to recreational fresh water accords with
results of other studies (10,12,26). By contrast with studies
from the United States (26,27), contact with children’s nurser-
ies was not found to be an independent risk factor. In New
Zealand, where the attack rate among young children is rela-
tively high, an increased risk was found in adults who changed
infants’ diapers (28), and information on household contact
with young children should be sought in further studies. No
risk was identified from contact with animals. One case-con-
trol study in the east of England showed associations with
exposure to farm animals and pets, particularly pigs, dogs, and
cats (29); other studies have not found such associations
(26,30). The microbiologic evidence for zoonotic transmission
is similarly conflicting (2). Although no questions were
included on sexual behavior, the similar numbers of male and
female cases in the study does not support a hypothesis that
male homosexual behavior was an important method of trans-
mission in this population.
The incidence of laboratory-reported cases of Giardia
infection in England and Wales was 8.2/105 in 1998–2000
(31), and a study of infectious intestinal disease in England in
1993–95 suggested that the true incidence rate of giardiasis
was around 50/105 (32). Giardia infection may be asymptom-
atic in children, but infection in adults usually leads to acute
severe gastrointestinal illness that may be prolonged (median
duration 3 weeks in our study) and may lead to chronic malab-
sorption and weight loss. In marked contrast to most other gas-
trointestinal infections, giardiasis can be successfully treated
with drugs such as metronidazole (1). Higher awareness of
non–travel-associated infection is needed in primary care and
diagnostic microbiology laboratories so that correct treatment
Table 2. Single variable analysis of risk factors for giardiasis: recreational water exposures
Swimming and related activities by location and frequency: Cases (n=192) Controls (n=492) Matched odds ratio (95% CI)a p value
Swimming anywhere No 123 406
Yes  66  85 3.9 (2.2 to 7.1) <0.0001
Swallowing water while swimming  No 132 428
Yes  26  33 6.6 (2.5 to 17.6) 0.0001
Frequency of swimming 0 123 406
1–2  29  44
3–4  22  19
5–6   6  10
7–8   4  11 1.3 (1.1 to 1.5)b 0.002
Chlorinated water exposure
Swimming No 149 434
Yes  43  58 2.7 (1.4 to 5.0) 0.002
Swallowed water  No 174 464
Yes  18  28 2.4 (0.9 to 6.0) 0.07
Head immersion  No 156 443
Yes  36  49 2.5 (1.3 to 5.0) 0.009
Fresh water exposure  No 172 469
Yes  20  23 5.1 (2.0 to 12.5) 0.0003
Swallowed water No 191 491
Yes   1   1 3.9 (0.1 to 136) 0.4
Head immersion  No 188 489
Yes   3   2 26.6 (1.2 to 572) 0.02
Sea water exposure No 187 486
Yes   5   6 1.2 (0.2 to 8.4) 0.9
aCI, confidence intervals.
bFor each additional visit.
Table 3. Multivariable analysis of risk factors for giardiasis
Exposure
Odds ratio
(95% CI)a p value
Swallowed water while swimming 6.2 (2.3 to 16.6) <0.0001
Recreational fresh water contact 5.5 (1.9 to 15.9) 0.001
Each additional glass of tap water 
consumed per day
1.3 (1.1 to 1.5) <0.0001
Ate lettuce 2.2 (1.2 to 4.3) 0.01
Ate ice cream 0.4 (0.2 to 0.7) 0.002
aCI, confidence intervals.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 233
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can be given and disease incidence measured more accurately.
A causal link between exposure to treated drinking water and
sporadic giardiasis would have considerable public health
importance but cannot be established on the basis of this study.
Further case-control studies, in conjunction with assessment of
drinking water quality that includes examination for Giardia
cysts, would help to resolve this issue. 
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Viral Encephalitis in England, 
1989–1998: What Did We Miss? 
Katy L. Davison,* Natasha S. Crowcroft,* Mary E. Ramsay,* David W.G. Brown,† and Nick J. Andrews*
We analyzed hospitalizations in England from April 1, 1989,
to March 31, 1998, and identified approximately 700 cases, 46
fatal, from viral encephalitis that occurred during each year;
most (60%) were of unknown etiology. Of cases with a diagno-
sis, the largest proportion was herpes simplex encephalitis.
Using normal and Poisson regression, we identified six possi-
ble clusters of unknown etiology. Over 75% of hospitalizations
are not reported through the routine laboratory and clinical noti-
fication systems, resulting in underdiagnosis of viral encephali-
tis in England. Current surveillance greatly underascertains
incidence of the disease and existence of clusters; in general,
outbreaks are undetected. Surveillance systems must be
adapted to detect major changes in epidemiology so that timely
control measures can be implemented. 
outine laboratory reports and statutory clinical notifica-
tions of infectious diseases are a source of viral encepha-
litis surveillance in England; however, these methods are
considered to be incomplete. Hospital episode statistics record
hospital admissions of viral encephalitis; although not timely
enough for surveillance, these statistics can be used to monitor
the distribution of admissions attributed to viral encephalitis
by hospital physicians. 
Most cases of viral encephalitis in the U.K. are thought to
be rare complications of common infections. Herpes simplex
virus (hereafter referred to as herpes) is the virus most often
associated with encephalitis (1–3). Other viruses known to
cause encephalitis include varicella-zoster virus 1 (VZV),
measles virus, rubella virus, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis
virus, cytomegalovirus, Epstein-Barr virus, and the adenovi-
ruses (4–6). Cases of encephalitis attributed to arthropod-
borne viruses (arboviruses) are common in certain areas of the
world, but only rare, imported cases have been reported in the
U.K. (7,8). 
Clinical diagnosis of viral encephalitis is based on symp-
toms such as fever, headache, and altered mental state; how-
ever, a definitive diagnosis of viral encephalitis relies on
detecting the virus in cerebrospinal fluid or brain. The use of
virologic investigation has been inconsistent in England. Virus
isolation, formerly the standard criterion for diagnosis, is
steadily being replaced by polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
(9–11), which is more sensitive and provides a more rapid
result.  However, PCR was not widely used at the time of this
study (9,12,13). 
The demonstration of specific intrathecal antibody, either
by detecting a raised antibody index or by detecting specific
oligoclonal bands in cerebrospinal fluid, provides evidence of
recent neurologic infection. When combined with an appropri-
ate clinical picture, this demonstration is considered diagnostic
(14). A noninvasive investigation such as magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) is also diagnostic (15). Serologic confirmation
based on a fourfold rise in the level of antibody to the virus in
the acute- and convalescent-phase blood samples or the dem-
onstration of an intrathecal antibody response also provides
evidence of recent infection.
The accurate diagnosis of viral encephalitis is important,
particularly so for herpes and VZV encephalitis because sev-
eral effective antiviral drugs are widely available for treatment
(1,16,17). Accurate diagnosis is also required to increase the
usefulness of surveillance so that the pattern of viral encepha-
litis cases can be monitored, especially since concern is
increasing about the potential problems posed by new and
reemerging infections (18). As new treatments and vaccines
for existing viral infections become available, good surveil-
lance data are required to accurately describe the public health
cost of viral encephalitis, develop appropriate vaccination
strategies, and perform treatment algorithms (available from:
URL: http://www.isabel.org.uk/) (19,20). 
This study describes the epidemiology of viral encephalitis
in England from 1989 to 1998 by using hospital episode statis-
tics (available from: URL: http://www.doh.gov.uk/hes/) and
evaluates routine surveillance systems in terms of their ability
to quickly and accurately monitor sporadic cases and clusters.
We also consider possible future surveillance methods.
Methods
Data Sources
Hospital episode statistics provide information on hospital
care in National Health System hospitals in England. No case
definition is available for viral encephalitis, but diagnosis is
generally based upon clinical evidence of viral encephalitis
and available confirmatory laboratory data as recorded in the
patient’s medical record at the time of discharge. The diagno-
sis is recorded by using the World Health Organization Inter-
*Public Health Laboratory Service Communicable Disease Surveil-
lance Centre, London, United Kingdom; and †Public Health Laboratory
Service Virus Reference Division, London, United Kingdom
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national Classification of Disease (ICD) codes. These codes
allow for specific (clinical and laboratory evidence) and non-
specific (only clinical evidence) diagnoses. We analyzed
reports of hospital admissions for all adults and children (<17
years of age) from April 1, 1989, to March 31, 1998. Cases of
viral encephalitis were identified by ICD ninth edition (ICD-9)
codes for admissions in 1989–1995 and 10th edition (ICD-10)
codes for admissions in 1995–1998. Patient records were also
extracted if any of seven diagnostic codes mentioned a diagno-
sis of viral encephalitis (Table 1). Since no ICD-9 code has
been defined for VZV or adenovirus encephalitis, any VZV or
adenovirus infection code accompanied by a code for nonspe-
cific viral encephalitis before 1995 was included in the analy-
sis. Multiple episodes for one patient were considered to be a
single infection if <1 month elapsed between episodes.
The second data source was laboratory reports sent to the
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre from the Public
Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), National Health System,
and private laboratories in England. All laboratory reports of
isolates of viruses known to cause encephalitis from January 1,
1990, to December 31, 1998, were extracted from LabBase
(the PHLS laboratory network electronic database). From
these reports, infections thought to be associated with enceph-
alitis were identified. Data extracted included laboratory
reports in England with specimen date between January 1,
1990, and December 31, 1998, of adenoviruses, herpes, VZV,
cytomegalovirus, lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus,
Epstein-Barr virus, measles, mumps, or rubella detected in the
cerebrospinal fluid, or adenovirus, herpes, VZV, cytomegalov-
irus, lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus, Epstein-Barr virus,
measles, mumps, or rubella in any specimen with an encepha-
litis diagnosis in the feature or comment field.
An additional data source was the Notifications of Infec-
tious Disease System (NOIDS) (available from: URL:
www.phls.co.uk/facts/NOIDS/noid.htm). Clinically diagnosed
cases of viral encephalitis are reported weekly as acute, infec-
tious encephalitis to consultants in Communicable Disease
Control and collated by the Communicable Disease Surveil-
lance Centre. Data collected included the week of the report
and patients’ age, sex, and local health authority of residence.
Reports from 1989 through 1998 were available for analysis. 
The final source was certified deaths reported to the Office
of National Statistics. Information about deaths attributed to
viral encephalitis from January 1, 1993, to December 31,
1998, in England was available from Office of National Statis-
tics data held by the Communicable Disease Surveillance Cen-
tre. All deaths were coded with an ICD-9 designation.
Analysis
We investigated trends in hospitalizations of viral encepha-
litis by fiscal year, using 1995 mid-year resident population
estimates for England to calculate rates. Single- and multi-
variable regression was used to compare rates by fiscal year,
age group (<1, 1–4, 5–9, 10–16, 17–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54,
55–64, and >65 years of age), sex, and regional health author-
ity of hospital (Anglia and Oxford, North West, South and
West, Trent, North Thames, Northern and Yorkshire, South
Thames, and West Midlands). We initially investigated evi-
dence of clustering of case-patients with a nonspecific diagno-
sis by comparing weekly totals of hospitalizations of
nonspecific viral encephalitis to the weekly overall mean num-
ber during the study period. Possible clusters were considered
to have occurred when the weekly total was >2.58 and >3.3
standard deviations from the mean, corresponding to 99.5%
and 99.95% upper prediction limits, respectively. In addition,
we used Poisson regression to calculate an upper weekly and
monthly prediction limit (at 99.5% and 99.95%) for each hos-
pital’s district health authority. Any weekly or monthly count
greater than or equal to the limit in each district was flagged as
a possible outbreak. We compared NOIDS and laboratory
reports to hospital episode statistics to determine the level of
underreporting in each.
Results
Hospital Episode Statistics
From April 1, 1989, to March 31, 1998, a total of 6,414
adults and children were hospitalized in England with a diag-
Table 1. Diagnostic codes used to identify cases of viral encephalitis in hospital episode statistics
Encephalitis diagnosis ICD-9a ICD-10a
Specific diagnosis: Exotic virus 0620–0629, 0630–0638, 064, 0661, 0622, 3233 A830–A839, A840–A849, A852
Herpes simplex virus 0543 B004
Varicella-zoster virus 1 Undefined B011, B020
Measles virus 0550 B050
Mumps 0722 B262
Rubella 0560, 0567 B060
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus 0490, 3126 A872
Adenovirus Undefined A851
Other 0498, 3234 A858
Nonspecific diagnosis: Unspecified 0499, 3239 A86, G051
aICD, International Classification of Disease.RESEARCH
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nosis of viral encephalitis (Table 2), a figure that corresponds
to an estimated annual rate of 1.5 cases per 100,000 popula-
tion. Most of these patients had a nonspecific infection. A spe-
cific diagnosis was recorded for 2,574 patients, the largest
proportion of which (52%) had herpes infection. The other
diagnoses included 18% with “other” and 13% with VZV. The
remaining 223 included patients with encephalitis associated
with measles, mumps, rubella, exotic viruses (arboviruses),
and Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus infections. 
A total of 2,734 cases were diagnosed in children (includ-
ing 35 in neonates), corresponding to an estimated annual rate
of 2.8 per 100 000 children and accounting for 43% of all hos-
pitalizations of viral encephalitis. An estimated 21% declining
trend occurred in the rate over the 9 years, although this
decline is not significant (p=0.065). Over half (51%) of the
hospitalizations of children occurred for those <5 years of age,
with the highest rate (8.7/100 000) for infants <1 year of age.
The rate remained highest for infants throughout the 9 years of
the study; however, we found some variation between the age
groups in the time trends that approached significance
(p=0.063), with the largest decline in adolescents ages 10–16
years (estimated to be 37%) and the smallest in toddlers 1–4
years of age (estimated to be 4%). Little difference appeared in
the rate in male children compared to female children overall
(2.9 and 2.8/100,000 children; p=0.23); furthermore, the trend
over the 9 years did not differ by sex (p=0.63).
In adults, 3,680 patients diagnosed with encephalitis were
hospitalized, which approximates an annual rate of 1.1 per 100
000 adults with no overall significant trend over time (p=0.17).
No significant variation appeared in the rate between the age
groups overall, but the highest rate occurred in those aged 17–
24 years at approximately 1.2 per 100,000. The change in the
incidence of hospitalized case-patients over time varied
between age groups (p=0.0016); this change was mostly attrib-
utable to an increase of 46% in the rate in elderly case-patients
(>65 years of age) with no significant changes in other age
groups. We found no difference in the overall rate of male
case-patients compared to female case-patients (1.1 and 1.0/
100,000 adults; p=0.12); furthermore, the trend over the 9
years did not differ by sex (p=0.74). 
The rate between the regional health authority of hospitals
did not vary significantly overall (p=0.55); however, the larg-
est proportion of cases (16%) and highest rate (1.63/100 000
population) were hospitalized in the North Thames region.
The trend over the 9 years did not significantly vary by
regional health authority (p=0.13).
The proportion of cases with a specific diagnosis was sig-
nificantly lower in children (33%) than adults (45%)
(p<0.001). In children, this proportion varied throughout the
study (p<0.001); it was at a minimum of 23% during 1992–
1993 and a maximum of 50% during 1996–1997. Children
with a specific diagnosis were significantly younger than those
without (mean age of 5 vs. 6.1 years; p<0.001) but did not dif-
fer in terms of sex. In adults, the proportion with a specific
diagnosis did not vary significantly by year. Those with a spe-
cific diagnosis were significantly older compared to those
without (mean age 49 vs. 43 years; p<0.001) but did not differ
in terms of sex. The proportion of all cases with a specific
diagnosis varied significantly by region, ranging from 34% in
Trent to 47% in Northern and Yorkshire (p<0.001). The
regions of Northern and Yorkshire had the highest proportion
of herpes encephalitis (28.35%); in comparison, Trent had
Table 2. Hospitalizations of viral encephalitis patients by diagnosis and fiscal year of admission, April 1, 1989–March 31, 1998, England
Diagnosis
Date of admission by fiscal yr
1989–90 1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 Total
E x o t i c 337759 2 0 736 4
Herpes viruses
   Herpes simplexa 138 163 170 175 172 168 120 147 166 1,419
   Varicella zoster 8 17 13 8 8 6 94 99 80 333
Others
    M e a s l e s 1 6 8878 2 3 7548 6
    M u m p s 1 2 523102323 0
    R u b e l l a 5331255112 6
    LCMVb 002000023 7
    Adenoviruses 19 15 21 14 17 14 12 10 7 129
    Otherc 47 75 56 51 62 48 58 46 37 480
Total specified viral infection (%) 248 (40) 289 (40) 282 (37) 266 (37) 275 (33) 273 (36) 318 (47) 320 (48) 303 (47) 2,574 (40)
Unspecified viral infection (%) 379 (60) 422 (60) 488 (63) 461 (63) 551 (67) 480 (64) 365 (53) 351 (52) 343 (53) 3,840 (60)
Total (%) 627 (100) 711 (100) 770 (100) 727 (100) 826 (100) 753 (100) 683 (100) 671 (100) 646 (100) 6,414 (100)
aHerpes simplex virus is undefined after 1995–1996 and recorded thereafter as herpes.
bLCMV, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus.
cBoth “other” and “unspecified” are included because both groups existed from 1995 to 1996 onward.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 237
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21.4%, and North West (the region with the lowest proportion)
had 18%.
In hospitalized case-patients, 417 deaths were identified
during the 9 years of study. The severity of cases was com-
pared by using a crude case-fatality rate and mean length of
stay (Table 3). The overall case-fatality rate was 6.5 per 100
cases, and the mean length of stay was 17.5 days. Consider-
able variation appeared in case-fatality rate and mean length of
stay among the different diagnoses. Herpes encephalitis had
the highest overall case-fatality rate and mean length of stay
and was considered to be the most severe diagnosis. In chil-
dren, the overall case-fatality rate was 2.3 per 100 cases (95%
confidence interval [CI] 1.8 to 3), 1.9 per 100 cases of herpes
(95% CI 0.7 to 4), and 2.1 per 100 cases of viral encephalitis
without a specific diagnosis (95% CI 1.5 to 2.8). The mean
length of stay for children was 10.9 days, increasing to 11.6
days for patients without a diagnosis specified and 13.2 days
for patients with herpes encephalitis. In adults, the case-fatal-
ity rate was higher than children at 9.7 per 100 cases (95% CI
8.8 to 10.7), 12.5 in herpes encephalitis (95% CI 10.4 to 14.3),
and 8.5 per 100 cases without a diagnosis specified (95% CI
7.2 to 9.7). The mean length of stay for adults was 22.4 days,
which increased to 30 days for those with herpes or “other”
diagnoses compared with 17 days for cases without a diagno-
sis specified. 
Evidence of Clustering
For nonspecific cases of viral encephalitis, the frequency
of hospitalizations (noted by week) indicated that some clus-
tering of undiagnosed viral encephalitis had occurred during
the 9 years of study since the upper prediction limits at 99.5%
and 99.95% were exceeded in 6 weeks. Three of the six clus-
ters occurred closely together in 1993 (weeks 45, 47, and 51),
which suggests an overall period of higher incidence during
this time. The Poisson regression model suggested clustering
of encephalitis of unknown cause in district health authorities,
and the total number of cases occurring in a week was greater
than the prediction limit at 99.95% in three districts. The
model did not identify any clusters when the period was
extended to those occurring within 1 month. 
Comparison of Data Sources
Significant underreporting of viral encephalitis was seen in
the routine systems when compared to hospital episode statis-
tics. A total of 215 cases of acute infectious encephalitis were
identified through NOIDS between April 1, 1989, and March
31, 1998, compared to 6,414 identified in hospital episode sta-
tistics. This disparity implies that almost all (97%) hospital-
ized cases were not formally reported. 
A total of 599 cases of viral encephalitis were identified
through the laboratory reporting system from January 1, 1990,
to December 31, 1998. Fifty nine per cent of these cases were
herpes (86 herpes simplex virus 1, 48 herpes simplex virus 2,
and 219 subtype not known), 21% varicella and 4% adenovi-
rus. The remaining 16% of cases included 26 cytomegalovirus,
15 Epstein-Barr virus, 20 measles virus, and 13 mumps. Of
herpes encephalitis, 19% (66/353) of cases occurred in chil-
dren and 4.8% (17/353) in neonates. Of herpes encephalitis
cases in neonates that were typed, seven were herpes simplex
virus 2 and two were herpes simplex virus 1. 
The number of laboratory reports of viral encephalitis
increased from 52 in 1990 to 80 in 1991, falling to 55 in
1993, and rising again to a peak of 104 in 1998. Excluding
those cases for which no specific ICD-9 or ICD-10 code
exists and which could not have been identified in hospital
episode statistics, 558 cases of viral encephalitis were
reported through the laboratory system from January 1, 1990,
to March 31, 1998. This total represents approximately 71%
underreporting when compared to 1,867 hospitalizations of
viral encephalitis with a specific infection reported (Table 4).
Table 3. Hospitalizations of viral encephalitis patients, deaths, and duration of stay, England, April 1, 1989–March 31, 1998a
Diagnosis No. of cases No. of deaths (%) Case-fatality rate/100 cases 95% CI Length of stay in days 95% CI
Exotic 64 1 (0.2) 1.6 0.01 to 8.6 16.5 7.5 to 25.5
Herpes viruses
    Herpes simplex virus 1,419 141 (33.8) 10 8.4 to 11.6 26.6 23.6 to 29.6
    VZV 333 25 (6.0) 7.6 4.9 to 10.9 11.8 10.0 to 13.4
Others
    Measles 86 1 (0.2) 1.2 0.01 to 6.3 6.8 3.1 to 10.5
    Mumps 30 1 (0.2) 3.3 0.01 to 15.8 4.1 2.9 to 5.3
    Rubella 26 2 (0.5) 7.7 0.9 to 25.1 76.0 0.0 to 174.0
    LCMV 7 0 (0.0) 0 7.2 2.1 to 12.3
    Adenoviruses 129 6 (1.4) 4.7 1.8 to 9.8 8.5 6.8 to 10.2
    Other 480 33 (7.9) 6.8 4.7 to 9.4 18.8 12.4 to 25.1
Unspecified viral infection 3,840 207 (49.6) 5.5 4.7 to 6.2 14.8 13.7 to 15.9
Total 6,414 417 (100) 6.5 5.9 to 7.1 17.5 16.4 to 18.6
aCI, confidence interval; VZV, varicella-zoster virus 1; LCMV, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus.RESEARCH
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This underreporting varied by virus, ranging between 28%
and 100%. 
Hospital episode statistics showed an underascertainment
of deaths. Viral encephalitis was given as the final underlying
cause of 622 deaths certified from January 1, 1993, to March
31, 1998. In that comparative period, hospital episode statis-
tics showed 259 deaths, only 42% of those formally certified
and reported to the Office of National Statistics. Most (483/
622) certified deaths from viral encephalitis did not have a
specific diagnosis; however, 139 deaths did. We compared the
139 deaths to the 112 identified in hospital episode statistics
for which a specific diagnosis was recorded (Table 4).
Discussion
The public health impact of viral encephalitis in England
cannot be clearly defined with existing data sources. During
our study of viral encephalitis in England, we found that more
cases of viral encephalitis were identified in hospital episode
statistics than in routine surveillance systems. Most cases
requiring hospitalization are viral encephalitis with unknown
etiology; of those cases with a specific diagnosis recorded,
herpes is the most common cause. Adults account for the
majority of case-patients, and rates have increased in those
aged >65 years. Our analysis of cases of viral encephalitis
without a specific diagnosis in hospital episode statistics iden-
tified clusters that would have otherwise gone undetected.
Timely hospital episode statistics would provide a more com-
prehensive surveillance than any existing system. 
The coding system used for the hospital diagnoses
recorded in hospital episode statistics changed from ICD-9 to
ICD-10 beginning on April 1, 1995. In some cases, diagnoses
became less specific and in some cases more specific (e.g.,
herpes simplex virus was coded to herpes while VZV encepha-
litis had a specific ICD-10 code from 1995). In this study, we
made some effort to compensate by including hospitalized
cases with a diagnosis of chickenpox and an unspecified viral
encephalitis infection. The change in coding did not appear to
cause any major changes in the total number of hospitalized
viral encephalitis cases. 
Why are so few diagnoses in hospital episode statistics
specific? Whether an appropriate investigation has been car-
ried out, the extent to which a specific diagnosis is sought, and
the quality of medical records affect the recording of specific
diagnoses in hospital episode statistics. Appropriate investiga-
tion is limited by the diagnostic techniques available; virus
isolation from cerebrospinal fluid or the brain can delay a
diagnosis because culturing is slow, sensitivity may be poor,
and obtaining specimens may require special techniques.
Determining the virus causing the encephalitis may not be
seen as essential if all patients diagnosed with viral encephali-
tis are routinely given acyclovir, regardless of the virologic
diagnosis. Regional variation in the proportion of hospitaliza-
tions without a specific diagnosis suggests that local labora-
tory practice or investigation by clinicians may differ. A
nonspecific diagnosis is recorded in hospital episode statistics
if the laboratory results arrive after discharge. During the
period of study, the rapid and highly sensitive PCR test was
not widely used in England; however, as the test becomes
more widely available, the proportion of cases with a specific
diagnosis in hospital episode statistics may increase. In this
study, we found that adults with a specific diagnosis were
older than those without a diagnosis, which is likely to reflect
the age distribution of herpes, VZV, and other specific viral
encephalitis diagnoses. A lower case-fatality rate, however,
and mean length of stay in hospital suggests that these infec-
tions without a specific diagnosis are less severe. 
With the emergence of new diseases and availability of
vaccines for some viruses, determining the cause of these
infections is increasingly important (19,21–25). Information
on etiology would also increase the specificity of cluster detec-
tion. In the past, routine data sources have been used alongside
hospital episode statistics to determine the likely cause of hos-
Table 4. A comparison of cases and deaths attributed to viral encephalitis with a specific diagnosis identified through hospital episode statistics, 
the laboratory reporting system, and the Office of National Statistics, Englanda
Diagnosis
Cases Deaths
HESb Laboratory reportsb
Estimate of underreporting 
in laboratory reports (%) HESc ONSc
Estimate of underreporting 
in HES (%)
Herpes 1,308 353 73 85 104 22
VZV 325 124 62 24 34 42
Measles 71 43 39 0 1 100
Mumps 18 13 28 2 0 0
Rubella 23 1 96 0 0 -
LCMV 7 0 100 0 0 -
Adenoviruses 115 24 79 1 0 0
Total 1,867 558 70 112 139 24
aHES, hospital episode statistics; Herpes, herpes simplex virus; VZV, varicella-zoster virus 1; LCMV, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus.
bJanuary 1, 1990–March 31, 1998.
cJanuary 1, 1993–March 31, 1998.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 239
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pitalizations without a specific diagnosis (26). These methods
depend on seasonality of the viruses and are thus inappropriate
for encephalitis. 
To minimize overestimating the public health cost of viral
encephalitis, multiple consultant episodes of care for a patient
were counted as a single infection if <1 month elapsed
between each. Hospital episode statistics do not include strict
case definitions, which could also lead to overestimating. For
example, between January 1, 1990, and March 31, 1998, a
total of 71 cases of measles were reported in hospital episode
statistics, most in children <5 years of age. These cases are
unlikely to be true measles encephalitis since measles was rare
in the 1990s following the introduction of the combined mea-
sles, mumps, and rubella vaccine in 1988 (27). Furthermore,
none of the laboratory reports of measles encephalitis in this
study were in infants, and only three were in children (aged 7,
11, and 14 years). The laboratory reports may also be overesti-
mated. Cases have been included in the laboratory data based
on a single high serum antibody titer. Had a stricter case defi-
nition been used, as has been suggested for measles (28), even
fewer cases of viral encephalitis would have been identified in
the laboratory system.
Hospital episode statistics identified a lower number of
deaths from viral encephalitis than the number reported rou-
tinely to the Office of National Statistics. Deaths in hospital
episode statistics are known to be incomplete since patients
with encephalitis may die after discharge, and the death may
be recorded in an episode that does not include encephalitis as
a diagnosis and was thus missed in the data extraction (29). 
Some epidemics of encephalitis in England are undetected
in routine surveillance systems and undiagnosed in hospital
episode statistics. This situation suggests the potential for
another emerging infectious disease, such as West Nile infec-
tion, to occur in the U.K.; existing routine surveillance sys-
tems would be incapable of detecting this (30–32). Levels of
disease in England are not as high as reported in a similar
study in the United States (33); however, the proportion with-
out a specific diagnosis is comparable. To improve surveil-
lance, clinicians must be encouraged to report viral
encephalitis, although notifications are not specific. Other
existing surveillance systems, such as the British Pediatric
Surveillance Unit (available from: URL: http://
www.bpsu.inopsu.com/), could be modified to include a spe-
cific diagnosis of viral encephalitis. Alternatively, a sentinel
surveillance system using existing laboratory networks and
offering screening for a wide range of viruses could provide
more accurate and timely data. 
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Preparing for a Bioterrorist Attack: 
Legal and Administrative Strategies
Richard E. Hoffman*
This article proposes and discusses legal and administra-
tive preparations for a bioterrorist attack. To perform the duties
expected of public health agencies during a disease outbreak
caused by bioterrorism, an agency must have a sufficient num-
ber of employees and providers at work and a good communi-
cations system between staff in the central offices of the public
health agency and those in outlying or neighboring agencies
and hospitals. The article proposes strategies for achieving
these objectives as well as for removing legal barriers that dis-
courage agencies, institutions, and persons from working
together for the overall good of the community. Issues related
to disease surveillance and special considerations regarding
public health restrictive orders are discussed.
his article proposes and discusses legal and administrative
strategies that state and local public health officers and
attorneys should consider when preparing for a bioterrorist
attack. Through thoughtful preparation, intelligent and enlight-
ened leadership can maximize coordination of available
resources in the community. 
Two predictable factors will dictate the manner in which
state and local governments respond to a bioterrorist attack:
1) the exposure will be covert, and an incubation period will
occur before ill persons seek medical care, i.e., there will not
be a single location for emergency response by emergency
medical teams, law enforcement officers, and firefighters as
there was in New York City and Washington, D.C., on Sep-
tember 11, 2001; and 2) the attack will be treated not only as
an epidemic but also as an emergency, a crime, and a matter of
national security. Because of the second factor, elected politi-
cal leaders will be in charge of  response to the attack, rather
than the health commissioner or the state epidemiologist,
either of whom would normally manage an epidemic or out-
break control activities. The president, governor, or mayor will
assume leadership roles, and public health agencies will need
to carry out their duties within an incident command structure.
The magnitude of a bioterrorist attack (i.e., how many per-
sons are exposed to the agent and how many become ill) and
the characteristics of the bioagent (e.g., contagious or not)
employed by the terrorists are not predictable, but these factors
will affect virtually all of the response activities. Nonetheless,
“generic” public health duties during a major bioterrorist
attack are predictable: providing accurate information to
health-care providers and the public about the status of the epi-
demic and protective measures; conducting disease surveil-
lance and contact tracing; administering vaccines or
prophylactic antibiotics; implementing restrictive measures;
analyzing human and environmental laboratory specimens;
and maintaining the quality of air, water, and food.
To perform these public health duties, two basic objectives
must be achieved: 1) a sufficient number of employees and
providers in state and local health agencies, hospitals, clinics,
and laboratories must show up for work; and 2) a good com-
munications system must exist between staff in the central
offices of the public health agency and those in outlying or
neighboring agencies and hospitals. Legal and administrative
strategies should be developed in advance of an attack with
these objectives in mind. 
“A sufficient number of employees and providers”
includes not only previously trained medical-care providers,
laboratory technicians, and public health epidemiologists but
also all untrained workers and volunteers who participate in
the response to the outbreak. Untrained does not mean
unskilled or untrainable. Untrained persons could come from
unrelated programs and departments within a public health
agency or hospital, from physicians practicing in the commu-
nity, and from volunteers within and outside the community. 
If the number of ill or exposed persons were large, the bio-
agent were contagious, or both, an epidemic could last for
weeks, and the demands on staff could be enormous. For
example, in response to a small number of smallpox cases in
New York City in 1947, the New York City Department of
Health gave smallpox vaccine to over 6 million residents by
operating 179 clinics from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. 7 days a
week for more than 3 weeks and by gaining the support of pri-
vate physicians, unions, and businesses (1). Before October
2001, no one in the United States. had experience with anthrax
transmitted through the mail or in the air of postal offices.
Many epidemiologic questions arose in the course of respond-
ing to that anthrax outbreak, and any future bioterrorist attack
will probably result in unpredictable or unimaginable issues
despite preparations and training that have been undertaken in
the past few years. Thus, the persons responding to an attack
will need flexibility in the statutes and regulations that govern
disaster emergencies. Rapidly amending statutes and regula-
tions by the usual legislative and administrative processes is
not feasible in an emergency; “flexibility” in this sense means
the legal authority manifest in statutes and regulations must
necessarily be nonspecific and allow for quick action by *University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado, USA
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elected officials and public health leaders. Emergency or exec-
utive orders issued by the president, governor, or mayor are the
most straightforward legal method for directing response
activities customized to the details of a given attack. 
In the Colorado bioterrorism statute enacted in 2000, no
new powers were authorized for either the health department
director or the governor because existing authority to manage
emergencies, disasters, and epidemics, though long-standing,
was determined to have sufficient latitude to deal with the new
threat of bioterrorism. The overall purpose of the introduced
bill was to remove legal barriers that discouraged institutions
and persons from working together for the overall good of the
community. Because the introduced bill did not seek new pow-
ers, it was more acceptable to state legislators.
Obtaining Expert Advice
My experience in state government1 has been that after
natural or manmade point-source disasters, a governor reflex-
ively turns to the office of emergency management, the depart-
ment of public safety (or homeland security), or the National
Guard for advice and counsel. The staffs of these agencies,
however, have neither the expertise necessary to guide the
response to an epidemic nor an established, ongoing commu-
nications and surveillance system with hospitals, laboratories,
and medical providers. It is essential, therefore, to establish a
formal process that allows public health and medical experts to
assist elected officials in analyzing and interpreting informa-
tion about the outbreak and in coordinating the public health
response to the outbreak. Guidance for fiscal year 2002 sup-
plemental funds for public health preparedness and response
for bioterrorism issued by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) requires that a state establish an advisory
committee that includes representatives from health depart-
ments, first responders, hospitals, and voluntary organizations
such as the Red Cross (11). 
In Colorado this advisory committee includes not only the
nine groups listed in the CDC announcement but also the pres-
idents of the state board of health, state medical society, and
state hospital association; the state veterinarian; a wildlife dis-
ease specialist; a medical examiner; a specialist in posttrau-
matic stress management; a pharmacist member of the Board
of Pharmacy; the Attorney General; the chief public informa-
tion officer for the state health department; and, as an ex-offi-
cio member, the chief of the Colorado National Guard (3).
These persons were named to the committee because they pos-
sess useful expertise or connections to the community. The
statute authorizing the formation of the committee provided
legal immunity to members for their advice (4), and the mem-
bers pledged that they would attend the committee meetings
during a bioterrorist attack rather than report to their regular
jobs. By meeting regularly the committee members learn
about each other’s skills, experience, and roles and develop a
working relationship that, by itself, can be extremely valuable
during a crisis. 
One notable absence in the composition of the advisory
committee is representation from federal agencies, such as
CDC, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Although these agencies cannot, as a practical
matter, attend meetings in every state and large municipality,
during a crisis they will have an integral role, and disputes are
more likely if the leaders are meeting for the first time in a
highly stressful situation. For example, local-state-federal dis-
agreements occurred in the management of the pneumonic
plague epidemic in Los Angeles in 1924, the last instance of
person-to-person transmission of plague in the United States,
as well as during the anthrax outbreak in 2001 (12,13).
Removing Legal Barriers
Some existing state regulations, which in normal times are
intended to ensure quality medical care, could hinder commu-
nity efforts during a bioterrorist attack. For example, consider-
ation should be given to modifying, for a limited period
through executive orders, the regulations that control the pre-
scription and dispensing of medicine, licensing of physicians
and nurses, and transfer of patients between hospitals. Provid-
ing antibiotics or vaccinations in mass clinics and obtaining
the services of retired or out-of-state physicians and nurses
may be necessary. 
In Colorado, executive orders that address these concerns
have been drafted by the governor’s technical advisory com-
mittee. The orders would permit a) health-care providers other
than pharmacists and physicians, such as nurses and emer-
gency management technicians, to dispense medications,
b) medicines to be distributed without an identified patient’s
name on the packet or bottle, c) practice of medicine and nurs-
ing by professionals who are not currently licensed in Colo-
rado, provided the practice is restricted to caring for epidemic-
associated illnesses and the persons are working under the
supervision of a licensed practitioner (who is given legal
immunity for the supervisee’s work), and d) persons seeking
medical care at one facility to be redirected to another facility
without initial assessment or stabilization attempt if the initial
hospital is unable to care for any more persons or if a specific
facility (established or temporary) has been directed to receive
epidemic patients, e.g., those with smallpox. These draft
orders must still be tailored to the actual emergency and signed
by the governor, but the background legal work can be com-
pleted ahead of time. 
Two additional features of the Colorado bioterrorism stat-
ute exist; these features were designed to encourage volunteers
and remove legal barriers to cooperation among institutions
1My perspective is based on experience serving as the state epidemiol-
ogist for Colorado from 1987 to 2001; as its chief medical officer from
1998 to 2001; as a participant in Operation Topoff (a full-scale, federal-
state-county 4-day bioterrorism exercise conducted in May 2000) (2);
and as the principal author of Colorado’s bioterrorism response statute
(enacted March 2000) (3–8), its bioterrorism preparedness regulations
(adopted May 2001) (9), and its bioterrorism reporting regulations
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and agencies. First, the statutory definition of “civil defense
worker” was modified to include a “physician, health care pro-
vider, public health worker, or emergency medical service pro-
vider who is ordered by the governor…to provide specific
medical or public health services during and related to an
emergency epidemic and who complies with this order without
pay or other consideration” (7). With this amendment, civil
defense workers may receive compensation for injury, includ-
ing illness caused by bioterrorism, which is suffered as a result
of civil defense service. Second, the statute provides that “per-
sons and entities [including hospitals] that in good faith com-
ply completely with board of health rules regarding the
emergency epidemic and executive orders…shall be immune
from civil or criminal liability for any action taken to comply
with the executive order or rule” and that the state shall pro-
vide “compensation for property…if the property was com-
mandeered or otherwise used in coping with an emergency
epidemic… ” (4). 
Requiring Plans for Bioterrorist Events
To ensure that a sufficient number of health-care providers,
laboratory technicians, public health epidemiologists, and
administrative support workers show up for work during a bio-
terrorist attack, appropriate personal protection (e.g., respira-
tory protection, vaccination, or chemoprophylaxis) for the
worker and, probably, for household members of the worker
are essential. When performing nonstandard work, the worker
may also need legal protection, as discussed above. Plans for a
bioterrorist attack should include these factors and be written
by the employer who knows how the agency operates and is
staffed because people work for an agency, hospital, or institu-
tion, not a region. Nonetheless, it makes sense to develop
mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions and inte-
grate single institution or agency plans into community,
regional, or statewide plans. 
In the 2000 Colorado bioterrorism statute, the state board of
health was given the new authority to promulgate rules requir-
ing each state and local health department, general or critical
access hospital, and managed-care organization to write a plan
for responding to bioterrorism (7). Such rules were adopted in
May 2001 (8). While hospitals and health departments may
have previously written plans for managing mass casualties
resulting from aircraft, bus, or train crashes or natural disasters,
such plans need to be modified to include consideration of the
special circumstances of bioterrorism (e.g., chemoprophylaxis
and personal protective equipment for workers, infection con-
trol, and handling of laboratory specimens). Because pandemic
influenza may pose challenges to the medical and public health
systems similar to those of bioterrorism, a single plan for both
types of epidemics should be drafted. 
Ensuring Good Communications
During “typical” outbreaks of communicable diseases,
clear and timely communication by the state health department
with multiple local health departments and hospitals can be a
challenge. In a bioterrorist attack, the communications chal-
lenge will likely be greater because many more persons and
agencies will be involved. The telephone system may not have
sufficient capacity for the increased demand or it may be dam-
aged and disorganized, as happened during the response to the
attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York City in Sep-
tember 2001 (14). Furthermore, a large, sometimes over-
whelming, number of inquiries made by members of the
public to the public health agency usually occur during public
health crises, and therefore, administrative plans for a bioter-
rorist event should include consideration of this workload.
Legal and administrative strategies should be developed in
anticipation of communication challenges. Rather than relying
on hospital personnel, public health agencies may find it
advantageous to station their own personnel with mobile tele-
phone or radio communications equipment in individual hos-
pitals to assure that public health agencies get the information
they need as rapidly as possible. Accomplishing this may
require an executive order of the governor that commandeers
two-way radios. In Colorado, board of health regulations
require the state and local health departments to include
assignment of employees to hospitals in the agency’s emer-
gency plan (8). 
Disease Reporting and Surveillance
Disease reporting requires specification of what to report
in what manner and timeframe to which parties. A first legal
step in this process is to require immediate reporting of any
suspected or confirmed illness, syndrome, or outbreak caused
by any potential bioterrorist agent. For example, Colorado reg-
ulations were modified in 1999 so that cases of plague, which
had been required to be reported within 24 hours of diagnosis
by telephone, fax, or through a Web-based system, were to be
reported immediately only by telephone to an on-call person if
the physician or hospital suspected the case was related to a
bioterrorist event (9). 
Disease surveillance systems are critical not only for the
initial detection of an outbreak but also for monitoring the
extent and spread of the outbreak and for determining when it
is over. Managing a large outbreak would require gathering
information from contact tracing and source-of-exposure
investigations as well as information about the availability of
critical medicine, medical equipment, and the handling of
corpses. These information needs are much different than
those needed for early detection of an attack. Therefore, legal
authority for surveillance should be modified as necessary to
ensure collection of all information that could be needed by
the public health agency to fulfill its duties throughout the epi-
demic. This legal authority may include requirements for
groups that do not commonly report information, such as phar-
macists, to provide it. 
Restrictive Measures, Isolation, and Quarantine
Administrative public health orders restricting personal
behavior of persons with certain diseases, such as tuberculosis,PERSPECTIVE
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are relatively common in this country (15). Such orders are
usually hand-delivered to a specific person(s), and the restric-
tions are removed after a specified period, such as after one
incubation period or when an ill person is no longer infectious.
Another type of public health order might involve work
restriction, e.g., health-care providers who cannot demonstrate
evidence of immunity to a vaccine-preventable disease are not
permitted to work during an outbreak of such disease.
Few, if any states, however, have experience issuing and
enforcing large-scale quarantine orders that last more than 1–2
days. Orders restricting large numbers of contacts of cases of
plague to home were issued in Florence, Italy, in 1630 and
described in the 1999 book, Galileo’s Daughter  (16). The
enforcement of orders restricting the movement of residents of
an entire town in which there was an outbreak of viral hemor-
rhagic fever was depicted in the 1996 movie, Outbreak. The
images of severe disease and enforced quarantine are similar
in the book and movie and are plausible and disturbing to lay
audiences. A more recent, well-documented example of a
large-scale movement restriction was the British epidemic of
foot-and-mouth disease of 2001, which affected many farms
and businesses and led to the quarantine and slaughter of 4
million sheep, cattle, and pigs for disease control purposes
(17). In all three examples, a decentralized quarantine was
imposed. In general, the advantage of a decentralized strategy
(e.g., persons are restricted to home) is that it may reduce the
risk for transmission of disease because fewer persons congre-
gate. However, a decentralized strategy may require more
community resources to implement and enforce. Alternatively,
the centralized strategy (e.g., restricted persons are taken to a
sports arena, auditorium, theater, school, or hospital) is seem-
ingly easier for the government to care for restricted persons
and to enforce the order but could allow contagious and non-
contagious persons to come into contact with each other. 
Another example of large-scale quarantine occurred in Los
Angeles in 1924 during the last epidemic of pneumonic plague
in this country (12). Three days after the first 15 cases in this
outbreak became known to public health officials, eight city
blocks that housed approximately 2,500 Mexicans were placed
in quarantine. Public health nurses were sent to the area to
make house-to-house inspections to identify new cases, and all
patients with suspected cases in the area were examined by
physicians at the patient’s home and then sent to the county
hospital. The Los Angeles County Board of Charities provided
7-day rations to each household. All persons who lived at
addresses where cases had occurred were quarantined in the
county general hospital, and a Spanish-speaking priest and
social workers were placed in the area to reassure and calm the
residents. The quarantine actions taken in this outbreak were a
combination of centralized and decentralized strategies. 
As has been discussed by Barbera et al. (18), numerous
concerns regarding large-scale quarantine exist. All states cur-
rently have in place varying degrees of legal authority
enabling isolation, quarantine, or travel restrictions if needed
to maintain the welfare and safety of the public. Drafting
restrictive orders in advance is less helpful than with the other
types of orders discussed above because restrictive orders
require more tailoring to the specific circumstances and
parameters of an outbreak. Factors such as duration and loca-
tion of restriction are dependent on what the bioterrorist agent
is, how it is transmitted, how widely the agent has been dis-
seminated, whether exposed persons can be personally identi-
fied, and what resources are available to care for restricted
persons. Not drafting such orders in advance, however, means
that they may be written during the turmoil of multiple agen-
cies trying to control an outbreak. Authorities should never
hesitate to revise the orders on the basis of updated informa-
tion. At the end of the Operation Topoff exercise, for instance,
when the governor had issued a travel restriction order for all
of metropolitan Denver and CDC had quarantined the entire
state of Colorado, such orders created many unforeseen prob-
lems, including how to enforce the orders, maintain essential
community services, and distribute foods and prescription
medicines. The exercise ended before any of these problems
were addressed and resolved. 
Conclusions
Accurate and substantive information given to the public
by credible public health and medical experts can do much to
allay the fears of the public and encourage their cooperation
and participation in constructive, organized community
response efforts (19,20). The foundation for this is thoughtful,
detailed preparations. In this article, I have discussed a number
of ideas about legal and administrative preparations for a biot-
errorist attack, but more work can be done, including develop-
ment of strategies addressing issues related to mental health,
disposal of corpses, performing forensic autopsies, signing
death certificates, and managing potential animal vectors of
disease. 
I have not discussed the sharing of medical and epidemio-
logic information between public health agencies and law
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. Under normal circumstances, public health officials
typically argue that release of disease surveillance information
to the criminal justice system will discourage persons with
reportable conditions from disclosing to public health officials
where they have been and with whom they have had contact.
However, a bioterrorist attack is not a routine event, and I rec-
ommend that state and local public health agencies review the
laws and regulations governing the confidentiality of disease
surveillance records and develop a legal and administrative
protocol for sharing pertinent and relevant information with
law enforcement agencies during a bioterrorist attack (21). 
Finally, I have not discussed the protection of civil liberties
and due process for persons affected by executive orders of the
governor and public health officials. This is an important and
difficult issue, especially when well persons are quarantined
solely on the basis of their having visited, worked, or resided
in a particular location at a particular time, as opposed to hav-
ing had face-to-face contact with a known contagious person.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 245
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Public health officials and attorneys general should review
existing safeguards for the protection of civil liberties and
determine whether modifications need to be made for the spe-
cial circumstances created by a bioterrorist attack.
Dr. Hoffman is adjunct associate professor in the department of
Preventive Medicine and Biometrics, University of Colorado Health
Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado. From 1987 to 2001, he was the
state epidemiologist for Colorado. He served as chief medical officer
for Colorado from 1998 to 2001. He was president of the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists from 1994 to 1995. 
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B-Virus (Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1) 
Infection in Humans and Macaques: 
Potential for Zoonotic Disease
Jennifer L. Huff* and Peter A. Barry*
Nonhuman primates are widely used in biomedical
research because of their genetic, anatomic, and physiologic
similarities to humans. In this setting, human contact directly
with macaques or with their tissues and fluids sometimes
occurs. Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (B virus), an alphaherp-
esvirus endemic in Asian macaques, is closely related to her-
pes simplex virus (HSV). Most macaques carry B virus without
overt signs of disease. However, zoonotic infection with B virus
in humans usually results in fatal encephalomyelitis or severe
neurologic impairment. Although the incidence of human infec-
tion with B virus is low, a death rate of >70% before the avail-
ability of antiviral therapy makes this virus a serious zoonotic
threat. Knowledge of the clinical signs and risk factors for
human B-virus disease allows early initiation of antiviral therapy
and prevents severe disease or death.
f the 35 herpesviruses identified in nonhuman primates,
only Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (B virus) is known to
be pathogenic for humans. Monkeys of the genus Macaca,
which are widely used as animal models for biomedical
research, naturally carry B virus. Infection in macaques is life-
long, with periodic, usually asymptomatic reactivation.
Approximately 40 cases of zoonotic B-virus infection have
been reported. Considering the number of people in contact
with macaques, this number of cases is quite low. However,
the death rate for B-virus infection before the availability of
antiviral therapy was >70%. Neurologic sequelae are common
in survivors. Treatment with antiviral medication may
decrease the death rate, but rapid diagnosis and initiation of
therapy are essential in controlling the spread of the virus in
the central nervous system and limiting neurologic sequelae.
Discovery of B Virus
The first documented case of human B-virus infection
occurred in 1932 when a researcher (patient W.B.) was bitten
on the hand by an apparently healthy rhesus macaque (Macaca
mulatta) and died of progressive encephalomyelitis 15 days
later. Two research groups obtained samples from patient
W.B.: Gay and Holden and Sabin and Wright (1,2). Both
groups demonstrated a similar disease progression in rabbits
inoculated with nerve tissue from patient W.B. and character-
ized the agent as a herpesvirus. Neither group was able to pro-
duce disease in rhesus macaques, presumably because the
monkeys were already naturally infected with what Sabin’s
group named B virus (after patient W.B.).
The familiar term B virus will be used throughout this arti-
cle. Many other accepted terms for this virus exist, including
Herpesvirus simiae, herpes B, monkey B virus, and herpesvi-
rus B. The International Committee on the Taxonomy of
Viruses uses the name Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (family:
Herpesviridae, subfamily: Alphaherpesvirinae, genus: Sim-
plexvirus). This designation is based on virologic characteris-
tics and serologic cross-reactivity with other members of the
genus Simplexvirus, namely HSV type 1 (HSV-1), the caus-
ative agent of oral herpetic ulcers (cold sores) in humans and
HSV type 2 (HSV-2), the agent of human genital herpes (3).
Structure and Life Cycle
B virus is a large, double-stranded DNA virus with numer-
ous open reading frames, some of which share approximately
79% amino acid sequence identity with HSV-1 and HSV-2 (4).
The viral genome is G+C rich (75% G+C), the highest of any
known herpesvirus (4). The B-virus genome is only partially
sequenced, but thus far, is colinear with that of HSV (5). Elec-
tron micrograph studies of B virus show a typical herpesvirus
structure (6), including an electron dense core with viral DNA
inside an icosapentahedral capsid surrounded by an amor-
phous tegument protein layer and a lipid envelope studded
with viral glycoproteins. Glycoproteins on the viral envelope
mediate attachment to and entry into the host cell. For HSV, 11
glycoproteins are known (gB–gM), and another is predicted
(gN). Of these, nine have been identified in B virus (5).
In general, alphaherpesviruses infect mucosal epithelia fol-
lowed by one or more rounds of replication in epithelial cells.
B virus likely replicates with three consecutive rounds of tran-
scription (the α , β , and γ  genes), as has been established for
HSV. The infected cells are lysed, releasing virus to spread to
other cells and sensory nerve endings, although direct entry
into neurons without replication can occur (3). Virus can also
spread from cell to cell without contacting the extracellular
environment. Spread of the virus to and from the nerve ganglia
occurs by axonal transport, which has been demonstrated for B
virus in experimentally infected mice (7). The virus estab-
lishes latency in the nerve ganglia. Latency is characterized by
a lack of viral replication and limited viral transcription. Peri-
odic reactivation from latency delivers the virus to mucosal
epithelial cells, where it replicates; infectious virus is released *University of California, Davis, California, USA
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from the mucosal epithelium. A heavy viral load in the ganglia
may increase the frequency of reactivation and shedding (8).
Recent findings from the study of primary and recurrent HSV-
2 infection indicate that most episodes of recurrent viral shed-
ding are asymptomatic. B-virus shedding in macaques also
appears to be primarily asymptomatic (9–11).
B-Virus Infection in Macaques
B-virus infection has been reported most commonly in the
rhesus and cynomolgus macaque (M. facicularis), two species
used extensively in biomedical research. B virus has also been
isolated from the stumptail (M. artoides), pig-tailed (M. nem-
estrina), Japanese (M. fuscata), bonnet (M. radiata), and Tai-
wan (M. cyclopis) macaque (12). Sequence comparisons and
restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis of viral
genomes have demonstrated strain differences between B-
virus isolates from different macaque species (13). Research
suggests that B virus from rhesus macaques may be more
pathogenic for humans than B virus from other macaque spe-
cies (13).  Where the species of macaque is noted, cases of
human B-virus infection have all been associated with direct
or indirect exposure specifically to rhesus macaques (14–19).
The ability of nonrhesus strains of B virus to infect humans is
not well understood. 
Little is known about the biology of B virus in its natural
host. Infection is usually acquired at sexual maturity (2–4
years of age for rhesus macaques). As seen in humans with
HSV, B-virus seropositivity increases with population age;
seropositivity rates of 80% to 100% occur among most adult
captive macaque populations (10,20,21). Oral herpetic lesions
such as gingivostomatitis, oral and lingual ulcers, and conjunc-
tivitis have been described, but are usually associated with
immunosuppression or stress attributable to recent importation
or crowded housing conditions (12,22,23). Genital lesions
have not been observed in macaques, although genital infec-
tion has been demonstrated by polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) (9), virus isolation from the genital mucosa (10,11), and
culture of the sacral ganglia (11). In general, macaques remain
asymptomatic, and identification of oral herpetic lesions is
sufficient grounds for euthanasia of the affected animal. The
infrequent cases of disseminated B-virus disease in macaques
are most often associated with immunosuppression, caused by
either chemotherapy or concurrent infection as with simian
type D virus (22). Although severe HSV disease is commonly
observed in humans co-infected with HIV, no cases of B-virus
disease associated with simian immunodeficiency virus infec-
tion in macaques have been reported (24).
Relatively few studies have surveyed macaques for B-
virus shedding, and detection of B virus by culture is rare.
Most cases of B-virus detection in asymptomatic macaques by
culture or PCR are associated with breeding season stress
(9,10), immunosuppression (25), or primary infection (10,11).
The true frequency of B-virus shedding in macaque popula-
tions is not known but is likely to be low. 
Most cases of human B-virus infection have been associ-
ated with apparently healthy macaques (i.e., no obvious her-
petic lesions), which indicates asymptomatic shedding of the
virus. Lack of clinical signs of recurrent infection makes iden-
tification of shedding animals difficult. People working with
these animals should consider every animal a potential source
of B virus and use proper protective equipment and care when
handling them (21,26–28). 
Human B Virus Infection
Most cases of human B-virus infection have involved
direct contact with macaques, such as a bite, scratch, or
mucosal contact with body fluid or tissue (12,14–16,19,27,28).
Indirect contact, such as injury from a contaminated fomite
(e.g., needle puncture or cage scratch), has also resulted in
human infection. Human-to-human transmission has been doc-
umented in one case (15); however, further investigation has
indicated that the risk for secondary transmission is low (18).
Human B-virus disease generally occurs within 1 month of
exposure (21), commonly with an incubation period of a few
days to a week. The development and progression of disease
depend on the site of exposure and the amount of virus inocu-
lated. Vesicular lesions have not been consistently found at the
site of exposure (12,14–19). Disease often starts with general
influenzalike symptoms of fever, muscle aches, fatigue, and
headache (12,14). Other variable symptoms include lymphad-
enitis and lymphangitis, nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain,
and hiccups (12,14). Neurologic signs develop when the virus
spreads to the central nervous system and vary with the part of
the brain or spinal cord affected. Hyperesthesias, ataxia, diplo-
pia, agitation, and ascending flaccid paralysis have been
described after virus spread to the brain (12,14–19).  Virus
spread to the central nervous system is an ominous sign; even
with antiviral therapy and supportive care, most patients die,
and those who survive often have serious neurologic sequelae.
Deaths are often attributed to respiratory failure associated
with ascending paralysis. 
The possibility of asymptomatic or mild B-virus infection
in humans has been suggested (2,29). A carefully controlled
study of B-virus antibodies in persons with macaque contact
and controls without contact showed no evidence of asymp-
tomatic human infection or a carrier state for B virus (29).
Although HSV antibodies can neutralize the virus in vitro, anti-
body titers to HSV are not protective in human cases of B-virus
exposure or infection (21,29) and can confound diagnostic test-
ing because of cross-reactivity. Asymptomatic human infection
with B virus appears exceedingly rare if it occurs at all.
With the discovery of simian immunodeficiency virus and
its identification as a model for HIV infection, the number of
macaques used in research has increased, as has the number of
human B-virus cases. Guidelines for reducing and controlling
exposure were first published in 1987 (26) by a group of veter-
inarians, physicians, and research scientists called the B Virus
Working Group. Guidelines were again published in 1995 (21)SYNOPSIS
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by a new B Virus Working Group to include new information
and provide protocols for handling exposures. Further recom-
mendations were made in 1998 to emphasize the need for lim-
iting mucosal exposure to potential sources of B virus (19,28).
New guidelines by another B Virus Working Group have
recently been published (30).
Treatment of B-Virus Infection in Humans
The 2002 B Virus Working Group guidelines address
issues to be considered in cases of possible exposure to or
infection with the virus (30) and reflect consensus of opinion
at the time the guidelines were written. In cases of exposure,
an established and frequently updated protocol should be used
based on these guidelines and on current literature regarding
human cases of B-virus infection. Additional information and
contacts are available from: URL: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
hid5.html, http://www.haz-map.com/Macaque.htm.
According to the guidelines, the most important action in a
case of potential exposure to B virus is to rapidly and thor-
oughly cleanse the wound or exposure site. HSV can enter
sensory nerve endings within 5 minutes of exposure, and B
virus is likely to infect just as rapidly. Bite wounds, scratches,
or puncture wounds of nonmucosal surfaces should be
cleansed with soap or detergent for at least 15 min (30). The
time spent mechanically cleansing the area is more important
than the type of cleansing solution used. Mucosal surfaces
should be rinsed with sterile saline or running water for 15
min. Immediate cleansing or rinsing can inactivate and wash
away virus present in the exposure site. After immediately
cleansing the wound or exposure area, the person should seek
medical attention, specifically from a physician identified in
the facility’s protocol as someone familiar with treating these
B-virus exposure cases. 
A physician with a patient who has potentially been
exposed to B virus faces a conundrum. Before onset of neuro-
logic symptoms, antiviral therapy is successful. However, few
cases of potential exposure lead to infection. Prophylactic treat-
ment is unnecessary in most cases of potential exposure
because treatment can confound diagnostic testing by interfer-
ing with the humoral immune response (21). However, the
2002 B Virus Working Group viewed prophylactic treatment
more favorably in light of the efficacy of postexposure prophy-
laxis for nosocomial HIV exposure and the availability of new
antiherpes drugs, such as valacyclovir, that achieve higher
serum levels with a more reasonable dosing schedule (30).
Although severity of injury may prompt use of antiviral ther-
apy, the amount of inoculated virus determines if infection is
likely to occur. In some cases, minor scratches or needle-sticks
have transmitted B virus, while bites with severe tissue lacera-
tion have healed without infection. The primary factor to con-
sider is whether cleansing (or rinsing, if it is a mucosal surface)
was initiated immediately and performed for the recommended
15 min (21). Inadequate cleansing of the wound or exposed
area in a timely manner could warrant prophylactic antiviral
therapy. Other indications for immediate initiation of antiviral
treatment include the identification of herpetic lesions in the
source animal, injuries involving the head or neck, and mucosal
exposure to macaque fluid. Because of the prevalence of
asymptomatic B-virus shedding in macaques, the clinical
appearance of the monkey involved (if the animal is identified)
may not be helpful in evaluating the possibility of transmission.
In addition to working closely with a physician trained to
handle cases of B-virus exposure and infection, taking samples
from the exposed person and the source animal is important
for virus culture and serologic testing. A list of recommended
swabs for virus culture and serum samples is available from:
URL: http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwvir/index.html. 
Detection of B Virus
Early suspicion and rapid diagnosis of B-virus infection
are critical to the control of human infection. The extreme
cross-reactivity of primate alphaherpesviruses has required the
development of diagnostic methods that can differentiate
between HSV and B-virus infection. Despite the inherent risk
for exposure, direct culture of B virus has been the standard
for diagnosis of infection. Culture of B virus requires a special
containment facility since the virus is a biosafety level 4
pathogen (31). Serologic methods for the detection of B-virus
infection have also involved propagation of the virus in tissue
culture to produce antigen. However, the substitution of
related antigens appears to work well for serologic tests. The
most promising of these antigens is herpesvirus papio 2, an
alphaherpesvirus of baboons that is as closely related to B
virus as HSV-1 and HSV-2 are to each other (32,33). Serologic
methods are useful only for retrospective analysis, not for ther-
apeutic decisions, which need to be made rapidly in cases of
potential human infection. 
More recently, PCR methods have allowed direct demon-
stration of B-virus infection without the risk of working with
virus cultures (9,34,35). PCR methods have been hampered by
the close genetic relationship between primate alphaherpesvi-
ruses; many require post-PCR techniques to definitively dif-
ferentiate between HSV and B virus.  To specifically detect B
virus, we developed a method using quantitative real-time
PCR, whose potential application for human clinical samples
in cases of exposure warrants further study (9). Samples to be
tested by PCR may contain B virus and must be handled
accordingly (31).
B Virus Outside the Research Setting
The cases of human B-virus infection that have been
described have all occurred in relation to contact with
macaques in a biomedical research setting. However, this set-
ting is not the only one in which humans have contact with
macaques. The Woburn Safari Park in the U.K. recently culled
all B-virus–positive macaques from its facility (36). No cases
of human infection have been documented despite contact
between macaques and humans driving through the park, but
the risk perceived by this situation warranted the action. B
virus is also prevalent in free-ranging macaques native toEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 249
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Southeast Asia (12,37). A recent survey of workers at a
Balinese Hindu temple that is a refuge for free-ranging
macaques and a tourist attraction showed that contact between
humans and macaques sufficient to transmit B virus com-
monly occurred. A serosurvey of 38 macaques in the area
showed that 31 (81.6%) were B-virus seropositive. No cases
consistent with B-virus disease in humans have been described
in this area of Bali or in other areas of Southeast Asia where
humans are in contact with free-ranging macaques. However,
in cases of encephalitis, B virus may not be considered.
In other situations, particularly when potentially seroposi-
tive macaques have been domesticated as pets, opportunities
for exposure to B virus are frequent. One report documented
many instances of potential exposures from bites, scratches,
food sharing, close physical contact, and even shared chewing
gum (38). This study also found that children were three times
more likely than adults to be bitten by pet macaques. Although
the number of macaques kept as pets is probably small, the
risk of B-virus infection is increased because of the lack of
precautions and the extent of contact between monkey and
owner. The risk of B-virus infection is low, but the risk for
death is high. 
Specific Pathogen-Free Colony Development
In 1989, the National Institutes of Health’s National Center
for Research Resources started funding specific pathogen-free
macaque colony development. The timing and local nature of
B-virus reactivation and shedding make detecting infection in
an animal difficult. Therefore, serologic methods are used to
screen and monitor animals for consideration as pathogen-free.
Numerous negative serologic results are necessary to deter-
mine a macaque’s B-virus status. Although specific pathogen-
free status reduces the likelihood of infection, this status does
not eliminate the risk for infection entirely. Full protective
equipment should be used for working with all macaques
regardless of their pathogen status. While population numbers
in these specific pathogen-free colonies are increasing, the
demand for pathogen-free animals will continue to exceed the
supply for some time (24). 
B-Virus Vaccine Development 
While antiviral therapy has substantially improved the sur-
vival rate for human B-virus infection, fatal cases still occur
(19,28). The ability of the virus to modulate and evade the
immune response has stymied vaccine development for most
herpesvirus infections. A vaccine for use in rhesus macaques
could reduce transmission of the virus and, over time, reduce
the prevalence of infection in captive macaque populations.
Given the lack of an effective vaccine for HSV after years of
research effort and clinical trials, development of a B-virus
vaccine presents a challenge.
A formalin-inactivated B-virus vaccine was developed and
tested in the 1960s (39). Although this vaccine did induce an
antibody response, antibody titers were low, and frequent
boosters (every 3 months) were required (39). Recently, suc-
cessful use of a vaccinia vector to deliver the gD gene of B
virus was demonstrated in rabbits with protection of 10 (91%)
of 11 animals from B-virus challenge (40). A DNA vaccine
against B virus has also recently been described (41). Glyco-
protein B of B virus delivered in a plasmid vector induced a
humoral response in both mice and rhesus macaques.
Although no challenge experiments were performed in mon-
keys, an anamnestic-like response upon boosting was noted.
While the ability of a B-virus antibody response to protect
from infection is not known, studies of HSV suggest that an
antibody response alone is not protective. Both the vaccinia
and DNA vaccine approaches described above are likely to
induce cellular immunity to B virus, although the cellular
response was not studied by either group (40,41). As clinical
trials of candidate HSV vaccines progress, the development of
a B-virus vaccine for use in macaques or humans at risk for
exposure should be considered.
Conclusion
The potential for fatal human infection with B virus is a
constant concern because frequent exposures occur to humans
in the course of caring for and using macaques in a research
setting. Personal protective equipment and safe handling pro-
cedures have limited the incidence of human disease. How-
ever, little is known about the biology of B virus in the natural
macaque host. A clear understanding of the real risk for B-
virus shedding in its natural host will help identify opportuni-
ties to prevent or limit zoonotic B-virus disease.
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Photorhabdus
Species:
Bioluminescent
Bacteria as
Emerging Human
Pathogens?
John G. Gerrard,* Samantha McNevin,† 
David Alfredson,* Ross Forgan-Smith,† 
and Neil Fraser‡
We report two Australian patients with soft tissue infections
due to Photorhabdus species. Recognized as important insect
pathogens, Photorhabdus spp. are bioluminescent gram-nega-
tive bacilli. Bacteria belonging to the genus are emerging as a
cause of both localized soft tissue and disseminated infections
in humans in the United States and Australia. The source of
infection in humans remains unknown.
ioluminescence is the production of visible light by a
chemical reaction in a living organism. The property is
rarely reported in the clinical bacteriology laboratory because
bacterial bioluminescence is seen primarily in marine species.
Photorhabdus spp (family: Enterobacteriaceae) are the only
terrestrial bacteria known to exhibit this property (1). The clas-
sification within the genus is complex with three currently rec-
ognized species: P. luminescens,  P. temperata, and P.
asymbiotica (2). Several subspecies are recognized.
Photorhabdus spp. have been the subject of intensive study
by agricultural scientists because of the role these bacteria play
in controlling insects. Insects, like humans, are subject to infes-
tation by nematodes (3). Photorhabdus spp. inhabit the gut of
some insect-pathogenic nematodes (Heterorhabditis spp.),
where they form a symbiotic relationship. Nematode species of
this type are able to invade the larvae of susceptible insects and
release Photorhabdus spp. The bacteria proliferate and promote
nematode reproduction by killing the insect larvae.
Insect-pathogenic nematodes harboring Photorhabdus spp
are used as biopesticides in a number of countries, including
the United States and Australia. Agricultural scientists are also
attempting to develop insect-resistant transgenic crops by using
insecticidal toxin genes derived from Photorhabdus spp. (4). 
Genes encoding homologues of insecticidal toxins from
Photorhabdus spp. occur naturally within the genome of Yers-
inia pestis, the cause of plague. Lateral transfer of genetic
material between Photorhabdus and Yersinia species is
thought to have resulted from their common association with
insects as bacterial pathogens (5).
Human infection with Photorhabdus  spp.  has been
described in two previous publications—six cases from the
United States (6) and four cases from South Eastern Australia
(Victoria and New South Wales) (1). We report two additional
recent human cases of Photorhabdus infection from the Aus-
tralian state of Queensland.
The Study
Patient 1
A 39-year-old male pest controller from Gladstone on a
routine visit to his general practitioner in April 2001 inquired
about the recent appearance of a red macule, 8 mm in diame-
ter, on the medial aspect of his right ankle. No specific treat-
ment was given.  When he was seen again 18 days later, a
painful, necrotic ulcer, about 12 mm in diameter, had devel-
oped at the original site of the red spot. A gram-negative
organism later identified as Photorhabdus sp. was isolated in
pure growth from the exudate. The patient began a 10-day
course of oral cephalexin. When he was observed again 11
days later, he exhibited a persistent discharge with surrounding
cellulitis. He was therefore prescribed a 10-day course of oral
amoxycillin-clavulanate. Three weeks later, the ulcer appeared
to be healing; after another 6 weeks, signs of infection had
again developed. A gram-negative organism was isolated from
the exudate but was not formally identified.
The patient was prescribed an additional 7-day course of
oral cephalexin. When he was observed 3 months later, the
infection had resolved. In his recent work as a pest controller,
he had been spraying chemical insecticides under houses and
in foreign cargo ships. He had never used insect pathogenic
nematodes as a biopesticide.
Patient 2
A 78-year-old man from the Queensland Gold Coast
sought treatment in January 1999 with a 3-day history of a
painful, swollen right foot. The patient had a history of poly-
myalgia rheumatica for which he was taking prednisone, 8 mg
daily. In January 1999, after working barefoot in the garden,
the man noted intense pain in his right forefoot and a very
small amount of bloody discharge from the web space between
his fourth and fifth toes.
The next day he was seen by his general practitioner who
treated him with oral dicloxacillin. Two days later he was
admitted to the hospital with increasingly severe pain with
extensive redness and swelling extending to his right knee. He
was noted to be afebrile with a mild neutrophil leukocytosis.
He was started on a regimen of intravenous dicloxacillin and
gentamicin. 
Surgical debridement of the right foot was required on
three occasions during the first 8 days of his admission. Pus
was collected for culture on two of these occasions, and tissue
was obtained during the third.  An organism identified as
*Gold Coast Hospital, Southport, Queensland, Australia; †Queensland
Medical Laboratory, West End, Queensland, Australia; and ‡Harbour
City Family Practice, Gladstone, Queensland, Australia
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Photorhabdus sp. was isolated in pure culture from each of
these operative specimens. The same organism was also iso-
lated, together with Staphylococcus aureus, from a superficial
swab collected in the emergency department on presentation.
No bacterial growth was obtained from blood cultures col-
lected on admission.
The patient was treated with intravenous gentamicin for 2
weeks and ceftazidime for 1 week. He was discharged on a 6-
week course of oral ciprofloxacin. The foot remained healed
on follow-up 3 months later.
Photorhabdus spp. can be isolated and identified to genus
level by using techniques available in most clinical bacteriol-
ogy laboratories. A total of five isolates from the two patients
described in the current report were examined in our laborato-
ries with standard techniques (one from patient 1 and four
from patient 2). The phenotypic characteristics that the isolates
displayed were typical of the genus.
Colonies were formed after 24–48 hours on tryptic soy
agar containing either 5% sheep or horse blood (bioMérieux,
Baulkham Hills, Australia) at both 35°C and at room tempera-
ture, with a tendency to “swarm” (Figure 1). The isolates also
grew on MacConkey agar. On sheep and horse blood agar, a
thin line of annular hemolysis was observed 4–12 mm from
the colony edge. The hemolysis was more apparent when the
isolates were incubated at room temperature (Figure 2). The
organisms were motile, gram-negative, rod-shaped bacteria.
They were facultatively anaerobic, oxidase negative, and
strongly catalase positive. Other biochemical reactions were as
described previously (1).
The defining characteristic was the presence of faint lumi-
nescence, which could be clearly seen with the naked eye
when the colonies were examined under conditions of total
darkness. It was critical to this examination that the observer’s
eyes be allowed to adjust to the darkness for 10 minutes.
Two commercially available automated bacterial identifi-
cation systems were used in our laboratories: MicroScan
Walkaway (Dade Behring Inc., MicroScan Division, West
Sacramento, CA) and bioMerieux Vitek (bioMérieux; Hazel-
wood, MO). Photorhabdus spp. do not currently appear on the
databases of either of these systems, which leads to misidenti-
fication (Table 1).
Photorhabdus spp. have been shown to form a heteroge-
neous group based on DNA-DNA hybridization studies, 16S
rDNA sequencing and polymerase chain reaction ribotyping
(2). A polyphasic approach is now applied to classifying iso-
lates within the genus, dividing it into three species and sev-
eral subspecies. The American clinical isolates described by
Farmer et al. (6) belong to a new species, Photorhabdus asym-
biotica (2). A specific epithet has not yet been assigned to the
Australian clinical isolates but they also may form a new spe-
cies within the genus (7).
Antimicrobial sensitivity was assessed by using broth
microdilution. The isolates were sensitive to a broad range of
antimicrobial agents with activity against gram-negative bac-
teria including ciprofloxacin, gentamicin, tetracycline, ceftri-
axone, and amoxycillin-clavulanate. Isolates from both
patients were resistant to cephalothin and ampicillin.
Conclusions
Publication of information about these two cases brings to
a total of 12 the number of human infections with Photorhab-
dus spp. documented in the medical literature (Table 2 and
Figure 3). The clinical picture described in the 12 cases has
generally been one of localized or more commonly multifocal
skin/soft tissue infection. Such infection has had a tendency to
relapse. The disseminated distribution of skin/soft tissue infec-
tion in several cases suggests hematogenous spread. Bactere-
mia was documented in 4/12 case-patients. Cough was
Figure 1. Photorhabdus isolate from patient 2, growing on tryptic soy
agar containing 5% sheep blood, after 48 hours’ incubation at 35°C.
Arrows indicate “swarming.” The colonies could be seen to glow faintly
with the naked eye under conditions of total darkness after 10 minutes
of adjustment.
Figure 2. Photorhabdus isolate from patient 2 after 5 days’ growth at
room temperature on sheep blood agar. Arrows indicate the character-
istic thin line of “annular” hemolysis surrounding the colonies.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 253
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documented in two of the bacteremic case-patients. In one of
these, isolates of a Photorhabdus sp. were obtained from spu-
tum as well as from blood and skin/soft tissue.
Given the very limited clinical experience, making defini-
tive recommendations about treatment is not possible. Antimi-
crobial therapy should be guided by in vitro sensitivities. The
tendency for Photorhabdus infection to relapse suggests that
prolonged therapy for a period of weeks would be prudent,
perhaps with an oral fluoroquinolone.
Photorhabdus  spp.  are not human commensals. The
patients apparently acquired the pathogen from an unidentified
source in the terrestrial environment. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by the observations that at least 4/6 of the Australian
patients were engaged in outdoor activities around the time of
acquisition and that the initial site of infection was on the
lower limbs in more than half of Australian and American
case-patients. 
Photorhabdus spp. have never been shown to live freely in
soil, although they will survive in soil under laboratory condi-
tions (8). Photorhabdus spp. have only been isolated naturally
from two nonclinical sources: insect-pathogenic nematodes
(Heterorhabditis spp) and the insects they parasitize (beetles,
moths, and the like). It seems likely therefore that Photorhab-
dus spp are transmitted to humans by a terrestrial invertebrate
(nematode or arthropod), but that vector has not yet been iden-
tified.
Table 1. Misidentification of Photorhabdus isolates from patients 1 
and 2 by commercially available bacterial identification systems
System Misidentification Probability
MicroScan Walkaway Rapid 
Neg BP Combo Panel Type 4
Shewanella putrefaciens 99.97%
MicroScan Walkaway
Neg BP Combo Panel Type 11
Pseudomonas oryzihabitans 85.46%
BioMérieux Vitek
GNI+ V1316
Providencia stuartii 99%
Figure 3. Australian and American clinical isolates of Photorhabdus.
Table 2. Published human cases of Photorhabdus infection
Case no. Year  Country Location Age/sex Clinical Alleged vector Source of isolate
1 2001 Australia Gladstone, 
Queensland
39M Soft tissue infection right ankle
(professional pest controller)
Pus from ankle ulcer
2 1999 Australia Gold  Coast, 
Queensland
78M Soft tissue infection right foot Pus and tissue from 
right foot 
3 (1) 1998 Australia Murwil-lumbah, 
New South Wales
55M Multifocal soft tissue infections 
(upper and lower limbs, abdomen), 
pneumonia
Blood, sputum, pus 
and tissue
4 (1) 1998 Australia Wangaratta, 
Victoria
50M Multifocal soft tissue infections 
(upper and lower limbs)
Spider Pus from soft tissue 
abscesses
5 (1) 1998 Australia Melbourne, Victoria 90M Cough and fever Blood
6 (1) 1994 Australia Melbourne, Victoria 11F Multifocal soft tissue infections 
(lower limbs and chest)
Pus and soft tissue 
biopsies
7 (6) 1989 USA San Antonio, Texas Groin infection Groin
8 (6) 1987 USA San Antonio, Texas 45M Multifocal soft tissue infection, 
left lower limb
Spider Pus from lower 
limb abscess
9 (6) 1986 USA San Antonio, Texas 78M Multifocal soft tissue infection 
left lower limb
Pus from lower limb 
abscess and ulcer
10 (6) 1984 USA San Antonio, Texas 36F Disseminated bacterial infection Submandible, abdomen
11 (6) 1979 USA Pennsylvania 72F Blood, skin
12 (6) 1977 USA Maryland 80F Endocarditis BloodDISPATCHES
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Life-Threatening
Infantile Diarrhea
from Fluoroquinolone-
Resistant Salmonella
enterica Typhimurium
with Mutations in
Both gyrA and parC
Hideo Nakaya,* Akihiro Yasuhara,* Ken Yoshimura,* 
Yukio Oshihoi,* Hidemasa Izumiya,† 
and Haruo Watanabe† 
Salmonella Typhimurium DT12, isolated from a 35-day-old
infant with diarrhea, was highly resistant to ampicillin, tetracy-
cline, chloramphenicol, streptomycin, gentamycin, sul-
famethoxazole/trimethoprim,  nalidixic acid, and fluoro-
quinolones. The patient responded to antibiotic therapy with
fosfomycin. Multidrug-resistance may become prevalent in Sal-
monella infections in Japan, as shown in this first case of a
patient infected with fluoroquinolone-resistant Salmonella.
almonella enterica serovar Typhimurium (S. Typhimu-
rium) is one of the most important causative agents of
acute human Salmonella gastroenteritis. In particular, S. Typh-
imurium definitive phage type104 (DT104), which has devel-
oped multidrug resistance to ampicillin, tetracycline,
chloramphenicol, streptomycin, sulfa drugs, and other antibi-
otics, has quickly become widespread in developed countries
and drawn much attention worldwide (1–6). In European
countries, other types of Salmonella resistant to fluoroquinolo-
nes, including DT104, have been detected, and adequate treat-
ment of infected patients is now a serious issue. We isolated S.
Typhimurium DT12, highly resistant to fluoroquinolones,
from diarrhetic stools from an infant and reported the first clin-
ical infection in Japan (7). We describe our analysis of this iso-
late’s antibiotic susceptibility and drug resistance genes: three
point mutations in the region determining quinolone resistance
were identified in gyrA and parC.
Case Report
The patient was a 35-day-old infant boy with fever, diar-
rhea, and vomiting. He was born at 38 weeks, weighing 3,296
g. Hyperbilirubinemia developed at 1 week of age. He was fed
by both breast milk and formula. The family history was unre-
markable. The baby vomited on the night of September 4,
2000, and bloody diarrhea and fever >37°C developed at 3:00
a.m. the next day. His parents consulted the maternity office
where he was born, and the obstetrician prescribed oral fosfo-
mycin.  When his fever did not subside, the obstetrician
referred him to the outpatient department of pediatrics, Kansai
Medical University Kohri Hospital, Osaka, Japan. Acute
enteritis was diagnosed, and the patient was admitted to the
hospital on September 5.
On admission, the infant was 55.0 cm long and weighed
4,536 g. His temperature was 38.6°C, heart rate 162 beats/min,
respiratory rate 52/min, and blood pressure 102/palpable
mmHg. He was pale and lethargic with cold extremities and
cyanosis around the nose and mouth. His anterior fontanelle
was 1 cm in diameter without swelling. Small eruptions were
observed on his face and neck.
Laboratory evaluation was remarkable for the following:
total protein 4.9 g/dL (normal range: 5.0–6.5 g/dL), albumin
2.8 g/dL (normal range: 3.3–4.2 g/dL), C-reactive protein 2.5
mg/dL (normal: <0.3 mg/dL), leukocyte 3,730/mm3 (normal
range 5,000–19,500/mm3), neutrophils 59.4%, lymphocytes
33.0%, sodium ion 135 mEq/L (normal range: 135–147 mEq/
L), potassium ion 4.5 mEq/L (normal range: 3.6–5.0 mEq/L),
chlorine ion 108 mEq/L (normal range: 98–108 mEq/L), cal-
cium 5.0 mEq/L (normal range 4.2–5.7 mEq/L), blood urea
nitrogen 9.8 mg/dL (normal range: 4–15.4 mg/dL), creatinine
0.27 mg/dL (normal range: 0.23–0.6 mg/dL), uric acid 3.6 mg/
dL (normal range: 1.4–3.5 mg/dL), and blood sugar 93 mg/dL
(normal range: 60–100 mg/dL). S. Typhimurium DT12, named
KKH712, was isolated from his stool. Liver panel and chemis-
tries were otherwise normal.
Upon admission, fosfomycin by injection was adminis-
tered for bacterial enteritis. Frequent diarrhea and vomiting
decreased. The baby’s body temperature and C-reactive pro-
tein level normalized, and his general condition improved. He
was discharged on day 14. Outpatient follow-up showed that,
with fosfomycin, his stool culture eventually tested negative
for  Salmonella. Stool cultures from his family members
(father, mother, sister, and brother) did not show the causative
Salmonella isolate, and no member of family had diarrhea or
took antimicrobial drugs. The family did not have a pet and
had not traveled overseas recently. We did not find a route of
infection.
Conclusions
We examined the S. Typhimurium DT12 (KKH712) iso-
lated from the patient for drug susceptibility. We determined
MICs of 18 antibiotics (ampicillin, cefaclor, cefazolin, ceftazi-
dime, ceftriaxone, imipenem, streptomycin, kanamycin, genta-
mycin, amikacin, tetracycline, chloramphenicol, sulfametho-
xazole/trimethoprim, fosfomycin, nalidixic acid, levofloxacin,
ciprofloxacin, and norfloxacin) against the strain by the agar
plate dilution method provided by the National Committee for
Clinical Laboratory Standards (8). The strain, S. Typhimurium
ATCC13311, was used as a sensitive strain for the comparison,
and Escherichia coli ATCC25922 was used as the quality con-
trol reference strain. Susceptibilities of S. Typhimurium DT12
*Kansai Medical University Kohri Hospital, Osaka, Japan; and
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(KKH712) to the different antibiotics are shown in Table 1.
MICs were high for ampicillin (MIC:512 µg/mL), streptomy-
cin (512 µg/mL), gentamycin (32 µg/mL), tetracycline (128
µg/mL), chloramphenicol (>128 µg/mL), sulfamethoxazole/
trimethoprim (>128 µg/mL), and nalidixic acid (>512 µg/mL),
indicating resistance to these antibiotics. The strain was highly
resistant to all three fluoroquinolones tested: levofloxacin (8
µg/mL), ciprofloxacin (8 µg/mL), and norfloxacin (16 µg/
mL).
Sequence analysis of the gyrA and parC genes was per-
formed by the method described by Giraud et al. (9). In brief,
DNA fragments of each gene were amplified in 50-µL reaction
mixture by using boiled bacterial suspension with 200 µM of
deoxynucleotide triphosphate, 1 µM of the primer pairs, Taq
buffer (QIAGEN GmbH, Hilden, Germany), and 2.5 U of Taq
DNA polymerase (QIAGEN GmbH). Polymerase chain reac-
tion was run at 93°C for 30 sec, 55°C for 30 sec, and 72°C for
1 min for 35 cycles. The DNA fragments were purified by
using MicroSpin Column S-300HR (Amersham Pharmacia
Biotech, Piscataway, NJ). Sequence was determined by the
method described by Sanger et al. (10) in an automatic DNA
sequencer (Applied Biosystem 310, Perkin-Elmer Inc., Foster
City, CA) by using primer STGYRA1 or STPARC1 for gyrA
or  parC fragments, respectively (Table 2). Nucleotide
sequences of its gyrA and parC genes were determined and
point mutations were detected: Ser83Phe (TCC→ TTC) and
Asp87Asn (GAC→ AAC) in the quinolone resistance–deter-
mining region (QRDR) of gyrA and Ser80Arg (AGC→ CGC)
in the QRDR of parC.
The World Health Organization has determined that Sal-
monella is reemerging as one of the most important infectious
diseases in the world. Drug-resistant Salmonella strains, for
which infections are increasing worldwide, are of special con-
cern (1–6). In Japan, quinolone-resistant S. Typhimurium
strains from domestic cases have been emerging since 1995
(11). The phage type of the multidrug-resistant S. Typhimu-
rium that we isolated was DT12, not DT104, the prevalent
type in developed countries (12), which suggests that the strain
in this study may differ from the prevalent ones. BlnI-digested
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns were different
between S. Typhimurium DT12 KKH712 and typical Japanese
isolates of S. Typhimurium DT104 (12, data not shown),
which also supports the idea that this strain is different. Some
multiple drug-resistant S. Typhimurium DT12 strains have
been reported in Japan, but the frequency of this strain is not as
high as that of DT104 (12). Recently, other S. Typhimurium
DT12 strains with high fluoroquinolone resistance in humans
were isolated in Japan (pers. comm., H. Izumiya). However,
scant data are available on fluoroquinolone resistance of S.
Typhimurium DT12 originating from cattle in Japan.
The main mechanism of fluoroquinolone resistance by
Enterobacteriaceae, including Escherichia coli, is reported to
be several point mutations in the QRDR in the structural gene
of DNA gyrase or DNA topoisomerase IV. Analysis of the qui-
nolone resistant gene in the strain obtained from our patient
showed three point mutations in QRDR: Ser83Phe
(TCC→ TTC) and Asp87Asn (GAC→ AAC) in QRDR of gyrA
and Ser80Arg (AGC→ CGC) in QRDR of parC. These same
three mutations have been reported previously in fluoroqui-
nolone-resistant bacteria (9,13–15). However, to the best of
our knowledge, this report is the first of a Salmonella isolate
highly resistant to fluoroquinolones from a clinical case with
three point mutations in the QRDR (16).
Ampicillin, chloramphenicol, sulfa drugs, and fluoroqui-
nolone have been established as standard first-line therapy for
Salmonella infections. If the Salmonella is a multidrug-resis-
tant strain as in this case, however, all of these antibiotics will
be ineffective, and treatment will be difficult. In fact, a previ-
ous report describes a patient death after a nosocomial Salmo-
nella outbreak in a U.S. hospital (17).
Fosfomycin, administered to our patient, has been used to
treat various infectious diseases in Japan. This drug is one of
the most commonly used antibiotics in Japan because it pro-
duces relatively few side effects. In our case, fosfomycin was
quite effective against the multidrug- and fluoroquinolone-
Table 1. MICs (µg/mL) of 18 antibiotics for Salmonella Typhimurium 
strains (ATCC13311 and KKH712)
Antibiotics ATCC13311 KKH712
Ampicillin <0.5 512
Cefaclor 0.5 1
Cefazolin 1 2
Ceftazidime 0.13 0.25
Ceftriaxone <0.03 0.06
Imipenem 0.13 0.06
Streptomycin 8 512
Kanamycin 1 8
Gentamicin 0.25 32
Amikacin 0.5 1
Tetracycline 1 128
Chloramphenicol 4 >128
Sulfamethoxazole/trimethoprim 1 >128
Fosfomycin 0.5 0.5
Nalidixic acid 4 >512
Levofloxacin <0.03 8
Norfloxacin 0.06 16
Ciprofloxacin <0.03 8
Table 2. Primers for sequence analysis of gyrA and parC 
Primers Sequences
STGYRA1 5´-TGTCCGAGATGGCCTGAAGC-3´
STGYRA12 5´-CGTTGATGACTTCCGTCAG-3´
STPARC1 5´-ATGAGCGATATGGCAGAGCG-3´
STPARC2 5´-TGACCGAGTTCGCTTAACAG-3´Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 257
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resistant  Salmonella; our patient recovered after taking this
antibiotic, which is considered relatively safe. Fosfomycin is
often administered to babies and children and expected to be
effective; however, fosfomycin-resistant Salmonella has been
reported in Japan (18). In Japan, fosfomycin was approved for
use in animals in 1986. Thus far, fosfomycin-resistant Salmo-
nella has not increased. We must be very careful not to overuse
this antibiotic and thereby introduce Salmonella strains resis-
tant to fosfomycin as has happened with the fluoroquinolones.
The emergence of fluoroquinolone-resistant Salmonella in
European countries is attributed to the use of fluoroquinolones
in livestock and the accompanying natural selection of the
resistant strain. In Japan, fluoroquinolones were approved for
use in animals in 1991. Fluoroquinolones tend to be used more
frequently in Japan than in Europe. Persons in Japan, then, are
at risk of having more infectious diseases caused by fluoroqui-
nolone-resistant  Salmonella and other bacteria. Surveillance
for antimicrobial resistance of Salmonella should be contin-
ued, particularly to monitor the emergence of strains with high
fluoroquinolone resistance from humans and livestock.
Mr. Nakaya is the chief medical technologist of Clinical Center
Laboratory, Kansai Medical University Kohri Hospital, Osaka, Japan.
His research interests include detecting and controlling antimicrobial
resistance in hospitals.
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Invasive Type e
Haemophilus
influenzae
Disease in Italy
Marina Cerquetti* Marta Luisa Ciofi degli Atti,* Rita 
Cardines,* Stefania Salmaso,* Giovanna Renna,* 
Paola Mastrantonio,* and the Hi Study Group1
We describe the first reported cases of invasive type e Hae-
mophilus influenzae disease in Italy. All five cases occurred in
adults. The isolates were susceptible to ampicillin and eight
other antimicrobial agents. Molecular analysis showed two dis-
tinct type e strains circulating in Italy, both containing a single
copy of the capsulation locus. 
n Italy, the vaccine against Haemophilus influenzae type b
(Hib) was licensed in 1995, but vaccination is voluntary.
Vaccination coverage by 24 months of age was estimated in
1998 at 19.8 % for the 1996 birth cohort (1). Coverage
increased in 2000 to 53.1% for the 1998 birth cohort (2). Since
1994, surveillance of H. influenzae meningitis has been con-
ducted within the National Surveillance of Bacterial Meningi-
tis (3). A laboratory-based active surveillance of invasive H.
influenzae disease was implemented in a sample of Italian
regions in 1997 (4). In 1997–1998, the incidence of invasive
Hib disease estimated by this system was lower than that
reported in northern and central Europe and in the United
States before mass vaccination was introduced, yet was com-
parable with the incidence reported in other Mediterranean
countries with similar vaccination coverage (4).
In 1998–2001, laboratory-based active surveillance was
conducted in seven Italian regions, including a population of
approximately 24 million persons (33% of the Italian popula-
tion). Participating regions were located throughout the coun-
try and included rural, urban, and large metropolitan areas.
Active H. influenzae case finding was conducted by contact-
ing, monthly, microbiologists from the regional laboratories
of hospitals with infectious disease or pediatric wards. A
patient with invasive disease was defined as a patient with a
compatible illness, accompanied by isolation of H. influenzae
from a normally sterile site or detection of Hib antigen in
cerebrospinal fluid. Hospital microbiologists were asked to
send H. influenzae isolates to the national reference labora-
tory at Istituto Superiore di Sanità, where all strains were
assayed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) capsular geno-
typing. Serotyping by slide agglutination was performed at
the regional level, when possible, and at the national refer-
ence laboratory. 
From 1998 to 2001, a total of 219 cases of invasive H.
influenzae disease were reported; 165 were diagnosed by iso-
lation of H. influenzae from a normally sterile site, and 54
were diagnosed by detection of Hib antigen in cerebrospinal
fluid. Of the 165 isolates, 97 (58.8%) were sent to the national
reference laboratory; the percentage of isolates sent to the ref-
erence laboratory remained relatively stable over the years
(from 62.3% in 1998 to 58.3% in 2001). Analysis of incidence
data by serotype showed that the annual number of cases of
invasive Hib disease decreased from 69 in 1998 to 17 in 2001,
while the number of nontypable H. influenzae remained con-
stant (mean 8 cases/year; range 7–11) (Table 1). No cases
attributable to capsulated H. influenzae other than type b were
detected in years 1998–1999; in the next 2 years, a total of
seven cases were traced; five were due to type e strain. 
We describe these five cases of invasive disease caused by
H. influenzae type e (Hie). Genetic relationship among the five
Hie isolates was assessed by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE). Susceptibility to nine antimicrobial agents, including
ampicillin, was also determined. Because amplification of cap-
sulation (cap) locus is assumed to contribute to strain viru-
lence, the copy number of cap e locus in each isolate was also
identified.
The Study
Five Hie isolates were detected through surveillance from
January 2000 to December 2001. Characteristics of patients
were obtained by reviewing clinical records (Table 2). Briefly,
two cases, both with meningitis, occurred in young adults,
who recovered. The remaining three cases, two with bactere-
mic pneumonia and one with septicemia, were in elderly
patients, who died. All but one (no. 2) of the patients were
from neighboring regions in northeastern Italy. However, the
towns they lived in were quite distant, and the patients were
admitted to different hospitals in different periods. Serotyping
of the isolates by slide agglutination was performed by using
polyvalent and monovalent antisera to capsular serotypes a
through f (Difco Laboratories, Detroit, MI). Capsular genotype
was identified by PCR (5). Briefly, in a first round of PCR,
primers to the ompP2 gene were used to confirm the H. influ-
enzae species, while primers directed to the bex region con-
firmed capsulation. A second round of PCR with primers
directed to the cap e–specific region (6) generated an expected
product of 1,350 bp. Further characterization of the isolates
was performed by phenotypic and genotypic methods. Bio-
types were assigned by determining indole production, urease
1Members of the Hi Study Group: Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Laborato-
rio di Epidemiologia e Biostatistica: Patrizia Carbonari; Associazione
Microbiologi Clinici Italiani (AMCLI): Pierluigi Nicoletti, Antonio Goglio;
Regione Piemonte: Angela Ruggenini Moiraghi, Stefania Orecchia,
Annalisa Castella, and Carla Zotti; Provincia Autonoma di Trento:
Valter Carraro, Iole Caola, and Anna Calì; Regione Veneto: Giovanni
Gallo; Regione Liguria: Pietro Crovari, Cristina Giordano, Pietro Tixi,
and Marina Lemmi; Regione Toscana: Paolo Bonanni, Alessia Tomei,
Patrizia Pecile, Emanuela Balocchini, and Lucia Pecori; Regione Cam-
pania: Francesco Santonastasi, Loredana Cafaro, and Vittorio Pagano;
Regione Puglia: Salvatore Barbuti and Maria Chironna. *Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Rome, Italy
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level, and ornithine decarboxylase activities. MICs of ampicil-
lin were determined by E-test (AB Biodisk, Solna, Sweden).
Hib strain ATCC 10211 was used as control. Susceptibilities to
trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, ceftazidime, chlorampheni-
col, azithromycin, aztreonam, ciprofloxacin,  imipenem, and
tetracycline were tested by disk diffusion assay. Both the E-
test and the disk diffusion assay were performed by using Hae-
mophilus test medium, as recommended by the National Com-
mittee for Clinical Laboratory Standards (NCCLS) (7).
Interpretative breakpoints and zone diameters were also based
on NCCLS criteria. Production of β -lactamase was detected by
the cefinase disk test (BBL, Becton-Dickinson, Sparks, MD).
Restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis by PFGE
was conducted as described (5), except for digestion of
genomic DNA, performed by using SmaI (20 U) or ApaI
(20 U) restriction enzymes (New England BioLabs, Wilbury
Way Hitchin, U.K.). The copy number of cap e locus was
determined by Southern blot analysis, using as probe the
1,350-bp amplicon obtained by PCR of a prototype type e
strain. Since the KpnI and SmaI sites flank the cap locus of
encapsulated  H. influenzae strains, the copy number of the
locus can be estimated by the size of the restriction fragment
obtained after digestion of the chromosome with these
enzymes (8). Restriction fragments were separated by PFGE
as described (5), transferred to nylon membranes, and hybrid-
ized with the probe. Labeling of the probe and hybridization
reactions were obtained by using the ECL kit (Amersham
Pharmacia Biotech, Little Chalfont, U.K.). Hybridizing bands
were visualized by autoradiographs. Although no data are
available on the size of cap e locus, on the basis of results
obtained on Hib strains, the DNA fragment for a single-copy
strain was expected to be approximately 27–28 kb. In fact, the
KpnI/SmaI fragment includes the cap locus, whose size is 18
kb in Hib strains, plus additional segments (about 10 kb)
upstream and downstream of the cap region (8). Strains with
two or more copies of the cap b locus featured fragments of
increased size (45 kb, 63 kb, 81 kb, 99 kb) (8). 
By PCR, all isolates exhibited the type e capsular geno-
type. By slide agglutination method, performed at the national
reference laboratory, four isolates were designed as type e, and
one was misidentified as nontypable. At the regional level,
only one of the five PCR-positive strains had been recognized
as type e, two had been identified as nontypable, and two had
not been typed. By biotyping, four isolates were classified as
biotype IV, and one as biotype I (patient no. 5) (Table 2). MICs
of ampicillin ranged from 0.125 µg/mL to 0.25 µg/mL, indi-
cating that all isolates were susceptible to this antibiotic; none
produced β -lactamase. As assessed by disk diffusion assay, all
isolates were also susceptible to trimethoprim/sulfamethox-
azole, ceftazidime, chloramphenicol, azithromycin, aztre-
onam, ciprofloxacin, imipenem, and tetracycline. PFGE with
SmaI restriction enzyme digestion generated not well-resolved
profiles, as several very close fragments of 194–145 kb were
obtained (data not shown). Following ApaI digestion, profiles
were easier to compare (Figure): three isolates (patients no. 3,
4, and 5) shared an indistinguishable pattern (pattern 1); one
isolate (patient no. 1) showed a profile closely related to pat-
tern 1 but with two band differences (pattern 1a). The isolate
from patient no. 2 appeared clearly different from the others
(pattern 2), according to criteria reported by Tenover et al. (10)
Table 1. Incidence per 100,000 persons and cases of invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease, by serotype, Italy, 1998–2001 
Incidence per 100,000 (no. of cases)
H.  influenzae 1998 1999 2000 2001
All capsular types plus nontypablea 0.35 (84) 0.26 (64) 0.16 (40) 0.13 (31)
Type b 0.28 (69) 0.18 (44) 0.09 (21) 0.07 (17)
Nontypable  0.05 (11) 0.03 (7) 0.03 (7) 0.03 (7)
Capsulated other than b 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.02 (4) 0.01 (3)
aIncludes isolates that were not serotyped.
Table 2. Clinical data of patients with Hie invasive disease and characterization of isolatesa
Patient no.
Mo/yr of 
onset Age Gender
Signs and 
symptoms
Underlying 
condition Outcome
Site of 
isolation Biotype
PFGE 
pattern
Copy no. of 
cap e locus
1 01/2000 75 M Bacteremic 
pneumonia
Chronic lymphocytic 
leukemia
Died Blood IV 1a 1
2 05/2000 35 M Meningitis Head trauma from 
car accident
Survived CSF IV 2 1
3 10/2000 65 M Septicemia Retro-peritoneal 
sarcoma
Died Blood IV 1 1
4 02/2001 98 F Bacteremic 
pneumonia
Chronic heart disease Died Blood IV 1 1
5 12/2001 33 F Meningitis None Survived CSF I 1 1
aHie, Haemophilus influenzae type e; CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; M, male; F, female.DISPATCHES
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(Table 2). All Hie isolates were unrelated to invasive Hib
strains circulating in Italy (9) (Figure). According to epidemi-
ologic data, patients with strains that showed an indistinguish-
able PFGE pattern did not appear to share any common risk
factor. Southern hybridization with the probe for the cap e
gene after PFGE identified a single fragment of 20.5 kb in
each isolate tested, suggesting the presence of one copy of the
cap locus (Table 2). 
Conclusions
Although studies on nasopharyngeal carriage of H. influen-
zae have shown the presence of serotype e as colonizer (11–
13), few studies have described serious infections attributable
to this capsular type (14–17). Our results suggest that Hie may
cause either fatal infections in elderly patients with underlying
disease or meningitis in adults whether or not underlying con-
ditions are present. In Italy, these cases of Hie infection are the
first reported. Despite limited data on the frequency of non–
type b invasive disease before 1997, our results are based on 4
years of laboratory-based active surveillance on a large popu-
lation sample. Since no type e strains were detected in the first
2 years of this surveillance, this clustering is likely due to the
emergence of invasive Hie disease. Alternative explanations
might include improved laboratory confirmation methods
(however, the proportion of meningitis cases without an identi-
fied etiologic agent did not decrease from 1998 to 2001) or
improved reporting in the last 2 years of surveillance (how-
ever, no changes to the system were made, and quality indica-
tors, such as proportion of isolates sent to the reference
laboratory, remained stable throughout the 4 years).
An unequivocal method of assigning capsular type is
required to monitor infection attributable to uncommon sero-
types, especially since, as in some Hie isolates, expression of
capsular polysaccharide is not sufficient to be detected by slide
agglutination (18). In our study, PCR capsular typing allowed
the identification of an additional Hie strain that had been mis-
identified by slide agglutination.
The prevalence of ampicillin resistance in both β -lacta-
mase–positive and –negative H. influenzae isolates has
increased worldwide. Neither β -lactamase production nor
intrinsic resistance was detected among our Hie isolates, con-
firming the low incidence of ampicillin-resistant H. influenzae
strains from invasive disease in Italy (5,9).
 PFGE has been successfully used to type H. influenzae
isolates. Our results suggest that two distinct Hie strains circu-
lated in Italy in 2000–2001. Four of the five isolates, found in
two neighboring regions, appeared to represent a unique clonal
group with two subtypes. This clustering of most strains in one
PFGE pattern might be explained with the clonal population
structure of encapsulated H. influenzae previously observed in
Italy (5,9), but further studies are needed to clarify this point.
Moreover, since the type e isolates analyzed in this study had
no close genetic relationship to the invasive Hib strain circu-
lating in Italy, their derivation from type b isolates by capsular
switch is unlikely. H. influenzae PFGE typing has a stronger
discriminatory power than biotyping (19). In our study, how-
ever, in the isolates assigned to the same clonal group by
PFGE, one was classified as biotype I, and the others were bio-
type IV. These findings suggest that biotyping could be a use-
ful adjunct to PFGE when typing Hie isolates. 
In our study, all five Hie isolates contained a single copy of
the cap locus, suggesting that they did not possess unusual vir-
ulent traits related to the capsule. Since the size of the restric-
tion fragment obtained was smaller than expected on the basis
of cap b locus size, a possible explanation may be that the size
of region 2 of cap e locus is smaller than that found in Hib
strains. Alternatively, the DNA flanking the cap e locus may
differ from that found in Hib strains; therefore, the segments
upstream and downstream from the cap e region would be
smaller.
Both the laboratory-based active surveillance of invasive
H. influenzae disease and PCR capsular genotyping could
have improved the capability to detect cases attributable to
serotypes other than b. Nevertheless, our data suggest the
Figure. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns of ApaI-digested chro-
mosomal DNAs of Haemophilus influenzae isolates. Lanes 1–5, H.
influenzae type e (Hie) isolates, respectively, from patient nos. 1–5;
lane 6, H. influenzae type b (Hib) strain belonging to one of the sub-
clones endemic in Italy (9); M, λ  ladder pulsed-field gel marker with
molecular weights indicated in kilobases (kb) at the right. The isolates
in lanes 3, 4, and 5 showed indistinguishable profiles (pattern 1); the
isolate in lane 1 was closely related to pattern 1 (pattern 1a), whereas
the isolate in lane 2 was clearly different from pattern 1 (pattern 2). All
Hie isolates were unrelated to the Hib strain.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 261
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emergence of invasive Hie disease among the adult population
in Italy and underline the need to closely monitor infection
caused by non–type b strains. 
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Public Health
Surveillance
for Australian
Bat Lyssavirus,
in Queensland,
Australia, 2000–2001
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From February 1, 2000, to December 4, 2001, a total of 119
bats (85 Megachiroptera and 34 Microchiroptera) were tested
for Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV) infection. Eight Megachi-
roptera were positive by immunofluorescence assay that used
cross-reactive antibodies to rabies nucleocapsid protein. A
case study of cross-species transmission of ABLV supports the
conclusion that a bat reservoir exists for ABLV in which the
virus circulates across Megachiroptera species within mixed
communities.
ince the identification of Australian bat lyssavirus
(ABLV) in bat species throughout Australia (1), public
health units have been forced to confront its implications for
human health. Fortunately, because of the close genetic and
serologic relationship between rabies and ABLV, rabies
immune sera and vaccines offer postexposure protection from
infection (1,2). A bite or scratch from a bat in Australia consti-
tutes a potential exposure to ABLV, and persons affected
should be offered postexposure prophylaxis unless the bat can
be shown to be uninfected with ABLV. However, such prophy-
laxis is costly and uncomfortable, and immune sera are in
short supply worldwide. As many bats involved in such inci-
dents are uninfected, and a negative results obviates the need
for postexposure prophylaxis, determining each bat’s ABLV
infection status is preferable. Under instruction from the pub-
lic health units, Queensland Health Scientific Services Public
Health Virology Laboratory has tested bats for ABLV since
July 1998.
Two strains of ABLV are known to be circulating. One
strain was isolated from a species of insectivorous Microchi-
roptera, Saccolaimus flaviventris (1). A second strain has been
shown to infect the four species of Megachiroptera in the
genus Pteropus that occur in mainland Australia (1,3). Isolates
from the four pteropid species show minimal sequence varia-
tion with geographic origin and species and are essentially
identical (I.L. Smith, unpub. data). Pteropid bats are nomadic
nocturnal mammals that roost in trees during the day in colo-
nies that frequently number in the thousands. Colonies may
contain one or more species, and fluctuate in size, depending
on available food resource (4). This dynamic social structure
has been evoked to explain the circulation of a single strain of
ABLV in pteropids (1).
In this article, we report on surveillance of bats brought in
for testing to our laboratory. A case is described in which cir-
cumstantial evidence exists for bat-to-bat cross-species trans-
mission of ABLV. This finding is consistent with a model in
which the social structure of pteropid camps results in a single
strain of circulating virus.
The Study
Bats involved in incidents involving public health were
tested for ABLV infection by immunofluorescence assay (IFA)
on brain impression smears by using a fluorescein isothiocyan-
ate-conjugated monoclonal (Fujirebio Diagnostics, Malvern,
PA) or polyclonal (Biorad, Hercules, CA) antibodies to the
nucleocapsid protein. The IFA was performed in parallel with
a fluorescent real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay
(5) for pteropid samples, or a heminested reverse transcriptase
(RT)-PCR for all others (6). When it was possible, the bat was
identified to the species level (7). For molecular analyses, the
region encoding the carboxy-terminal of the glycoprotein and
its long 3′  untranslated region were amplified by RT-PCR, and
the products were directly sequenced by using Big-Dye chem-
istry (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA). Primers and reac-
tion details are available on request.
During February 1, 2000, to December 4, 2001, a total of
119 bats, including 85 Megachiroptera  and 34 Microchi-
roptera, were submitted for testing to the Public Health Virol-
ogy Laboratory, Queensland Health Scientific Services. Bats
submitted for testing had either bitten or scratched a person, or
testing was considered to be in the interests of public health.
Eight bats tested positive for ABLV infection by IFA (Table 1).
Six of the bats positive for ABLV were P. alecto (75%); one
bat positive for ABLV was P. poliocephalus (12.5%), and
another bat that tested positive was an unidentified member of
the genus Pteropus  (12.5%). No positive Microchiroptera
were obtained during the study period. Positive bats were from
the Rockhampton area (37.5%), south of the Brisbane South
metropolitan area (25%), Townsville area (12.5%), Sunshine
Coast area (12.5%), and Brisbane South Coast area (12.5%).
Confirmatory real-time or heminested RT-PCR results were
concordant with IFA in all cases. Controls for contamination
were negative for ABLV. 
In October 2000, a wild Black Flying Fox (bat 1, P. alecto)
that was acting aggressively was removed from the top of a
dome-shaped wire-mesh enclosure for viewing bats at a zoo in
Rockhampton. Inside this enclosure were housed 23 flying
foxes, all previously well. No new bats had been added to the
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tralia; †Queensland Department of Primary Industries, Moorooka,
Queensland, Australia; ‡Public Health Services, Rockhampton,
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cage for 12 months. The animal was euthanized and sent for
testing to Queensland Health Scientific Services where it
tested positive for ABLV by IFA on brain impression smear.
One month later a captive Gray-headed Flying Fox (bat 2, P.
poliocephalus) from within the enclosure was observed behav-
ing abnormally. Normally a highly social animal, the bat was
not moving freely and was licking its vulva profusely. The ani-
mal was relocated to an isolation cage where, during the next
20 hours, it exhibited a progressive neurologic syndrome. The
bat was euthanized and found to be positive for ABLV by IFA. 
To enable molecular epidemiologic studies to be carried
out, the genomic RNA extracted from the brain of the two fly-
ing foxes mentioned previously, from another three other fly-
ing foxes from disparate locations (two Black Flying Foxes
and one Little Red Flying Fox [P. scapulatus]), and from a per-
son who acquired a fatal infection attributed to a flying fox
were amplified across the variable noncoding intergenic
region between the glycoprotein and polymerase. The reaction
products were directly sequenced, and the differences are pre-
sented in Table 2. Of the six differences among the sequenced
isolates, five were unique to both bats 1 and 2 submitted by the
zoo. To date, ABLV sequence variation in flying foxes has
been minimal across location, species, and time (I.L. Smith,
unpub. data), so the identical variation seen in these two bats
supports a model of natural cross-species bat-to-bat transmis-
sion. 
The remaining captive bats in the enclosure were quaran-
tined in a private facility off-site and were closely monitored
for clinical, serologic, and behavioral changes during the next
3 months, and then for a further 3 months after they returned to
their original enclosure. No attributable clinical disease, sero-
conversion, or behavioral change was observed during this
time. The bat enclosure was modified to incorporate an extra
outer mesh layer to prevent future direct contact with free-liv-
ing wild bats outside the enclosure. Existing double-fencing
had already prevented the public from having direct contact
with flying foxes in the enclosure.
Conclusions
The infection prevalence of 9.4% in submitted flying foxes
in this study is not statistically significantly higher than that
previously observed (6%) in sick, injured, and orphan flying
fox submissions (3; H.E. Field, unpub.data); the wide 95%
confidence interval (CI) (4% to 18%) reflects the limited sam-
ple size in this study. The prevalence is, however, statistically
significantly higher than that observed in wild-caught flying
foxes (3; H.E. Field, unpub. data), reinforcing the contention
that the subpopulation of sick and injured flying foxes poses a
higher risk for exposed humans. None of the submitted Micro-
chiroptera was positive for ABLV. The small sample size in
this study limits meaningful interpretation of this observation
(the 95% CI for 0% prevalence with a sample size of 34 is 0%
to 10%). Although this finding could indicate a lower inci-
dence of ABLV in communities of Microchiroptera, down-
playing the risk for human exposure posed by Microchiroptera
in Australia would be premature.
The incident showing transmission from an ABLV-
infected wild flying fox to a captive flying fox is interesting in
two respects. First, an incubation period for the virus can be
estimated. Assuming the scratch/bite occurred close to the
time when the wild bat was discovered, the captive bat was
observed to display symptoms after 29 days. This period com-
pares with the only reported incubation time for an ABLV
infection in a Black Flying Fox (P. alecto) of 6–9 weeks (9).
Incubation times after experimental infection of Vampire Bats
with rabies were shorter at 7–26 days for intramuscular injec-
tion (10) or 2–4 weeks after subcutaneous or intramuscular
injection (11).
Second, this report is the first to describe probable natural
cross-species transmission. This finding has implications for
Table 1. Bats positive for Australian bat lyssavirus infection
Species IFA positivea
Megachiroptera
Pteropodidae
Pteropus alecto 6/50
Pteropus scapulatus 0/18
Pteropus poliocephalus 1/8
Pteropus conspicillatus 0/4
Unidentified Pteropus 1/5
Subtotal 8/85
Microchiroptera
Hipposideridae
Hipposiderosater 0/1
Molossidae
Mormopterus beccarii 0/2
Mormopterus loriae 0/2
Unidentified Mormopterus 0/2
Rhinolophidae
Rhinolophus philippinensis 0/1
Vespertilionidae
Chalinolobus gouldii 0/1
Miniopterus australis 0/3
Miniopterus schreibersii 0/1
Miniopterus scotorepens 0/1
Scotorepens orion 0/1
Unidentified Scotorepens  0/1
Unidentified Vespertilionidae 0/14
Unidentified Microchiroptera 0/4
Subtotal 0/34
Total 8/119
aIFA, immunofluorescence assay; number positive/number tested.DISPATCHES
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our understanding of how the virus circulates in bat communi-
ties. Evidence of cross-species transmission is consistent with
the minimal sequence variation in isolates from sick or injured
flying foxes obtained from various species at different sites
around Australia (1). The large seasonally nomadic, multispe-
cies colonies in which flying foxes commonly congregate (and
interact) provide opportunity for interspecies and interregion
transmission of ABLV. Our findings support this model for cir-
culation of ABLV in pteropid colonies. 
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Table 2. Nucleotide differences in the glycoprotein coding/noncoding region of Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV)
Nucleotidea
Isolate host 4701 4751 4899 4987 5037 5058
Pteropus alectob AGGC G A
Pteropus poliocephalusc AGGC G A
Pteropus alectod CAAT A G
Pteropus alectod CAGT A G
Pteropus scapulatusd CAGT A G
Humand CAGT A G
Pteropus alectoe CAGT A G
aNucleotide position from the Ballina isolate of the pteropid strain of ABLV (8); A, deoxyadenosine; C, deoxcytidine; G, deoxyguanosine; T, thymidine.
bCase study, bat 1.
cCase study, bat 2.
dQueensland Health Scientific Services collection.
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Infection of Cultured
Human and Monkey
Cell Lines with
Extract of Penaeid
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Taura syndrome virus (TSV) affects shrimp cultured for
human consumption. Although TSV is related to the Cricket
Paralysis virus, it belongs to the “picornavirus superfamily,” the
most common cause of viral illnesses. Here we demonstrate
that TSV also infects human cell lines, which may suggest that
Penaeus is a potential reservoir of this virus. 
he Taura syndrome virus (TSV) causes a disease affecting
penaeid shrimp, the most important commercial family of
crustaceans (1). The causal agent is a single-stranded (+) RNA
virus, recently reported to be genomically related to the
Cricket Paralysis virus of the Cripavirus genus, family Dicis-
troviridae of the “picornavirus superfamily” (2–5). This super-
family includes several human pathogens, for example, the
common cold viruses and several enteroviruses (e.g., poliovi-
ruses). Traditionally, research on the replication of shrimp
viruses has been based on the use of cultured fish cellular lines
(6). However, because TSV could potentially represent a pub-
lic health threat, we explored whether this viral agent might be
capable of infecting cultured mammalian cells.
The Study
 Since Sabin strain LSc 2ab (Sabin 1), the poliovirus used
for human vaccination, is usually replicated in monolayer cul-
ture cells of human rhabdomyosarcoma (RD), human larynx
carcinoma (Hep-2C), or Buffalo green monkey kidney (BGM)
(7), we injected these cell lines with a 0.22-µm membrane-fil-
tered whole extract of the hepatopancreas of shrimp (Penaeus
stylirostris) affected with TSV. The animals were collected
from farms located in northwestern Mexico. Control cell lines
were injected with filtered hepatopancreas extracts from
healthy shrimp. Cultures were incubated at 37°C and periodi-
cally observed under a microscope until any sign of cytopathic
effect was detected (usually from 19–23 hours). Cells were
then harvested and lysed. Fresh cell lines were inoculated with
the lysate, incubated, and processed in a similar way. A third
inoculation was again performed with the second lysate (8).
The cytopathic effect in RD cells began with a partial
destruction of the cellular layer. Next, small cellular groups
and some isolated round cells were observed. The cells
showed an apparent increase in size, diffuse cell rounding, and
a refringent aspect (Figure 1B). In Hep-2C cells, the cellular
monolayer was partially destroyed. Most cells were individu-
alized and clearly rounded; they also presented a refringent
aspect. Hep-2C was the most affected of the three lines used
(Figure 1D). The cytopathic effect in the BGM cell line began
as a partial destruction of the cellular layer, which evolved to a
syncytial-like formation of rounded, refringent cells. Some
cells remained isolated but with altered morphology (Figure
1F). RD, Hep-2C, and BGM cells injected with an extract sim-
ilarly processed but from healthy shrimp, showed no cyto-
pathic effects, even after 7 days of culture (Figures 1A, 1C,
and 1 E). As a positive control, RD cells were injected with
Sabin viral extract and showed the characteristic cytopathic
effect produced by an enterovirus infection. 
To confirm the presence of TSV in the cell culture media, a
bioassay was performed by using media from the third pas-
sage. For this assay, healthy P. stylirostris shrimp were injected
with the infected medium in 10% volume of their corporal
mass in the third abdominal segment. Twenty-four hours later,
these animals were clearly infected, showing fragile antennas
and soft cuticle as well as chromatophore expansion along the
whole surface of the body, particularly at the tail fan (telson
and uropods). These signs were clinically indistinguishable
from those occurring in naturally infected animals and are con-
sidered as pathognomonic of the acute phase of infection by
TSV (9). Presence of the viral genome in different subcuticular
tissues (gills and pleopods) of these animals was confirmed by
in situ hybridization by using TSV ShrimProbe (DiagXotics,
Inc., Wilton, CT). RNA-DNA hybrids were clearly visible as
black spots after the samples were stained with Bismarck
*Universidad de Occidente, Los Mochis, Sinaloa, México; †Instituto de
Diagnóstico y Referencia Epidemiológicos, México, D.F., México; and
‡Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, D.F., México
T
Figure 1.  Image of mammalian cell lines injected with extracts from
healthy shrimp: A, human rhabdomyosarcoma (RD) cells; C, human
larynx carcinoma (Hep-2C) cells; E, Buffalo green monkey kidney
(BGM) cells.  Cythopatic effect in cultured cells inoculated with extracts
from shrimp affected with Taura syndrome: B, RD cells; D, Hep-2C
cells; F, BGM cells.DISPATCHES
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brown (Figure 2). Shrimp injected with culture media from
control cell lines showed no signs of infection after 7 days of
observation.
Conclusions
If one takes into consideration the capacity of viruses to
modify receptor recognition and host cell tropism and the fact
that cell receptors for many of the picornavirus superfamily
members seem to be ubiquitous membrane molecules (e.g.,
decay-accelerating factor, different type of integrins, low-den-
sity lipoprotein receptor, sialic acid [10–12]), the potential
wide range of host cells for TSV should not come as a sur-
prise. To our knowledge, these cultured human and monkey
cell lines are the first reported to be infected with a viral agent
isolated from shrimp. Because many members of the picor-
navirus superfamily are the most common causes of viral ill-
nesses worldwide (including nonspecific febrile illnesses,
myocarditis, aseptic meningitis, and sepsis-like disease), such
illnesses lead to frequent unnecessary prescription of antibiot-
ics (13). Penaeus could be considered as a reservoir of a virus
that could become a potential pathogen to humans and other
mammals (11,14).
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Figure 2. Microscopic image of the subcuticular tissue of the pleopod
from a shrimp infected with the supernatant of the third passage of a
human larynx carcinoma (Hep-2C) cell culture inoculated with an
extract of shrimp infected with Taura syndrome virus. The presence of
the virus is clearly visible by in situ hybridization as black spots after the
samples were stained with Bismarck brown.
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Ciprofloxacin resistance was analyzed in 354 Campylo-
bacter jejuni isolates collected during two study periods (1995–
1997 and 1998–2000) from travelers returning to Finland. The
increase in resistance between the two periods was significant
among all isolates (40% vs. 60%; p<0.01), as well as among
those from Asia alone (45% vs. 72%; p<0.01).
ampylobacter jejuni isolates are naturally susceptible to
fluoroquinolones (1,2). During the 1990s, however, fluo-
roquinolone resistance in Campylobacter rapidly increased in
several countries (3). In Thailand and Spain, for example, up
to 80% of Campylobacter isolates are fluoroquinolone-resis-
tant (4,5). However, major differences in Campylobacter fluo-
roquinolone resistance levels are known to occur, and in many
parts of the world fluoroquinolone resistance levels remain
low (3). This study was performed to evaluate the level of flu-
oroquinolone resistance in C. jejuni isolates from travelers
returning to Finland and to specify the countries where resis-
tant isolates are acquired. 
The Study 
Our study included 354 clinical human fecal C. jejuni iso-
lates collected from travelers returning to Finland from 1995
to 2000. The isolates were collected in two different phases
from the laboratory of a large private hospital in Helsinki, Fin-
land. Participants were treated as outpatients, and no data on
antimicrobial usage before fecal sampling were available; all
participants had a history of traveling abroad within the pre-
ceding 2 weeks. From January 1995 to November 1997, we
consecutively collected 205 isolates, and from October 1998
to January 2000, 149 isolates. The isolates were cultured and
identified by standard microbiologic methods (6). MICs of
ciprofloxacin and nalidixic acid for the isolates were deter-
mined by the agar plate dilution method, as described (7). C.
jejuni RH 3583 (a local control strain, originally isolated in
Edinburgh, U.K., C. jejuni 143483) was used as a control in
susceptibility testing and also as a growth control strain. The
MIC breakpoint used for the resistance to ciprofloxacin was
that recommended by the National Committee for Clinical
Laboratory Standards (NCCLS) for non-Enterobacteriaceae
(8). To nalidixic acid, the breakpoints were those recom-
mended by NCCLS for Enterobacteriaceae (8).
Data concerning the numbers of travels from Finland to
countries of interest (i.e., countries with the largest numbers of
all C. jejuni isolates or of ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates) dur-
ing the study months were received from Statistics Finland
(available from: URL: www.stat.fi/). The susceptibility data
were analyzed by using the WHONET5 computer program
(available from: URL: www.who.int/emcWHONET/WHO-
NET.html).
Statistical analysis was made by using the chi-square test
and the Fisher exact test. Differences between C. jejuni infec-
tion rates in travelers returning from various travel destina-
tions were statistically tested with Poisson regression analysis.
Differences were quantified with infection rates and 95% con-
fidence intervals; p values of <0.05 were considered signifi-
cant. Statistical data were analyzed by using the SAS system
for Windows, release 8.2/2001 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC).
Of the 354 C. jejuni isolates studied, the country where
campylobacteriosis was acquired could be identified for 319
isolates, collected from travelers to 40 different countries. The
origin of 22 isolates was traced at least to a continental level;
the patients involved had several travel destinations. The ori-
gin of 13 isolates remained unknown. The most common
countries of origin were Spain with 77 (22%) isolates, Thai-
land with 50 (14%) isolates, and India with 23 (6%) isolates.
During the first study period (1995–1997), 205 isolates were
collected from travelers. Of the 34 countries of origin that
were identified, the most common were Spain with 40 (20%)
isolates, India with 19 (9%) isolates, and Thailand and Turkey,
both with 17 (8%) isolates. During the second study period
(1998–2000), 149 isolates were collected from travelers; of the
25 countries of origin identified, the most common were Spain
with 37 (25%) isolates, Thailand with 33 (22%) isolates, and
Portugal and Tunisia, both with 6 (4%) isolates.
Of all 354 C. jejuni isolates, 172 (49%) were resistant to
ciprofloxacin. Of the 205 isolates collected in 1995–1997, 82
(40%) were resistant to ciprofloxacin compared with 90 (60%)
of the 149 isolates collected in 1998–2000 (p<0.01). When
analyzed by continent, the increase in fluoroquinolone resis-
tance between these two periods was significant among the
isolates from Asia alone (45% vs. 72%, p<0.01; Table 1). An
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increasing tendency for fluoroquinolone resistance was also
observed in the isolates from the three additional continents.
The numbers and proportions of ciprofloxacin-resistant iso-
lates collected from travelers returning from Spain and Thai-
land, the two most common countries of origin, were analyzed
separately. During the first and second collection periods, the
respective numbers and proportions of ciprofloxacin-resistant
isolates were 29 (73%) and 26 (70%) in the isolates from
Spain, and 13 (77%) and 26 (79%) in the isolates from Thai-
land. To assess whether the larger proportion of isolates from
Thailand during the second period (8% vs. 22%) explained the
significant increase in fluoroquinolone resistance in the whole
study group, we analyzed the data excluding all isolates from
Thailand. The increase in ciprofloxacin resistance, from 37%
to 55%, was still significant (p<0.01). A corresponding analy-
sis that excluded all isolates from both Spain and Thailand
resulted in an increase in ciprofloxacin resistance from 27% to
48% (p<0.01).
The number of ciprofloxacin-resistant C. jejuni isolates
collected was compared with the estimated numbers of all trips
from Finland during the study period to the five most frequent
countries of origin for the ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates.
These speculative infection rates were used to calculate rate
ratios between these countries. Because the speculative infec-
tion rate by fluoroquinolone-resistant C. jejuni isolates was
highest in travelers returning from Thailand, that country was
used as the reference in the rate ratio comparisons. The rate
ratios by fluoroquinolone-resistant isolates in travelers return-
ing from Spain and Portugal were 0.11 in both groups; the dif-
ferences were statistically significant compared with the ratios
for the reference country (p<0.01 for both; Table 2). The corre-
sponding rate ratios  in travelers returning from India and
China were 0.90 and 0.72, respectively; these differences were
not significant.
Conclusions
We have shown that ciprofloxacin resistance significantly
increased (from 40% to 60%; p<0.01) during the study period
among all C. jejuni isolates from travelers. The increase was
also significant in isolates from Asia alone, suggesting a con-
tinual presence of selection pressure for the emergence of fluo-
roquinolone resistance on that continent. Moreover, an
 Table 1. Origin of 354 Campylobacter jejuni isolates from travelers returning to Finland and proportion of ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates during 
two collection periods
Geographic area
1995–1997 1998–2000
All isolates % Ciprofloxacin resistant All isolates % Ciprofloxacin resistant
Africa 24 17 8 38
America 4 0 3 67
Asia 78 45a 57 72a
Southeast Asia 28 61 39 77
Other areas 50 36 18 61
Europe 93 44 73 51
Mediterranean area 64 59 48 69
Other areas 29 10 25 16
Total 205b 40a 149c 60a
aDifference is statistically significant (p<0.01).
bOne isolate from Australia and five isolates of unknown origin included.
cEight isolates of unknown origin included.
Table 2. Rate ratios of travel-associated infections with ciprofloxacin-resistant Campylobacter jejuni isolatesa
Country
Estimated no. of trips 
from Finland during
 the study monthsb
No. of all 
isolates
Speculative 
infection ratec Rate ratiod
No. of 
ciprofloxacin-
resistant isolates
Speculative infection 
ratec by ciprofloxacin-
resistant isolates
Rate ratiod by 
ciprofloxacin-
resistant isolates
Spain (incl. 
Canary Islands)
1,145,872 77 (0.1) 0.12 (0.08 to 0.17) 55 (0.05) 0.11 (0.07 to 0.16)e
Thailand 87,842 50 (0.6) 1 39 (0.44) 1e
India 27,591 23 (0.8) 1.46 (0.89 to 2.40) 11 (0.40) 0.90 (0.46 to 1.75)
China 25,073 12 (0.5) 0.84 (0.45 to 1.58) 8 (0.32) 0.72 (0.34 to 1.54)
Portugal 148,647 11 (0.1) 0.13 (0.07 to 0.25) 7 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05 to 0.24)e
aThe five most frequent countries of origin of ciprofloxacin-resistant C. jejuni isolates were included in this analysis.
bBased on the numbers of Finnish travelers to these countries; data collected from the reports of Statistics Finland.
cInfections per 1,000 trips. Since the total number of isolates from Finnish population was not studied, the rate is speculative but could be used to calculate comparable rate ratios.
dThailand as the reference country; 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
eDifferences between Thailand and Spain, and Thailand and Portugal, are statistically significant (p<0.01).Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 269
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increasing tendency in ciprofloxacin resistance was observed
in isolates from three additional continents, but either the
increase (from 44% to 51% in Europe) or the number of iso-
lates (7 isolates from America and 32 isolates from Africa)
was small, and the changes were not statistically significant.
Throughout the study, the rates of ciprofloxacin resistance
remained on a high level in Spain and Thailand, the two most
frequent countries of origin for all foreign isolates, as well as
for resistant isolates. The fact that the increase in ciprofloxacin
resistance remained significant even after all isolates from
Spain and Thailand were excluded from the analysis illustrates
that the emergence and spread of fluoroquinolone-resistant C.
jejuni are not restricted to a few highly Campylobacter-
endemic countries. Rather, these findings show that C. jejuni
fluoroquinolone resistance, which manifested at the beginning
of the 1990s, continues to grow rapidly in many parts of the
world.
Several studies have focused on the quinolone resistance
of Campylobacter spp. In Spain, a rapid increase in quinolone
resistance was observed after 1988, with up to 50% of C.
jejuni isolates resistant by 1991 (9,10). In recent years, fluoro-
quinolone resistance rates among Spanish C. jejuni isolates
have been reported to reach 80% (5); these findings are in
accordance with the 70% to 73% resistance rates we observed
in isolates from Spain. Similarly, the 77% to 79% rates of
ciprofloxacin resistance among our isolates from Thailand
concur with the surveillance data, indicating that fluoroqui-
nolone resistance rates already exceed 80% in Thailand (4).
Our study provides data on C. jejuni fluoroquinolone resis-
tance in 40 countries and on four continents, rendering possi-
ble the evaluation of the relative risk for a Finnish traveler to
acquire an infection by ciprofloxacin-resistant C. jejuni in dif-
ferent travel destinations. When assessing the actual infection
rate by ciprofloxacin-resistant C. jejuni in any destination, the
number of ciprofloxacin-resistant C. jejuni isolates imported
from that destination during the study months should be
divided by the number of simultaneous trips from Finland. In
our study, the total number of resistant C. jejuni isolates
imported to Finland was not known, since we examined iso-
lates from one hospital only. Thus, when the numbers of cipro-
floxacin-resistant C. jejuni isolates identified were divided by
the simultaneous numbers of trips from the whole country, the
figures (referred to as speculative infection rates in Table 2)
did not provide any real data on infection rates by resistant iso-
lates. Nevertheless, these figures could be used to calculate
rate ratios between different travel destinations. Despite the
high proportions of ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates in Spain
(71%) and Portugal (64%), the risk of acquiring fluoroqui-
nolone-resistant campylobacteriosis appeared to be 10 times
smaller in those countries than in Thailand. These results are
in line with our previous results, which showed that a tourist’s
risk of acquiring quinolone-resistant salmonellosis was signifi-
cantly higher in Thailand and Malaysia than in other travel
destinations (11). 
In conclusion, we demonstrated a significant increase in
ciprofloxacin resistance among all C. jejuni travelers’ isolates,
as well as among the isolates from Asia alone. The rate of
ciprofloxacin resistance remained on a high level throughout
the study in Spain and Thailand, the two most frequent coun-
tries of origin of the ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates. These
data support the concept of continuous selection pressure for
the emergence and spread of fluoroquinolone resistance not
only in Asia but also in many other parts of the world. Efforts
should be made to elucidate and alleviate the factors behind
this selection pressure. 
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Dual Infection by 
Dengue Virus and 
Shigella sonnei in 
Patient Returning 
from India
To the Editor: Two days after
returning from a 4-week trip in India,
a 44-year-old woman was admitted to
a local French hospital with diarrhea
and a fever (40°C). The fever had
started 2 days before her return and
was associated with myalgia and
backache. The patient had not been
vaccinated against yellow fever and
did not take malaria prophylaxis dur-
ing her trip. Blood smears were nega-
tive for malaria parasites. Biological
analyses (complete blood count, liver
enzymes, urine culture, stool culture,
blood cultures) were ordered. She was
sent home with an empirical treatment
with ofloxacin (200 mg per day). Bio-
logical parameters were within the
normal range, except for her platelet
count, which was at the lower limit
(170 G/L). Microbiologic analyses of
stools yielded an isolate of Shigella
sonnei serotype 9. 
One week later, the patient was
admitted to the infectious diseases unit
of a university hospital in Marseilles,
France, with persistent fever, myal-
gia, and a 7-kg weight loss; she had no
digestive manifestations. Results of
viral serology tests were negative,
except that immunoglobulin (Ig)M,
but not IgG, specific for dengue virus
(formal name: Dengue virus;
[DENV]) was present. This result was
obtained with the Dengue Virus IgM
and IgG Rapid Immunochromato-
graphic Card Test (Biotrin, PanBio
Pty. Ltd., Brisbane, Australia) and was
confirmed by the Dengue Duo IgM-
capture and IgG-capture enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
(PanBio) and a previously described
in-house IgM antibody capture ELISA
tests (1). Forty days later, a second
serum specimen was collected and
tested positive for DENV IgG with the
persistence of IgM by three tech-
niques. In light of these results, the
diagnosis of primary dengue infection
was established, according to criteria
of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (2). A literature review did
not find any documented case of coin-
fection by DENV and Shigella. 
In India, DENV causes epidemic
and sporadic cases year-round, with a
peak in frequency from August to
November, during the humid season
(3). During the patient’s trip, she suc-
cessively visited Mumbai (Bombay);
went north to the Shimla district, Him-
achal Pradesh, the Agra district, and
Uttar Pradesh; and came back to Bom-
bay 3 days before leaving for France.
If one assumes a 3- to 6-day incuba-
tion period, she likely acquired the
dengue infection in Uttar Pradesh; the
virus has been reported to circulate in
this area (4).
Although severe forms are
increasingly reported, most cases of
dengue fever consist of a mild illness
with nonspecific symptoms such as
headache, myalgia, and malaise. Den-
gue fever may go underdiagnosed in
travelers returning from DENV-
endemic areas. This case underlines
the importance of a thorough inter-
view and clinical examination to
detect characteristic signs (photopho-
bia, painful ocular mobilization, skin
rash) in patients returning from areas
endemic for dengue fever, when clini-
cal and biological signs incompletely
correlate with the primary diagnosis.
Since dengue fever is the second most
frequent cause of febrile illness in per-
sons returning from tropical areas,
such patients should be routinely
screened for the disease.
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St. Louis 
Encephalitis 
in Argentina: The 
First Case Reported 
in the Last 
Seventeen Years
To the Editor: St. Louis encepha-
litis is a mosquito-borne viral disease
that affects humans. The causative
agent, SLEV (formal name: Saint
Louis encephalitis virus), is a member
of the Flaviviridae family. Severity of
the clinical syndromes increases with
age, and persons >60 years old have
the highest frequency of encephalitis.
The primary transmission cycle
involves wild passeriform and colum-
biform birds, and Culex sp. mosqui-
toes (1). In Argentina, an urban cycle
may involve Cx. quinquefasciatus,
which is a source of a viral isolate, and
abundant birds (house sparrows,
doves, or chickens) (2). The distribu-
tion of SLEV in Argentina is wide;
seroprevalence ranges from 3% toLETTERS
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50% of the country’s population (3).
Spinsanti et al. reported results of a
serologic screening in persons ages 0–
87 years who live in the city of Cór-
doba; antibodies were most frequently
found in persons >60 years of age (4).
However, cases of St. Louis encephali-
tis reported in Argentina are very rare.
Two cases with serologic diagnosis
were reported in 1964 and 1968,
respectively (2). In 1971, two more
cases were diagnosed on the basis of
viral isolation (5). Finally, the last case
reported was a patient with menin-
goencephalitis diagnosed in the prov-
ince of Buenos Aires by hemaggluti-
nation inhibition assay (6). Herein, we
report a case of Saint Louis encephali-
tis that occurred in the province of
Córdoba, Argentina.
A 61-year-old man was admitted
to the hospital in February 2002, com-
plaining of headache, fever, and diplo-
pia. He had been well until 3 months
before admission, when ophthalmic
herpes zoster was diagnosed. He
underwent therapy with oral acyclovir
and had a good clinical outcome. Ten
days before admission, he developed
unstable gait with misbalance and
hand tremors, mainly at his left side.
On admission, he had occipital head-
ache, diplopia, and nausea and vomit-
ing associated with high fever and
chills. Somnolence appeared a few
hours before the consultation.
The patient was a right-handed
businessman, a native of Córdoba. He
was married and had no risk factors
for sexually transmitted diseases. He
had not traveled inside or outside the
country during the last year. He lived
near a river with a high-density popu-
lation of mosquitoes.
Vital signs on admission showed
axillary temperature of 39°C, pulse of
90 beats per minute, respiratory fre-
quency of 20 per minute, and blood
pressure of 110/70 mmHg. Physical
examination demonstrated a somno-
lent patient who was easily aroused
and oriented. His speech was slurred.
Results of a fundoscopic examination
appeared normal. Results of a cranial-
nerve examination showed horizontal
left diplopia with left sixth nerve pare-
sia. A resting, postural, and intentional
hand tremor was evident. Motor
strength was 5/5 throughout with nor-
mal bulk and tone, tendon reflexes,
and coordination. Examination of sen-
sitivity showed no abnormalities. A
slight neck rigidity was detected.
Routine laboratory analysis was
unremarkable, and results of serologic
tests for coxsackie virus, echovirus,
and HIV were negative. HIV-1 RNA
by polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
and p24 antigen were also negative.
Cerebrospinal fluid study revealed a
leukocyte count of 18/mm3 (80% lym-
phocytes), a glucose level of 48 mg/
dL, and a protein level of 87 mg/dL.
Cryptococcal antigen, antibodies for
syphilis, Human herpesvirus 1 and 2,
and PCR for varicella-zoster virus 1
and Human herpesvirus  were also
negative. Results of an electroenceph-
alogram and a chest radiograph were
normal. Therapy with intravenous
acyclovir was initiated. A magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the
brain showed a striking signal change
on T2 in the substantia nigra of the
midbrain, mainly at the right side.
The patient continued febrile,
diplopia disappeared, and meningeal
signs progressed with frank cervical
stiffness, positive Kerning sign, and
photophobia. Diffuse tremulousness
and axial rigidity appeared. Upper
extremities showed rigidity with cog-
wheel phenomenon. Conversely,
lower extremities showed spasticity
with bilateral Babinski sign. Tendon
reflexes became enhanced. His gait
showed retropulsion with wide base
sustentation. Dysdiadochokinesia ap-
peared. On the third day, a new lumbar
puncture showed worse results: a leu-
kocyte count of 210/mm3 (82% lym-
phocytes), a glucose level of 51 mg/
dL, and a protein level of 106 mg/dL.
Another electroencephalographic
examination showed unspecific cen-
troparietal disorganization with right
side predominance. Intravenous acy-
clovir was stopped. On the 5th day, the
patient began to recover; he was dis-
charged on the 10th day. After 3
months of follow-up, only left arm
rigidity and a left hand tremor per-
sisted.
Acute- and convalescent-phase
serum samples (taken 10 and 16 days
after onset of illness, respectively)
were sent to the Arbovirus and
Arenavirus Disease Laboratory, Insti-
tuto de Virología, Córdoba. SLEV
immunoglobulin (Ig) M antibodies
were positive by indirect immunofluo-
rescence assay (IFA). Seroconversion
for IgG antibodies was demonstrated
by IFA (7) and hemagglutination inhi-
bition assay, with titers of 640 and 80
in the first sample and 2,560 and 320
in the second sample. These results
were confirmed by neutralization test
using the reduction of plates technique
in Vero cells culture, as described (8).
Eastern equine encephalomyelitis
virus and Western equine encephalo-
myelitis viruses with known circula-
tion in Argentina were included in the
assay with negative results (3). An
increase in antibodies titers between
acute- (320) and convalescent-phase
(1,280) samples was found only for
SLEV. Among other flaviviruses, den-
gue, yellow fever, and Ilhéus circulate
only in subtropical areas of Argentina
(the province of Córdoba is not
included in this area); only dengue
virus was investigated (by neutraliza-
tion test) because of a current epide-
miologic surveillance program; results
were negative. No evidence that West
Nile virus is currently circulating or
has entered Argentina was found, so
we did not perform tests to detect it
(2,9). Isolation of SLEV from the
cerebrospinal fluid and blood was
attempted in newborn mice and Vero
cell cultures with negative results.
While the typical clinical manifes-
tations of viral encephalitis (fever,
headache, and altered level of con-
sciousness) are indistinguishable from
each other, tremor and other extrapy-
ramidal signs are described in St.
Louis encephalitis and Japanese
encephalitis (10). The typical MRI
finding of patients with St. Louis
encephalitis is localized in the sub-
stantia nigra (11). Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 273
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In summary, the occurrence of St.
Louis encephalitis in a 61-year-old
patient, after >10 years of no reports
in Argentina, along with specific epi-
demiology, suggest that further studies
are needed to assess the risk for
human infection by SLEV in Argen-
tina and the role of several mosquito
species in its transmission.
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Streptomyces 
bikiniensis 
Bacteremia
To the Editor: Carey et al.
recently reported in this journal a case
of catheter-related bacteremia attrib-
uted to Streptomyces in a patient
receiving holistic infusions (1). We
describe the isolation of Streptomyces
bikiniensis from multiple blood cul-
tures in a single patient over the
course of 1 week, further illustrating
that Streptomyces is pathogenic and a
cause of bacteremia even in the
absence of overt clinical symptoms
and risk factors.
A 14-year-old girl with osteosar-
coma of the right proximal tibia came
to our hospital 13 months after diag-
nosis for her final course of chemo-
therapy. At the time of diagnosis, a
double-lumen central venous catheter
was inserted. Her course was compli-
cated by poor response to chemother-
apy, and a limb salvage procedure was
performed 3 months after diagnosis.
The proximal tibia was replaced with
a cadaveric bone graft. Several hours
after the patient received methotrex-
ate, a fever of 39.2°C developed. No
sign of infection was observed on
physical examination. Her leukocyte
count was 6,300 cells/mm3 with an
absolute neutrophil count of 4,914
cells/mm3. She received a single dose
of acetaminophen and was without
fever for the remainder of her hospi-
talization. A blood culture obtained
from the central venous catheter at the
time of fever grew Streptomyces.
Repeat blood cultures obtained from
both ports of the central venous cathe-
ter on day 3 and a peripheral blood
culture obtained on day 4 also grew
Streptomyces. Treatment with vanco-
mycin and cotrimoxazole was started
on day 4 in the hospital. The Strepto-
myces isolate was susceptible to van-
comycin, amikacin, cotrimoxazole,
erythromycin, cephazolin, and tetracy-
cline and was resistant to ampicillin,
penicillin, oxacillin, and clindamycin.
A blood culture drawn from the cen-
tral venous catheter on day 3 of antibi-
otic therapy (the 6th day in the
hospital) grew Streptomyces after 9
days of incubation. All subsequent
blood cultures were without growth.
The central venous catheter was
removed, and the patient received van-
comycin intravenously for 6 weeks,
without recurrence of Streptomyces
bacteremia.
The bone graft was considered a
potential source of infection. As most
cases of disease from Streptomyces
occur in the tropics, we requested
information on whether the donor
traveled or resided outside the United
States. However, the donor had no his-
tory of travel outside the United
States. All cultures taken from the
donor and the graft were without
growth (although this did not exclude
the graft as the source of infection),LETTERS
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and no reports of disease transmission
were received from any other recipi-
ents of organs from this donor. In
addition, the patient had no history of
receiving infusions of holistic or alter-
native medicines.
The organism was initially
detected in the aerobic Bact/Alert
blood culture system (bioMérieux,
Inc., Durham, NC) after 72 h incuba-
tion at 35°C. Presumptive identifica-
tion of the pleomorphic gram-positive
bacillus as Streptomyces sp. was based
on phenotypic characterization by
using standard conventional tests and
cellular fatty acid analysis. Species
identification was determined by
DNA sequencing of the 16S rRNA
gene. DNA sequencing reactions were
performed with the Tag Dye Deoxy
Terminator Cycle Sequencing Kit
(Applied Biosystems, Inc., Foster
City, CA), and data were generated
with an ABI 377 automated instru-
ment. The sequence data were assem-
bled, edited, and compared with
published sequences for the 16S
rRNA gene of S. bikiniensis (2).
The genus Streptomyces belongs to
the order Actinomycetales, which
includes  Mycobacterium,  Nocardia,
and  Actinomyces.  Streptomyces  are
gram-positive, extensively branched,
filamentous bacteria that form aerial
hyphae with chains of spores. Their
natural habitat is soil, and each species
has a defined geographic distribution.
None are common in the United
States. With the exception of speci-
mens from actinomycotic mycetoma,
the isolation of Streptomyces from
clinical specimens frequently is con-
sidered laboratory contamination (3).
Rare cases of clinical disease attrib-
uted to Streptomyces have been pub-
lished, including bloodstream
infection (1,4) and focal invasive
infections (5–9). Streptomyces was not
the only potential pathogen isolated
from some of the clinical specimens in
these studies. 
Scant data are available on effec-
tive treatment of Streptomyces infec-
tion. Mycetoma caused by Strep-
tomyces is often treated with penicillin,
sulfonamides, or tetracycline; how-
ever, the cure rate is low. The recom-
mended duration of therapy is lengthy
(up to 10 months). Isolates of S. gri-
seus referred to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention were fre-
quently resistant to ampicillin (80%),
sulfamethoxazole (43%), cotrimox-
azole (29%), and ciprofloxacin (57%)
(10). Resistance to doxycycline (19%)
and minocycline (10%) was lower.
Vancomycin susceptibility was not
tested. Resistance patterns must be
interpreted cautiously because Strepto-
myces can synthesize antibiotics,
potentially confounding results of in-
vitro susceptibility testing. 
The patient described in this report
had no signs or symptoms of infection.
The transient fever that prompted the
first blood culture was probably due to
the methotrexate infusion and not
infection with S. bikiniensis. That the
fever was of short duration despite
persistently positive blood cultures
supports this conclusion. The potential
for causing minimal symptoms may
contribute to assignment of Streptomy-
ces as a contaminant. Clinical correla-
tion is difficult if the infection is
silent.  Streptomyces isolated from
blood cultures should not be dismissed
as contaminants without careful con-
sideration of the clinical situation; the
isolation of Streptomyces from repeat
blood cultures strongly suggests a
pathogenic role. 
William J. Moss,* Jason A. Sager,* 
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*Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore,
Maryland
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Drug-Resistant 
Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis among 
New Tuberculosis 
Patients, Yangon, 
Myanmar
To the Editor: Spread of drug-
resistant tuberculosis (TB) and disas-
trous rates of HIV-TB co-infection
pose serious threats to TB-control pro-
grams around the world (1). The
World Health Organization/Interna-
tional Union Against Tuberculosis and
Lung Diseases urges all national TB
programs to practice the Directly
Observed Treatment-Short Course
(DOTS) strategy as well as to closely
monitor the patterns and trends of
anti-TB drug resistance (2). Such data
allow an assessment of the quality of
TB control, help forecast future trendsEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 275
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of drug-resistance, and serve  as
guidelines for suitable therapy. 
In 1997 the national TB programs
of Myanmar introduced DOTS in the
capital city, Yangon, which has
approximately 5 million inhabitants.
All new case-patients in national TB
program clinics are routinely treated
with isoniazid, rifampicin, ethambu-
tol, and pyrazinamide without drug
susceptibility testing of Mycobacte-
rium tuberculosis. However, isolates
from previously treated patients are
frequently tested for drug susceptibil-
ity, and treatment is guided by the
results. Myanmar is one of the 22
countries that account for 80% of the
world’s new TB cases (3), yet little is
known about drug-resistant TB in that
country. We report on the pattern of
drug resistance to first-line anti-TB
drugs among M. tuberculosis com-
plex isolates from Zone 1 TB center in
Yangon, which receives approxi-
mately 70% of the national TB pro-
grams’ TB cases in Yangon. Of the
864 patients who attended this center
in July 2000, a total of 202 were diag-
nosed as having pulmonary TB on the
basis of medical history, clinical signs,
two smear-positive sputum samples,
and chest x-ray, if necessary. Approxi-
mately half of these cases were new
pulmonary TB patients, i.e. smear-
positive patients who had never been
treated previously. Sputum specimens
from 72 consecutive, new pulmonary
TB case-patients were injected on
Ogawa medium according to standard
procedure (2); samples from 68
patients (94%) were culture-positive.
Isolates from 17 patients were lost for
further study because of bacterial con-
tamination and failure to grow on sub-
culture. Thus, isolates from 51
patients were available for the current
investigation. By using the AccuProbe
Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex
test (Gen-Probe, San Diego, CA), all
isolates were found to belong to the M.
tuberculosis complex. Testing of iso-
lates for susceptibility to isoniazid,
rifampicin, ethambutol, and strepto-
mycin was performed by using the
standard Mycobacteria Growth Indi-
cator Tube manual system, as recom-
mended by the manufacturer (Becton
Dickinson, Sparks, MD). The Wayne
assay (4), which measures the activity
of pyrazinamidase, was used for
pyrazinamide susceptibility testing.
This assay was performed according
to World Health Organization guide-
lines for speciation within the M.
tuberculosis  complex (5). Eighteen
isolates (35%) were resistant to any
one of the five anti-TB drugs. Thirteen
isolates (26%) were resistant to iso-
niazid, nine isolates (18%) to strepto-
mycin, four isolates (8%) to
ethambutol, one isolate (2%) to
rifampicin, and one isolate (2%) to
pyrazinamide. Only one isolate (2.0%)
was multidrug resistant (MDR)-M.
tuberculosis, i.e., resistant to both iso-
niazid and rifampicin. 
The World Health Organization/
International Union Against Tubercu-
losis and Lung Diseases global survey
in the year 2000 (6) showed that the
prevalence of resistance to at least one
anti-TB drug (isoniazid, rifampicin,
ethambutol, and streptomycin) among
new cases ranged from 1.7% to
36.9%. In our study, 33.3% of the iso-
lates from new pulmonary TB patients
were resistant to at least one of these
drugs. The finding shows that a rela-
tively high frequency of drug resis-
tance exists among our patients. If
pyrazinamide is included in the calcu-
lation, the proportion of drug resis-
tance among our patients is 35.3%. In
1994, Ti et al. reported that MDR-TB
represented 1.25% of the isolates from
400 patients with newly diagnosed
pulmonary TB who attended the Zone
1 TB center (7). When one considers
the corresponding figure of 2.0% in
the current material, frequency of
MDR-TB in Yangon does not seem to
have changed dramatically during the
period 1994–2000. MDR-TB among
new patients appears to be less com-
mon in Yangon than in big cities in
Thailand (4.2%) (8) and in China
(4.5%) (6). However, a substantial
number of our isolates (15.7%) were
resistant to two or more anti-TB drugs,
in most cases to both isoniazid and
streptomycin (9.8%). In the 1994
report by Ti et al., mono-resistance to
streptomycin (6.5%) or isoniazid
(5.8%) predominated, and 2.0% of the
isolates were resistant to both iso-
niazid and streptomycin (7). Our
present results, therefore, indicate that
drug resistance is an imminent threat
to TB-control efforts in Yangon,
although MDR-TB still seems to be
relatively rare. 
The low number of MDR cases in
our study could partly be explained by
demographic features of the studied
population, which is composed pre-
dominately of people residing in satel-
lite townships of Yangon. These
townships usually attract young peo-
ple who immigrate to Yangon from
village areas. These immigrants are
less likely to have previous exposure
to TB than the permanent population
since the prevalence of TB infection is
lower in rural than in urban areas (9).
Moreover, population densities of the
satellite townships are 2- to 10-fold
lower than in inner Yangon city
(Myanmar Central Statistical Organi-
zation). The high number of drug-
resistance cases among our patients
with newly detected TB could be
explained by an undisclosed past
exposure to anti-TB drugs. The case
detection rate reported by the Myan-
mar national TB programs is 48% (3),
suggesting that many TB patients
receive their treatment elsewhere. A
World Health Organization report (10)
indicates that >80% of the health-care
expenditure in Myanmar and other
Asian countries such as India, Viet-
nam, and Cambodia is spent in the pri-
vate sector. In such countries, poor
treatment practices in the private sec-
tor may lessen the impact of the
DOTS implemented by national TB
programs and contribute to a growing
incidence of drug-resistant TB. This
problem will undoubtedly be escalated
by the availability  of anti-TB drugs
without prescription. HIV-TB co-
infection often results in increased fre-
quency of adverse drug effects, which
may reduce compliance and increase
induction of drug resistance. AlthoughLETTERS
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the prevalence of HIV positivity
among our patients is unknown, a pre-
liminary study from Yangon shows
that the prevalence of drug-resistant
TB among HIV-seropositive and -
seronegative patients is the same
(pers. comm., Myanmar national TB
programs]. To our knowledge, this
report is the first to describe drug-
resistant patterns in M. tuberculosis
isolates from Myanmar.
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Pneumocystis 
carinii vs. 
Pneumocystis 
jiroveci: Another 
Misnomer 
(Response to 
Stringer et al.)
To the Editor: The proposal by
Stringer et al. to change the name of
Pneumocystis carinii found in humans
to Pneumocystis jiroveci requires criti-
cal consideration (1). First, their ratio-
nale for the choice of Jírovec is not
compelling. Principle III of the Inter-
national Code of Botanical Nomencla-
ture (ICBN) states: “the nomenclature
of a taxonomic group is based upon
priority of publication” (2). Jírovec’s
publication in 1952 was not the first to
report  P. carinii infection in human
lungs. In 1942, two Dutch investiga-
tors, van der Meer and Brug,
described  P. carinii as the infecting
organism in a 3-month-old infant with
congenital heart disease and in 2 of
104 autopsy cases (a 4-month-old
infant and a 21-year-old adult) (3).
Their description, photomicrographs,
and drawings of P. carinii are
unequivocal. They also described the
typical “honeycomb” patterns in alve-
oli. In 1951, Dr. Josef Vanek at Karls-
Universität in Praha, Czechoslovakia,
reported his study of lung sections
from 16 children with interstitial
pneumonia and demonstrated that the
disease was caused by P. carinii (4).
Vanek notes in his report, “In man the
parasite was for the first time estab-
lished as a cause of pneumonia in a
child by G. Meer and S. L. Brug
(1942).” In 1952, Jírovec reported P.
carinii as the cause of interstitial plas-
macellular pneumonia in neonates (5).
A year later, in a coauthored publica-
tion, Vanek, Jírovec, and J. Lukes
acknowledged and referenced the ear-
lier reports of van der Meer and Brug
and Vanek (6). If principle III is to be
followed, as well as fairness to the
investigators, both van der Meer and
Brug and Vanek hold priority over
Jírovec, assuming the designation of
the species name should be based on
the name of the first person to dis-
cover P. carinii in humans.
The nomenclature of P. carinii has
actually been fraught with errors from
the beginning. In the earliest publica-
tions, Carlos Chagas and Antonio Car-
ini mistook the organism for stages in
the life cycle of trypanosomes. Chagas
placed it in a new genus, Schizotry-
panum (7,8). In 1912, Delanoë and
Delanoë at the Pasteur Institute in
Paris published the first description of
the organism as a new entity unrelated
to trypanosomes (9). They proposed
the name “Pneumocystis carinii” as a
tribute to Carini. The Delanoë paper
has remained unchallenged as the
original description of P. carinii. Both
Chagas and Carini later acknowledged
their errors and the validity of the Del-
anoës’ conclusion. By current ICBN
principles,  P. carinii is acceptable
nomenclature because the authors of
the first publication proposed the
name of Carini, rather than their own.
In addition, changing the name to
P. jiroveci will create confusion in
clinical medicine where the name P.
carinii has served physicians and
microbiologists well for over half aEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 277
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century. I was moved to write this let-
ter because of a call from a knowl-
edgeable oncologist asking for
information on “the new strain of P.
carinii that has just been reported
from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention,” referring to the
report by Stringer et al (1).
AIDS patients are well informed
about P. carinii pneumonia and avidly
monitor medical news about their dis-
ease. Without doubt, the name change
will cause confusion and undue anxi-
ety among the many thousands of
HIV-infected patients who attend clin-
ics. Health-care workers will have an
added burden of explaining why the
name was changed, but the organism
and infection are unchanged. Also,
versions of the pronunciation of
jiroveci (yee row vet zee) by Ameri-
can patients, physicians, and health-
care workers will be interesting to
hear.
The tone of the article by Stringer
et al. implies that the change of P. car-
inii to P. jiroveci is final, which is not
the case. The nomenclature of fungi is
governed by ICBN under the auspices
of the International Botanical Con-
gress and is not based solely on
molecular genetics. Neither P. carinii
nor P. jiroveci have been submitted for
ICBN scrutiny. In another paper,
Stringer et al. outline the mechanics
for submission, but indicate that no
application has been submitted for
their proposal (10). In fact, P. carinii
has not been acknowledged as a fun-
gus by ICBN or any other authorita-
tive taxonomic system. Only when
nomenclature is registered in ICBN,
can a name be referred to as “formally
accepted.” In the meantime, the work-
able terminology proposed earlier by
Stringer et al. in 1994 (11) will suffice
for clinical use.
Walter T. Hughes*
*St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital,
Memphis, Tennessee, USA
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A New Name 
(Pneumocystis 
jiroveci) for 
Pneumocystis from 
Humans (Response 
to Hughes)
Reply to W.T. Hughes: We appre-
ciate Dr. Hughes’ letter of concern
regarding our article endorsing the
name Pneumocystis jiroveci (1). When
working with well-known disease
agents and syndromes, these types of
changes are more difficult to adopt
because of the effect they have on
daily communication, patient care,
record keeping, and other important
routines of health-care providers.
However, in this case, new informa-
tion and understanding dictate that a
change be made.
For some time, scientists have
known that humans are infected by a
particular species of Pneumocystis and
that this species does not infect other
host species. In recognition of these
facts, Frenkel named the human
pathogen Pneumocystis jiroveci, using
the procedure prescribed by the Inter-
national Code of Botanical Nomencla-
ture (ICBN) (2). Although Dr. Hughes
raised a number of issues, none justi-
fies rejecting the new, valid name. 
Dr. Hughes suggested that the
name  P. jiroveci is incorrect on the
basis of principal III of ICBN, which
holds that “the nomenclature of a tax-
onomic group is based upon priority
of publication.” He indicated that
Jírovec was not the first investigator to
report  Pneumocystis in humans.
Although this situation may be the
case, principal III has not been vio-
lated because “priority of publica-
tion” refers to the time when a name is
validly published, not to the time
when an organism is first described.
The name P. jiroveci was validly pub-
lished in 1999, and this name therefore
has priority. To be valid, all of the fol-
lowing steps must be completed: aLETTERS
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name must be published in a scientific
journal, the name must be a binary
Latin name, the organism must be
described in Latin, the rank of the
organism must be indicated, and the
new species must be called by the
term “typus or holotypus,”and the
specimen or microscope slides must
be placed in a public holding (details
are available from: URL: http://
www.bgbm.fu-berlin.de/iapt/nomen-
clature/code/SaintLouis/0000St.Luis-
title.htm). Dr. Frenkel was the first to
fulfill these requirements in his 1999
publication (2).
The 1912 publication by Delanoë
and Delanoë does not have priority in
naming  Pneumocystis from humans
because the organism studied by the
Delanoës was from the rat. The rat-
derived  Pneumocystis organism con-
tinues to be known as P. carinii, in
keeping with principal III. As an addi-
tional historical note, Dr. Frenkel was
the first investigator to understand the
clear differences between human and
rat-derived Pneumocystis, which were
described in a landmark publication in
1976 (3). He proposed a change in
nomenclature in which the name
Pneumocystis jiroveci n. sp. applied to
the human organisms and Pneumocys-
tis carinii was retained for the rat
organism. However, Frenkel did not
attempt to follow ICBN  procedures
because at the time Pneumocystis was
thought to be a protozoan. Neverthe-
less, this early paper established the
idea of naming human Pneumocystis,
P. jiroveci.
Dr. Hughes stated a concern over
the possibility that the name change
may cause “confusion and undue anxi-
ety among the many thousands of
HIV-infected patients who attend clin-
ics.” Such concern is understandable.
However, patients will have guidance
in understanding the significance of
the name change. Health-care provid-
ers will allay any fears that might be
elicited by the application of the new
name. The level of anxiety experi-
enced by persons at risk of acquiring
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
(PCP) is more likely to decline than to
increase. People may be relieved to
learn that they are not going to catch
PCP from a pet, for example. 
Dr. Hughes suggested that the
name P. jiroveci is unofficial because
it has not yet been sanctioned by a
body of experts that scrutinizes pro-
posed name changes and has the
power to either accept or reject them.
This situation is not the case. The pro-
cess by which new names are vali-
dated does not directly involve a body
of experts. The International Botanical
Congress does not evaluate names.
Instead, the congress has established
ICBN, which sets forth the procedures
authors must follow to publish a valid
new name. The scientific basis for the
new name is included in the publica-
tion. In the case of P. jiroveci, abun-
dant evidence shows that P. carinii
and  P. jíroveci are different species.
This evidence, which also indicates
that the genus Pneumocystis contains
many additional species, has been
reviewed extensively (4,5). Dr.
Hughes gave the impression that that
this evidence is exclusively molecular
genetic data. In fact, the molecular
genetic evidence is mirrored by clear
biologic differences, the most dra-
matic being host species specificity. 
As our knowledge of the biology
and genetics of disease-causing micro-
organisms grows, openness to changes
in the taxonomy and classification is
needed. Given the impact such
changes can have outside of the realm
of basic science, the decision to accept
the proposed changes in the nomen-
clature used for Pneumocystis has not
been made frivolously. This decision
is the result of a long and deliberate
process that began almost 10 years
ago, when data demonstrating that dif-
ferent mammalian hosts harbor differ-
ent  Pneumocystis species first began
to appear. In 1994 and 2001, nomen-
clature issues were discussed at inter-
national meetings of the Pneumocystis
community, with both physicians and
research investigators present. In
1994, the data supporting new species
were relatively limited. Consequently,
a provisional tripartite nomenclature
was adopted in lieu of recognizing
new species (6). By 2001, however,
the existence of multiple species and
the necessity of assigning new species
names were accepted by consensus.
Because Frenkel had already pub-
lished the name P. jiroveci, the suit-
ability and validity of this name were
also discussed. The new name was
approved by consensus (4). We recog-
nize that the results of these meetings
do not necessarily reflect all opinions
on the matter of Pneumocystis nomen-
clature, but we know of no better way
to assess the majority opinion.
In endorsing the name Pneu-
mocystis jiroveci, we hope to foster
scientific understanding and commu-
nication. The tripartite name formerly
used to denote the distinctness of this
organism is not only cumbersome, it is
inadequate because its meaning is not
apparent and must be defined every
time it is used. The arcane nature of
the tripartite name tended to deprive
the broad audience of persons inter-
ested in PCP of vital information,
namely, a unique  species of Pneu-
mocyctis infects humans. By contrast,
the new species name clearly states
the uniqueness of P. jiroveci; a distinc-
tion is needed when assessing the sig-
nificance of findings obtained by
studies on other members of the
genus.  Recognition of this uniqueness
will undoubtedly stimulate more
research on this species. Communica-
tion will best be served by uniformity
in nomenclature.
Frenkel has assigned a valid name
to the Pneumocystis species found in
humans. Ignoring this name on the
grounds of inconvenience is not only
unjustified, it is impractical. If names
published in accordance with ICBN
are not accepted, the field will have no
recognized mechanism for conferring
names, fostering the use of idiosyn-
cratic, inadequate, and misleading
names. Communication and progress
will suffer as a result. Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 279
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Correction, Vol. 9, No. 1
In “Transfusion-Associated Babesiosis after Heart Transplant” by Joseph Z. Lux et al., errors occurred in the text. On page 118, left
column, lines 20–22, the sentence should read “he became symptomatic during the typical 2- to 8-week incubation period for transfusion-
transmitted B. microti infection (7).” 
The corrected text appears online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol8no12/02-0149.htm.BOOK REVIEWS
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Field Epidemiology, 
2nd edition 
Michael B. Gregg, editor
Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, England, 2002
ISBN 0-19-514259-4
Pages: 451 pp
Price: $49.95
Before the first edition of Field
Epidemiology was published in 1996,
no single authoritative textbook or
manual existed for public health epi-
demiologists engaged in active field
investigation and outbreak control.
Those needing preparation or guid-
ance in responding to acute problems
in the community (infectious or nonin-
fectious) were left to read a variety of
disparate materials and exercises
(many from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention [CDC]), learn
on the job, or find a mentor. 
In the current revised and aug-
mented edition of Field Epidemiology,
the first chapter defines field epidemi-
ology as “the constellation of prob-
lems faced by epidemiologists who
are called upon to investigate urgent
public health problems… ” and further
states, “public health epidemiologists
must travel to and work in the field to
solve the problem.” Thus, for those
practicing in this arena, the motivation
is not primarily research oriented but
rather geared to those problems for
which government agencies usually
are given the primary mandates and
responsibilities. I would imagine that
those involved in “nonacute” epidemi-
ology or investigating non-urgent pub-
lic health problems also consider
themselves to be carrying out “field
work” (such as doing a nutritional or
behavioral survey or assessment in the
community) and might object to the
all-inclusive title used for this book.
Perhaps the title of “The Field of
Acute Public Health Epidemiology,”
although awkward, is a better descrip-
tion of the content of this book. 
How will readers of Emerging
Infectious Diseases benefit from such
a book? Clearly this book provides an
excellent primer in basic epidemio-
logic techniques, including discus-
sions of principles and surveillance;
collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and
presenting data; surveys and sam-
pling; even the more advanced topics,
such as confounding, the role of
chance, and the exploration of interac-
tions, are discussed. More importantly,
I believe the many chapters describing
the operational aspects of epidemio-
logic field investigations—including
the legal considerations, special prob-
lems in health-care settings, current
public health laws, and laboratory sup-
port—provide insights into both the
methods and investigational steps for
many of the diseases that eventually
result in publication in journals like
Emerging Infectious Diseases. Thus,
such a book provides readers with a
greater appreciation and understand-
ing for work behind the resulting pub-
lication.
Overall, I find the writing to be
lucid and readable. Moreover, one can
read any chapter independently. A
large number of examples and case
studies are used. For example, before
the reader has progressed more than a
sentence or two into the book, the
authors describe the events that unrav-
eled at the American Legion Conven-
tion in Philadelphia, which led to the
discovery of Legionella pneumophila.
Throughout the book, chapters focus
on practical and real-world situations. 
Over 25 years ago, I started work
in Los Angeles as an epidemiologist in
the Acute Communicable Disease
Control program and later for the Tox-
ics Epidemiology program. This book
would have been worth its “weight in
gold” if it had been available to me as
a novice epidemiologist. Even today,
200–300 outbreaks and investigations
later, I found much to learn, particu-
larly those chapters providing new and
updated information on bioterrorism
preparedness and response and field
investigations of occupational disease
and injury. I especially found intrigu-
ing the chapter on surveillance, which
includes a number of case studies, giv-
ing the reader an appreciation for the
many biases and limitations in analyz-
ing and interpreting incidence and
prevalence data. The book includes an
excellent appendix with current inter-
esting Web sites. Despite the large
number of authors, almost all experts
in their fields (a veritable who’s who
of well-respected and accomplished
epidemiologists), with slightly differ-
ent writing styles, most of the book
flows evenly. Some oddities do appear
now and then, such as the mnemonic
or acronym called “SLACK OFF”
used in the chapter on analysis. This
term is meant to help the investigator
remember to describe the methods and
techniques in an investigation (S is for
Shells, which actually means setting
up tables for analysis at the start of an
investigation). I found the chapter on
sampling lacking in examples, unlike
most chapters in the book. Particularly
well-written and of interest to the
computer and technologically minded
is the chapter by Andy Dean, the
father of Epi Info Software. This
robust freeware product provided by
CDC is one of the best-kept secrets of
epidemiologists,  and researchers in
allied fields can benefit from reading
about this comprehensive database
and statistics software for public
health professions (available from:
URL: http://www.cdc.gov/epiinfo). 
Overall, this comprehensive vol-
ume can be viewed as a “Prolegomena
for any Future Public Health Epidemi-
ology.” I highly recommend it for
those who will be practicing field epi-
demiology and for those who wish to
know more about the application of
epidemiologic methods to acute and
urgent public health problems. 
Marc A. Strassburg*
*University of California and Los Angeles
County Department of Health Services, Los
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Frida Kahlo (1910–1954). 
Self-Portrait with Monkey (1938). 
Oil on masonite, 16″  x 12″
Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, New York, USA
Copyright 2003 Banco de México Diego Rivera & 
Frida Kahlo Museums Trust. Av. Cinco de Mayo No. 2, 
Col. Centro, Del. Cuauhtémoc 06059, México, D.F.
Frida Kahlo was born in Mexico City, the third daughter of a German father and a Spanish
and Native American mother. Her life was marred by physical trauma—from childhood polio
that left her with a limp, to serious injury in 1926, when a bus she was riding collided with a
streetcar. Lifelong pain and its psychological aftermath had a profound effect on her artistic
development (1).
Kahlo was well educated and fiercely independent. A frail girl with a limp, she set out to be
a tomboy, an intellectual, a heartbreaker, and a communist. Relentless physical pain, marital
strife, and emotional rejection marked the course of her life. Her work, which incorporates Mex-
ican folk motifs and particularly the small votive pictures known as retablos, exudes powerful
feeling and is unlike that of any of her contemporary Mexican muralists (2). Characterized by
boundless energy and strength, her paintings represent her passion for meaning and truth, her
feistiness and defiance of limits, her intimate acquaintance with suffering, and finally her poig-
nant acknowledgment of things as they are.
Kahlo’s artistic talent was recognized by the French poet and critic André Breton in 1938,
when he visited Mexico. Breton, who had studied medicine and worked on psychiatric wards
during World War I, was a founder and chief promoter of the surrealist movement. The move-
ment, partly borne of post–World War disillusionment, promoted a “revolution of the mind”
against a civilization that seemed to be lowering human aspirations and proliferating human
misery. Surrealism sought to synthesize humans and their world, eliminating the barriers
between dream and reality, reason and madness, persons and things (3). 
During her early association with Breton in Mexico (which he termed a “naturally surrealist
country”), Kahlo worked alongside the surrealists, yet she denied any connection with them:
“They thought I was a surrealist…but I wasn’t. I never painted dreams, I painted my own reality”
(2). Even if she never espoused surrealist ideology, Kahlo seemed to embody it. She transcended
her physical suffering and delved into untapped emotional depths for universal truth, which she
uncovered and brought to the viewer in raw, brilliant color. In a surrealist manner, Kahlo’s work
was permeated by her tempestuous life and cannot be fully understood apart from it. 
From her vivid self-portrait on the cover of this month’s Emerging Infectious Diseases,
Frida Kahlo casts a pensive but challenging look at a world that denied her the comforts of
health. Like an exotic flower, she embellishes the luscious tropical tableau. Yet, in spite of her
regal demeanor and the scene’s vibrant hues, something is troubling about the picture. Menace
lurks in nature itself, which though seemingly embracing, is not unqualifiedly benign. The enig-
matic presence of the monkey heightens the portrait’s uneasiness. Might it be the devil, as pur-
ported in Kahlo’s native Mexico? Non-human primates are frequent human playmates in the
arts, the circus, and the streets—always amusing, romantic, and mysterious, and sometimes
dark. Might the monkey on Kahlo’s back be the harbinger of ill health? Like her contemporar-
ies, Kahlo knew little of her close phylogenetic kinship with her pet or the extreme caution pre-
scribed by this kinship. The threat signaled by the presence of a primate, be it turbulence in
Kahlo’s life or herpes B viruses in ours, remains uncharted. The monkey on our back is to deci-
pher the zoonotic puzzle of infection that perpetuates suffering and limits the immense capacity
of the human spirit.  
Polyxeni Potter
1. Janson HW, Janson AF. History of art. New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc.; 2001.
2. Lucie-Smith E. Lives of the great 20th century artists. Thames and Hudson; 1999. 
3. André Breton (1896–1966) [cited 2002 December 18]. Available from: 
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Upcoming Infectious 
Disease Conferences
March 17-20, 2003 
27th National Immunization Conference
Chicago, IL
Contact: Suzanne Johson DeLeon 
(404) 639-8225
E-mail: msj1@cdc.gov
Website: http://www.cdc.gov/nip/nic
April 6-8, 2003
Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of 
America (SHEA) Annual Meeting 
Arlington, VA
Contact: SHEA Meetings Dept. 
(856) 423-7222 ext. 350
Website:  www.shea-online.org
May 7, 2003
Certificate of Knowledge in 
Travel Medicine Examination
International Society of 
Travel Medicine Conference
New York, New York
Contact: Brenda Bagwell
E-mail: exam@istm.org
Phone: 770-736-7060
Fax: 770-736-6732
Website: http://www.istm.org
May 7-11, 2003
8th Conference of the International 
Society of Travel Medicine
New York City 
Contact: Lisa Astorga, 
Conference Manager
E-mail: lastorga@talley.com
Website: www.istm.org
May 10-13, 2003
13th European Congress of Clinical 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases 
(ECCMID)
Glasgow UK
Contact: Administrative Secretariat +41 61 
686 77 11
E-mail: info@akm.ch
Website: www.escmid.org/eccmid2003
May 27-30, 2003 
Global Health Council's 
30th Annual Conference
Our Future on Common Ground: 
Health and the Environment
Washington, DC
Website: http://www.globalhealth.org/
May 29-30, 2003
ISC Disease Management Series 
International Conference Surgical
Infections: Prevention and Management
Moscow, Russia
Contact: Dr. Dr. Dmitry Galkin
PO Box 60, Smolensk, 214019, Russia
Tel.: 7 0812 611301/611327
Fax: 7 0812 611294
E-mail: galkin@antibiotic.ru
Website: http://www.antibiotic.ruEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2003 283
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Look in the March issue for the following topics:
Enterovirus 71 Outbreaks, Taiwan: Occurrence and Recognition
Human Metapneumovirus in Severe Respiratory Syncytial Virus Bronchiolitis
Electron Microscopy for Rapid Diagnosis of Emerging Infectious Agents
Reservoir Competence of North American Birds for the 
New York 1999 Strain of West Nile Virus
Emergence of Ceftriaxone-Resistant Salmonella Isolates and Rapid Spread 
of Plasmid-Encoded CMY-2-Like Cephalosporinase
Bartonella henselae in Ixodes ricinus  (acari ixodida) Ticks 
Removed from Humans, Belluno Province
New Lyssavirus Genotype from the Lesser Mouse-Eared Bat (Myotis blythi)
Molecular Detection of Bartonella quintana, B. koehlerae, B. henselae, 
B. clarridgeiae, and Rickettsia felis in Cat Fleas
Amplification of the Sylvatic Cycle of Dengue Virus Type 2 Senegal, 
1999–2000: Entomologic Findings and Epidemiologic Considerations
Persistence of Virus-Reactive Serum Immunoglobulin M Antibody in 
Confirmed West Nile Virus Encephalitis Cases
Upcoming Issue 
For a complete list of articles included in the March issue, and for articles published online 
ahead of print publication, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/upcoming.htmInstructions to Authors
Manuscript Preparation. For word processing, use MS Word. Begin
each of the following sections on a new page and in this order: title page,
keywords, abstract, text, acknowledgments, biographical sketch, refer-
ences, tables, figure legends, appendixes, and figures. Each figure should
be in a separate file. 
Title Page. Give complete information about each author (i.e., full name,
graduate degree(s), affiliation, and the name of the institution in which the
work was done). Clearly identify the corresponding author and provide
that author's mailing address (include phone number, fax number, and e-
mail address). Include separate word counts for abstract and text. 
Keywords. Include up to 10 keywords; use terms listed in Medical Sub-
ject Headings Index Medicus.
Text. Double-space everything, including the title page, abstract, refer-
ences, tables, and figure legends. Printed manuscript should be single-
sided, beginning with the title page. Indent paragraphs; leave no extra
space between paragraphs. After a period, leave only one space before
beginning the next sentence. Use 12-point Times New Roman font and
format with ragged right margins (left align). Italicize (rather than under-
line) scientific names when needed. 
Biographical Sketch. Include a short biographical sketch of the first
author—both authors if only two. Include affiliations and the author's pri-
mary research interests. 
References. Follow Uniform Requirements (www.icmje.org/index.html).
Do not use endnotes for references. Place reference numbers in parenthe-
ses, not superscripts. Number citations in order of appearance (including
in text, figures, and tables). Cite personal communications, unpublished
data, and manuscripts in preparation or submitted for publication in
parentheses in text. Consult List of Journals Indexed in Index Medicus for
accepted journal abbreviations; if a journal is not listed, spell out the jour-
nal title. List the first six authors followed by “et al.” Do not cite refer-
ences in the abstract.
Tables and Figures. Create tables within MS Word’s table tool. Do not
format tables as columns or tabs. Send graphics in native, high-resolution
(200 dpi minimum) .TIF (Tagged Image File), or .EPS (Encapsulated
Postscript) format. Graphics should be in a separate electronic file from
the text file. For graphic files, use Arial font. Convert Macintosh files into
the suggested PC format. Figures, symbols, letters, and numbers should
be large enough to remain legible when reduced. Place figure keys within
the figure. For more information see EID Style Guide (http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/style_guide.htm). 
Manuscript Submission. Include a cover letter indicating the proposed
category of the article (e.g., Research, Dispatch) and verifying that the
final manuscript has been seen and approved by all authors. To submit a
manuscript, access Manuscript Central from the Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases website (www.cdc.gov/eid).
Manuscript Types 
Perspectives. Articles should be under 3,500 words and should include
references, not to exceed 40. Use of subheadings in the main body of the
text is recommended. Photographs and illustrations are encouraged. Pro-
vide a short abstract (150 words) and a brief biographical sketch of first
author. Articles in this section should provide insightful analysis and
commentary about new and reemerging infectious diseases and related
issues. Perspectives may also address factors known to influence the
emergence of diseases, including microbial adaptation and change,
human demographics and behavior, technology and industry, economic
development and land use, international travel and commerce, and the
breakdown of public health measures. If detailed methods are included, a
separate section on experimental procedures should immediately follow
the body of the text. 
Synopses. Articles should be under 3,500 words and should include ref-
erences, not to exceed 40. Use of subheadings in the main body of the
text is recommended. Photographs and illustrations are encouraged. Pro-
vide a short abstract (150 words) and a brief biographical sketch of first
author—both authors if only two. This section comprises concise
reviews of infectious diseases or closely related topics. Preference is
given to reviews of new and emerging diseases; however, timely updates
of other diseases or topics are also welcome. If detailed methods are
included, a separate section on experimental procedures should immedi-
ately follow the body of the text. 
Research Studies. Articles should be under  3,500 words and should
include references, not to exceed 40. Use of subheadings in the main
body of the text is recommended. Photographs and illustrations are
encouraged. Provide a short abstract (150 words) and a brief biographi-
cal sketch of first author—both authors if only two. Report laboratory
and epidemiologic results within a public health perspective. Although
these reports may be written in the style of traditional research articles,
they should explain the value of the research in public health terms and
place the findings in a larger perspective (i.e., "Here is what we found,
and here is what the findings mean").
Policy and Historical Reviews. Articles should be under 3,500 words
and should include references, not to exceed 40. Use of subheadings in
the main body of the text is recommended. Photographs and illustrations
are encouraged. Provide a short abstract (150 words) and a brief bio-
graphical sketch. Articles in this section include public health policy or
historical reports that are based on research and analysis of emerging dis-
ease issues.
Dispatches. Articles should be 1,000–1,500 words and need not be
divided into sections. If subheadings are used, they should be general,
e.g., “The Study” and “Conclusions.” Provide a brief abstract (50 words);
references (not to exceed 15); figures or illustrations (not to exceed two);
and a brief biographical sketch of first author—both authors if only two.
Dispatches are updates on infectious disease trends and research. The
articles include descriptions of new methods for detecting, characterizing,
or subtyping new or reemerging pathogens. Developments in antimicro-
bial drugs, vaccines, or infectious disease prevention or elimination pro-
grams are appropriate. Case reports are also welcome. 
Commentaries. Thoughtful discussions (500–1,000 words) of current
topics. Commentaries may contain references but should not include fig-
ures or tables.
Another Dimension. Thoughtful essays, short stories, or poems on
philosophical issues related to science, medical practice, and human
health. Topics may include science and the human condition, the unan-
ticipated side of epidemic investigations, or how people perceive and
cope with infection and illness. This section is intended to evoke com-
passion for human suffering and to expand the science reader's literary
scope. Manuscripts are selected for publication as much for their content
(the experiences they describe) as for their literary merit.
Letters. This section includes letters that present preliminary data or
comment on published articles. Letters (500–1,000 words) should not be
divided into sections, nor should they contain figures or tables. Refer-
ences (not more than 10) may be included.
Book Reviews. Short reviews (250–500 words) of recently published
books on emerging disease issues are welcome. The name of the book,
publisher, and number of pages should be included.
Announcements. We welcome brief announcements (50–150 words) of
timely events of interest to our readers. (Announcements may be posted
on the journal Web page only, depending on the event date.) 
Conference Summaries. (500–1,000 words) of emerging infectious dis-
ease conferences may provide references to a full report of conference
activities and should focus on the meeting's content rather than on indi-
vidual conference participants.
Editorial Policy and Call for Articles
Emerging Infectious Diseases is a peer-reviewed journal established expressly to promote the recognition of new and reemerging infectious dis-
eases around the world and improve the understanding of factors involved in disease emergence, prevention, and elimination. 
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